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JACK J. STREIBICK, a single man, JACK ) 
STREIBICK as Personal Representative of the ) 
Estate of Maureen F. Streibick, deceased, ) 
CITY OF LEWISTON, a municipal corporation ) 
of the State of Idaho, and its employee, LO\VELL ) 
J. CUTSHAW, City of Lewiston Engineer, and ) 
DOESl 2~ ) 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Latah ) 
John Block, upon oath, deposes and says: 




Case No. CV09-02219 
SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN 
BLOCK 
1. I am over eighteen (18) years of age and make this affidavit upon my personal 
knowledge. 
2. I am a Plaintiff in the within action and am competent to testify to the matters stated 
herein. 
3. I make this my Second Affidavit to supplement my July 13, 2010 Affidavit. 
4. Based on my review of the City's records and its responses to discovery, 
improvements required under SP No. 4 and SP No. 8 other than the 1993 grading permits and the 
public right-of-way subdivision approvals, Streibick's grading and fill activities, drainage 
improvements, detention pond removal and reconstruction activities on 153, 155, and 159 were 
unpermitted and unapproved by the City. 
5. When I purchased Lots 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Amended Administrative Plat of Sunset 
Palisades No. 8 ("SP No. 8") in December 2005 from Defendants Streibick I had knowledge that 
SP No. 8 had been improved by Streibick with public street, water and sewer; I had no 
knowledge and was unaware that other stormwater drainage pipes, previously failed stonnwater 
detention facilities and uncontrolled fill had also been constructed on this site. 
6. The SP No.8 plat was recorded by the City on November 7, 2005. The City 
recorded the Canyon Greens plat approximately three months later on February 15, 2006. 
7. During Streibick' s subdivision of SP No. 8 in 2005, during my subdivision of 
Canyon Greens in 2006, and during my subdivision of Canyon Greens No. 2 in 2006-2007, 
during my efforts to obtain building permits for the lots within Canyon Greens in 2006, and 
during my efforts to obtain building permits for the lots within Canyon Greens No. 2 in 2007-
2008 the City failed to disclose to me its knowledge of the 1999landslide in the vicinity of 153, 
155, and 159. 
SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN BLOCK- 2 
8. The homes I constructed at 153, 155 and 159 were ofhigh quality construction and 
listed for sale near $600,000 each. 
9. In late 2006, I made application to the City to resubdivide the remainder of SP No. 8 
then designated as Lots 1-3, into eight lots, and such resubdivision application was reviewed and 
approved by Cutshaw and by the City as Lots 1 through 8 of Canyon Greens No. 2 to the City of 
Lewiston, a resubdivision of Lots 1, 2 and 3 of Amended Administrative Plat of Sunset Palisades 
No. 8 (collectively "Canyon Greens No. 2") commonly known as 161 Marine View Drive 
("161"), 101 Canyon Greens Court ("101"), 102 Canyon Greens Court ("102"), 103 Canyon 
Greens Court ("103"), 104 Canyon Greens Court ("104"), 105 Canyon Greens Court ("105"), 
106 Canyon Greens Court (" 1 06"), and 107 Canyon Greens Court (" 1 07"). 
10. In part, because the City's review and approval of the Canyon Greens subdivision 
occurred three months after its review and approval of SP No. 8 and the City did not raise any 
major issues with SP No. 8, I assumed that all grading and fill on the Canyon Greens property, 
other than the new storm drain I was required to dedicate, had been properly placed and installed 
under pennit from the City and under its supervision and inspection. 
11. In the spring of2007, I began constructing homes on the Canyon Greens No. 2lots. I 
began with 161, which was completed in fall2007. Additionally, in fall2007, I began 
construction ofhornes on 104 and 107, with 104 being completed in May 2008 and 107 being 
completed in fall 2008. Also in the fall 2008, I began constructing homes on 103 and 105, with 
105 being completed in May 2009 and 103 being sold unfinished in April 2011. I began 
constructing a horne on 1 02 in April 2009 and that horne was completed in April 2011. 
12. I conducted considerable due diligence as part of my efforts to purchase the lots 
within SP No. 8 as well as resubdivide Lot 4 of SP No. 8 in the Canyon Green subdivision and 
SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN BLOCK- 3 
resubdivide Lots 1-3 ofSP No.8 in the Canyon Greens No.2 subdivision. I met and talked with 
City staff regarding the existing and required sewer, water, and drainage systems. I explained to 
the City that I intended to construct three homes on the three newly created lots of Canyon 
Greens. I inquired about easements. In regards to the Canyon Greens subdivision, I attended a 
pre-application meeting with City staff to learn about any issues with the property with the intent 
and understanding that City staff would inform me of any requirements and that City staff would 
bring the relevant files to the meeting. I expected and relied on the City to be prepared and to 
attend the meeting and to follow up with any relevant additional meetings or correspondence. 
The City issued building permits for all lots on Canyon Greens No. 2, and all seven (7) homes I 
constructed, I sold 108 to a builder, were constructed in compliance with all applicable codes, 
including all required compaction testing. 
13. None ofthe information about the landslide or the filling of the 40-foot deep canyon, 
the unengineered drainage system and the unengineered destruction of the detention pond had 
been disclosed to or known to me when I purchased SP No. 8 and developed Canyon Greens and 
Canyon Greens No. 2. 
14. If the City had disclosed its knowledge of the 1999 landslide or provided me copies 
of the documents and photographs describing the 1999 landslide and the severity of such, I may 
have decided not to purchase the property, or may have decided to conduct a geotechnical 
investigation prior to purchasing the property, and may have decided to purchase the property 
and have altered my construction plans to avoid problems with the landslide area. If the City had 
notified or warned me at any time before constructing my homes that a landslide had occurred on 
the site where I was preparing to construct three homes, I could have determined for myself 
whether there was a potential problem. 
SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN BLOCK- 4 
1 5. I purchased 159 from its ovroer in December, 2007 to appease their dissatisfaction. I 
ended up demolishing 153 and 159, the latter after moving the upper level of 155 to 106 at great 
expense. 155 is rented from time to time but is not saleable as the landslide continues to cause 
structural and cosmetic problems. In all, I used $1,000,000 in retirement savings, $500,000 from 
my parent's estate, $300,000 of proceeds from the sale of four of my rental properties, and 
proceeds from the sale of my personal residence to attempt to remedy and resolve the problems 
associated with the landslide. 
The above statements are true and cmTect to the best of my knowledge and belief. 
Dated this day of July, 2011. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this day of July, 2011. 
SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN BLOCK- 5 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certifY that on this fil day of July, 2011, I caused a true and correct copy of this 
document to be served on the following individual in the manner indicated below: 
BRIAN K. JULIAN 
STEPHEN L. ADAMS 
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP 
C. W. MOORE PLAZA 
250 SOUTH FIFTH STREET, SUITE 700 
POST OFFICE BOX 7426 
BOISE, ID1\HO 83707-7426 
CLINTON 0. CASEY 
DANIEL J. SKIJ\TNER 
CANTRILL, SKINNER, SULLIVAN & KING LLP 
1423 TYRELL LANE 
P.O. BOX359 
BOISE, ID 83701 
SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN BLOCK- 6 
[ £;('] U.S. Mail 
[ ] FAX (208) 344-5510 
[ ) Hand Delivery 
[ ] FedEx Overnight Delivery 
[ ] email to sadams@ajhlaw.com 
[ ] email to bjulian@ajhlaw.com 
[ti] U.S. Mail 
[ ] FAX (208) 345-7212 
[ ) Hand Delivery 
[ ] FedEx Overnight Delivery 
[ ] email to CCasey@cssklaw.com 
] email to danskinner@cssklaw.com 
RONALD J. LAN'DECK 
DANELLE C. FORSETH 
LANDECK & FORSETH 
693 Styner A venue, Suite 9 
P.O. Box 9344 
Moscow, ID 83843 
(208) 883-1505 
Landeck ISB No. 3001 
Forseth ISB No. 7124 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Fl 
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JACK J. STREIBICK, a single man, JACK ) 
STREIBICK as Personal Representative of the ) 
Estate of Maureen F. Streibick, deceased, ) 
CITY OF LEWISTON, a municipal corporation ) 
of the State of Idaho, and its employee, LOWELL ) 
J. CUTSHAW, City of Lewiston Engineer, and ) 




STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Nez Perce ) 
Eric Hasenoehrl, upon oath, deposes and says: 
SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF ERIC HASENOEHRL- 1 
Case No. CV09-02219 
SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF 
ERIC HASENOEHRL 
1. I am over eighteen (18) years of age and make this affidavit upon my personal 
knowledge. 
2. I am a licensed civil engineer in the State ofldaho. I am qualified to render the 
testimony and opinions expressed in this affidavit. 
3. I am employed by Keltic Engineering, Inc., an Idaho professional services 
corporation ("Keltic"), as a civil engineer and am a principal of that business and its President. 
4. I make this my Second Affidavit to supplement my July 13, 2010 Affidavit. 
5. Keltic has calculated that the amount of fill placed within a 40-foot canyon prior to 
1995 within SP No.8 to be approximately 63,350 cubic yards. In addition to the 63,350 cubic 
yards of soil placed to fill in the canyon on SP No. 8, between 1995 and 2005, an additional 976 
cubic yards of fill was placed and approximately 564 cubic yards of soil was cut within the area 
presently known as Canyon Greens that the City failed to approve, supervise or inspect. 
6. The latent defects associated with Lot 4 of SP No. 8, including, that approximately 
63,350 cubic yards of uncontrolled fill had been placed on the site, that a landslide had occurred 
on the site, that a storrnwater detention pond had failed on the site, that various concealed 
storrnwater drainage systems existed on the site and contributed water to fill placed on the site, 
were not discoverable by reasonable inspection in the latter half of2005. 
7. The onus to make a geotechnical evaluation ofthe property encompassed by SP No. 
8, cannot be placed by the City on Block, a party who had no knowledge of the 1999landslide, 
had no records within his possession of the 1999 landslide, had no knowledge of the previous 
SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF ERIC HASENOEHRL - 2 
topography and prior 40-foot deep canyon that had been continually filled \Vith uncontrolled 
material and had no knowledge of the previous installations of unengineered drainage features. 
8. In conducting Block's due diligence in regard to developing Canyon Greens, it was 
reasonable for Block to assume that he could rely on the recency of the City's previous approval 
and recordation of SP No. 8 which occurred approximately three months before the City 
approved and recorded Canyon Greens since it was the exact same property at issue, that being 
Lot 4 of SP No. 8. 
The above statements are true and conect to the best of my knowledge and belief. 
Dated this ZIR ..J day of July, 2011. 
Eric Hasenoehrl 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this day of July, 2011. 
SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF ERIC HASENOEHRL - 3 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this %" day of July, 2011, I caused a true and correct copy of this 
document to be served on the following individual in the manner indicated below: 
BRIAN K. JULIAN 
STEPHEN L. ADAMS 
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP 
C. W. MOORE PLAZA 
250 SOUTH FIFTH STREET, SUITE 700 
POST OFFICE BOX 7426 
BOISE, IDAHO 83707-7426 
CLINTON 0. CASEY 
DANIEL J. SKINNER 
CANTRILL, SK.Il\TNER, SULLIVAN & KING LLP 
1423 TYRELL LANE 
P.O. BOX 359 
BOISE, ID 83701 
[~] U.S. Mail 
[ ] FAX (208) 344-5510 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] FedEx Overnight Delivery 
[ ] email to sadarns@ajhlaw.corn 
[ ] email to bjulian@ajhlaw .corn 
[J.(] U.S. Mail 
[ ]FAX(208)345-7212 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] FedEx Overnight Delivery 
[ ] email to CCasey@cssklaw.corn 
( ] email to danskinner@cssklaw.corn 
/l s 
1 tLO- ct \[ca~,__L{. {.'--~ 
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RONALD J. LANDECK 
DANELLE C. FORSETH 
LANDECK & FORSETH 
693 Styner A venue, Suite 9 
P.O. Box 9344 
Moscow, ID 83843 
(208) 883-1505 
Landeck ISB No. 3001 
Forseth ISB No. 7124 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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JACK J. STREIBICK, a single man, JACK ) 
STREIBICK as Personal Representative of the ) 
Estate of Maureen F. Streibick, deceased, ) 
CITY OF LEWISTON, a municipal corporation ) 
ofthe State of Idaho, and its employee, LOWELL) 
J. CUTSHAW, City of Lewiston Engineer, and ) 




STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Latah ) 
Case No. CV09-02219 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN R. 
("HANK") SWIFT 
John R. ("Hank") Swift, upon oath, deposes and says: 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN R. ("HANK") SWIFT- 1 
1. I am over eighteen (18) years of age and make this affidavit upon my personal 
knowledge. 
2. I am a licensed civil engineer in the State of Idaho. I am qualified to render the 
testimony and opinions expressed in this affidavit. 
3. I am employed by HKS Engineers, PLLC, an Idaho professional services limited 
liability company ("HKS"), as a civil engineer and am a principal of that business. 
4. Changes in groundwater and surface water can increase the moisture content and the 
weight of soil and if saturation occurs, the particle interaction may also be adversely impacted, 
lessening the frictional resistance between individual soil particles. In the case of the subject 
properties, the soil moisture content may have been increased due to leaking storm drains. This 
increased moisture content can destabilize sensitive slopes such as those on the subject 
properties. 
5. The City's failure to require a geotechnical evaluation and implement the 
recommendations of that evaluation for earthwork and storm water drainage facilities in an area 
where a known landslide had occurred, the City's failure to supervise and/or inspect 
development that concealed a landslide, the City's failure to require proper abatement of a 
landslide, the City's failure to prevent, restrict or regulate development in the area of a landslide, 
the City's failure to act with ordinary care to protect against the risks of a landslide, and the 
City's failure to warn of a landslide at the time of subdivision of property encompassing such 
landslide area and/or at the time the City issued building permits for the affected property in 
2006 and thereafter, contributed to the instability of the property Block purchased and which 
instability ultimately caused his damage. 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN R. ("HANK") SWIFT- 2 
6. Significant amounts of earthwork (grading and filling) had taken place on what is 
now Block's property before Block's purchase in late 2005 and there are scant, if any, City 
records of such work and because of the City's lack of monitoring and supervision of a 
significant alteration being made to property within a platted subdivision, such work was 
performed without complying with essential code requirements and, therefore, not performed in 
a workmanlike manner which contributed significantly to the later earth movement events. 
The above statements are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. 
Dated this 26th day ofJuly, 2011. 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN R ("HANK") SWIFT- 3 
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Lowell J. Cutshaw, City Engineer 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND 
FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
JOHN G. BLOCK, a single man, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JACK J. STREIBICK, a single man, JACK 
STREIBICK as Personal Representative of the 
Estate of Maureen F. Streibick, deceased, CITY 
OF LEWISTON, a municipal corporation of the 
State of Idaho, and its employee LOWELL J. 
CUTSHAW, City of Lewiston Engineer, and 
DOES 1 20, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV 09-02219 
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
COME NOW, the above-entitled Defendants, City of Lewiston and Lowell J. Cutshaw, 
by and through their attorneys of record, Anderson, Julian & Hull, and hereby submit this Reply 
in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
I. 
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- 1 
INTRODUCTION 
In reply to Plaintiff's voluminous brief, Defendants will attempt to address the issues of 
why summary judgment is appropriate as concisely as possible. Generally, there are a number of 
misstatements and improperly cited references to the record. Plaintiff relies significantly on out-
of-state law to support contentions for which there are Idaho cases directly on point. There is no 
evidence that Defendants assumed a duty, nor was there any duty owed as a matter of law to 
Plaintiff. Even if there a duty did exist, the immunities under the Idaho Tort Claims act apply, 
and the statute of limitations bars Plaintiff's claims. 
Because of the size of Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition (referred to hereinafter as 
"Response"), Defendants will address each issue in the order outlined in Plaintiff addresses it in 
the Response. Throughout this Reply, Sunset Palisades No.4 will be referred to as "SP4", Sunset 
Palisades No. 8 as "SP8", Canyon Greens as "CG", and Canyon Greens No.2 as "CG2" 
II. 
LEGAL ARGUMENT 
A. PLAINTIFF'S MISCHARACTERIZATIONS OF THE FACTS IN THIS CASE DO 
NOT CREATE ISSUES OF FACT THAT PRECLUDE SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
There are a number of mischaracterizations in Plaintiff's statement of facts which 
Defendants believe should be corrected in the record. First, Plaintiff alleges that the City has not 
produced records of fill being placed in Sunset Palisades No. 4. Response, p. 4. As Plaintiff 
points out, the City has produced the records it has with regard to fill placement. Id. Mr. 
Morrison testified that compaction testing was done on that work. Morrison Dep., pp. 25- 26. If 
additional fill was placed without permitting, then the City would not have record of it, and 
obviously could not turn it over during discovery. The City does not and cannot babysit 
developers, who are known, in an effort to save costs, to avoid steps during the development 
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- 2 
process. If the City finds out about such discrepancies, including undocumented fill, it addresses 
them. 
Next, Plaintiff alleges that the Tim Richards memorandum was never placed in the SP8, 
CG, or CG2 files. Response, pp. 5-6. Defendants admit this, but contend that the memo was 
also never taken out of the SP4 file, which is where Plaintiff found it when he finally decided to 
look at the City files. Plaintiff also contends that he "could not have discovered evidence of the 
1999 landslide by simply reviewing the City's files on the lots he purchased." Response, p. 12. 
This is not an assertion that is grounded in fact. Admittedly, the purchase agreement between 
Streibick and Block lists that the purchase was for "Lots 1-4, Sunset Palisades No. 8." Skinner 
Aff., Ex. 3. The purchase agreement was signed August 10, 2005. Id; Complaint, 1 11. The 
Administrative Plat for Sunset Palisades No.8 was recorded on August 18, 2005. Cutshaw Dep., 
Ex. 45. Until that plat was approved and recorded, the property purchased by Plaintiff was 
actually part of SP4, and if Plaintiff had searched any files (which he admits he did not), the 
proper files to have searched would have been the SP4 files. Plaintiff knew that SP8 was a 
resubdivision of SP4, and so it is extremely disingenuous to say that had he searched the 
available files at the time he purchased the property, he would not have found the Tim Richards 
memo. This does not create an issue of fact which precludes the entry of summary judgment. 
Next, Plaintiff argues that "if the City had disclosed its knowledge of the 1999 landslide 
or provided Block copies of the documents and photographs describing the 1999 landslide and 
the severity of such, Block may have forgone purchase of the property." Response, p. 13. This 
assertion does not work temporally. As discussed above, Block entered a contract for purchase of 
the property on August 10, 2005. Skinner Aff., Ex. 3. Block's application to subdivide SP8 into 
CG was filed on December 2, 2005. Cutshaw Dep., Ex. 47. There is no evidence before the 
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- 3 
Court that Mr. Block informed the City in August, 2005 that he was purchasing the property (the 
City certainly isn't listed as a party on the purchase agreement, see Skinner Aff., Ex. 3)), and 
therefore there was no opportunity or reason for the City to inform Block of anything prior to his 
purchase of the property. This allegation is not supported by any evidence, does not create an 
issue of fact, and is not a grounds to avoid the entry of summary judgment. 
B. THE CITY OWED NO DUTY OF CARE TO BLOCK BEFORE HE OWNED THE 
PROPERTY. 
Plaintiff alleges that the City owed a duty of reasonable care to Mr. Block. Response, pp. 
15 - 18. "[D]uty is a question of law to be determined by the court." Summers v. Cambridge 
Joint Sch. Dist. No. 432, 139 Idaho 953, 955 (2004). Contrary to Plaintiff's allegations, in the 
context of a governmental entity, the duty owed to a citizen is limited. In discussing a duty, 
Plaintiff cites Coghlan v. Beta Theta Pi Fraternity, 133 Idaho 388, 399 (1999) (discussing the 
elements to consider when a duty arises). See also Sharp v. W.H. Moore, Inc., 118 Idaho 297, 
300 (1990); Alegria v. Payonk, 101 Idaho 617, 619 (1980). The fact that foreseeability (an 
element of whether a duty arises) is often a question of fact reserved for juries, see Stoddart v. 
Pocatello Sch. Dist. # 25, 149 Idaho 679, 686 (2010), Idaho case law makes it clear that 
summary judgment is still available for governmental entities on the issue of whether a duty 
exists. See Stoddart, 149 Idaho at 687. Further, where the duty imposed upon the governmental 
entity will be excessive, burdensome, and expensive, Courts will not impose such a duty. 
In Summers v. Cambridge ]oint Sch. Dist., 139 Idaho 953 (2004), the Supreme Court 
indicated that the duty owed by a School District to a student was limited to the time that the 
student was in the District's custody. Summers, 139 Idaho at 956. The same logic should be 
applied in this case; the City only owes a duty to Plaintiff related to actions taken while Plaintiff 
owns the property. To extend the City's duty beyond that time frame would impose a duty 
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against the City for every potential owner of the property, creating an almost unlimited and 
debilitating burden upon the City. The Courts only engage in the balancing of the harm outlined 
in Sharp and other cases when "called upon to extend a duty beyond the scope previously 
imposed, or when a duty has not previously been recognized." Rife v. Long, 127 Idaho 841, 846 
(1995). If, in Rife and Summers the Supreme Court found that the burden upon school districts 
would be debilitating if a duty was owed by them to students off school property after school 
hours, see Rife, 127 Idaho at 847, then surely it would be even more debilitating a burden on 
cities to impose a duty owed to every future landowner for an action taken at a given time. 
Therefore Defendants ask that as a matter of law the Court find that no duty was owed to Block 
before he purchased the property. 
In this section, Plaintiff blatantly violates the Idaho Rules of Evidence. Plaintiff states 
"the City has insurance coverage for its liabilities, a factor that also argues for the imposition of 
this duty." Response, p. 18. Regardless of whether availability of insurance is a factor in 
determining whether a duty arises, Plaintiff may not use evidence of insurance to show that a 
person acted negligently. I.R.E. 411. By attempting to use evidence of insurance to establish a 
duty, this is exactly what Plaintiff is doing. Therefore, this evidence and statement should be 
stricken from Plaintiff's briefing. 
C. THERE WAS NO SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BLOCK AND THE 
CITY THAT CREATED A DUTY. 
Next, Plaintiff alleges that the City owed a duty of care to Block because of a special 
relationship between Block and the City. Response, pp. 19 - 22. Plaintiff fails to cite a single 
Idaho case showing that there is a special relationship between a citizen and a City that creates a 
duty. In fact, the opposite is quite true. The Idaho Supreme Court has already found that there is 
no special relationship between a citizen and a governmental agency with regard to inspection of 
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property. See Duffin v. Idaho Crop Improvement Ass'n, 126 Idaho 1002, 1008 (1995) (there 
must be evidence that the governmental entity sought to induce reliance on the part of the citizen 
to create a special relationship). As there is no evidence that the Defendants in any way sought to 
induce Block to rely on them, there is no special relationship, and no duty arising. 
Plaintiff cites only out-of-state cases addressing this issue, which are not applicable to the 
facts of this case. In Rogers v. Toppenish, 23 Wn. App. 554, 555 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979), a 
property owner asked a City employee a specific question with regard to possibility of building 
an apartment on a property, and the City employee incorrectly stated that the property owner 
could do so. This set of facts does not apply to this case. Plaintiff did not specifically ask about 
the history or zoning of the properties. Instead, he filed a subdivision application. There was 
nothing preventing Plaintiff from subdividing SP8 into CG, and thus approving the subdivision 
application is not negligent. Plaintiff never requested specific information, and so the City never 
had a reason to look up specific information. No duty was created. 
The only duty that arose (after Plaintiff purchased the property) was the duty under the 
Lewiston Subdivision Code, and that code did not create any obligation of the City to search its 
existing, publicly available records to determine every potential problem with the property. It did 
not create a duty of the City to uncover every potential problem with the property. It did not 
require the City to mandate that Plaintiff have a geotechnical evaluation (specifically giving the 
City engineer discretion to require such an evaluation). See Lewiston City Code, §§ 32-9, 32-20, 
32-21. There is no evidence that the City did not comply with the requirements of the 
Subidivision Code. Plaintiff's only argument is that, in hindsight, the City should not have let 
him build on the property. However, based on what was actually known at the time, the City 
concluded that both Mr. Streibick and Mr. Block had properly developed the property, and that 
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development could proceed. Neither City Engineer Shawn Stubbers nor Lewiston Building 
Official Smith knew about the landslide, and there was no obligation in the City code for them to 
search the City files to protect Mr. Block against every eventuality. Their decisions were 
appropriate under the circumstances. 
D. THE CITY HAS NOT ASSUMED A DUTY TOWARD BLOCK. 
Plaintiff alleges that the City assumed a duty toward Block. Response, pp. 22 - 23. 
Defendants only admit that there was a duty owed to Block after he purchased the property as 
required by City code, and Defendants argue that they complied with that duty. Beyond that, 
there was no assumption of duty. 
Liability for an assumed duty ... can only come into being to the extent that there 
is in fact an undertaking. Although a person can assume a duty to act on a 
particular occasion, the duty is limited to the discrete episode in which the aid is 
rendered. In other words, past voluntary acts do not entitle the benefited party to 
expect assistance on future occasions, at least in the absence of an express 
promise that future assistance will be forthcoming. 
Udy v. Custer County, 136 Idaho 386, 389-390 (2001). The only facts Plaintiff can point to that 
tend to show the City assumed a duty was a statement by former City Engineer Tim Richard 
made in a newspaper article in 1999. Response, p. 23. Looking at the statement actually made, 
no duty toward Plaintiff was created, and even if a duty was created, there was no breach. The 
comment made in in the 1999 newspaper article, allegedly by Tim Richard, is not even a quote. 
See Cutshaw Dep., Ex. 29. All Tim Richard allegedly said was that the situation would be 
documented (there is no doubt that it was documented in the SP4 file), and addressed in the 
future (there is no doubt that it was, as Block had to go through the subdivision process in 2005, 
and the City complied with the requirements of the City code). Defendants contend that Tim 
Richard did not have authority to bind the City to a specific act in the future, and therefore there 
was no duty. Assuming the City assumed a duty, it was limited to only what Tim Richard "said". 
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The City has complied with what Tim Richard said (documenting and addressing the situation). 
Therefore there is no breach. 
Plaintiff also alleges that former Public Works Director Bud Van Stone showed that the 
City assumed a duty by statements he made during his deposition. Response, p. 23. However, 
Bud Van Stone was no longer the Public Works Director after April, 1999.1 Van Stone Dep., pp. 
6 7. It isn't clear that he was the City Public Works Director at the time notice of the slope 
movement was provided to the City. There is no evidence that he made any comment or had the 
authority in 1999 to bind the City to a course of action. Certainly a comment made by Mr. Van 
Stone in his deposition in 2011 cannot bind the City to a duty in 1999 or 2005. Further, Mr. Van 
Stone has never been identified as an expert witness in this case, so it is improper to rely on his 
testimony as to what the City should have done in 2005, when he quit his job in 1999. 
Based on the foregoing, there was no assumed duty toward Mr. Block, and Defendants 
request that the Court grant summary judgment on this issue. 
E. THE CITY HAD NO DUTY TO REQUIRE A GEOTECHNICAL EVALUATION. 
Plaintiff next alleges that the City was negligent in failing to require a geotechnical 
evaluation. Response, pp. 23 - 25. As there was no requirement in the City code that the City 
mandate Plaintiff obtain a geotechnical evaluation. The only reason Plaintiff suggests that there 
was a duty to require a geotechnical evaluation was because after Lowell Cutshaw retired, 
Shawn Stubbers required a geotechnical evaluation on a different property (the "Medley 
Subdivision"). Response, p. 24. First, the fact that a later City engineer, under different 
circumstances, at a different time, and at a different location, utilized his discretion to require a 
geotechnical evaluation does not mean that the City had a duty to require such for Plaintiff in 
Mr. Van Stone also worked as interim Public Works director for a short period of time in 2000. Van Stone 
Dep., pp. 6-7. 
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2005 - 2006. Second, this argument clearly violates I.R.E. 407, as subsequent remedial measures 
may not be used to prove liability, which is exactly what Plaintiff is attempting to do. If Mr. 
Stubbers was a bit apprehensive as a result of John Block suing the City and required later 
developers to perform geotechnical evaluations, it does not mean a duty automatically arose in 
Mr. Block's circumstances. Even Plaintiff's expert, Warren Watts, who provided the engineering 
work on the Medley Subdivision, stated that he wondered why the City was picking on him and 
this development. Watts Dep., pp. 14- 15. Mr. Watts could only think of two times, in all of the 
work that he had done within the City of Lewiston, where a geotechnical analysis had been 
required. Watts Dep., pp. 12- 13. 
As stated above, there is nothing in the Lewiston Subdivision Code that required the City 
to mandate that Block perform a geotechnical evaluation. Similarly, there was nothing 
preventing Block from getting a geotechnical evaluation on his own, and he chose not to. 
Therefore, there is no duty, there has been no breach, and there is no liability for this action. 
F. THE CITY HAD NO DUTY WITH REGARD TO THE OTHER ALLEGATIONS 
IN BLOCK'S COMPLAINT. 
Plaintiff's Response next address a number of various allegations. Response, pp. 25 32. 
Again, Plaintiff relies on the testimony of Bud Van Stone to show that the City violated a duty 
with regard to Mr. Block. Response, p. 26. As stated above, Mr. Van Stone was not the City 
Public Works Director after April, 1999 (with the exception of an interim period in 2000), and 
has no idea what the City's current policies are or were in 2006 with regard to subdivision 
review, and so his statements are of no value. He doesn't get to say whether the City did 
something wrong in 2005 and 2006, particularly where he is not an expert witness. His 
comments do not create an issue of fact, because they are not binding on the City, and created no 
assumed duty. 
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Next, Plaintiff discusses concerns regarding CG2. Response, p. 28. This property should 
not be part of this discussion, as the slope movement did not physically affect that subdivision or 
cause any structural damage. Even if there is a duty owed regarding those houses, the only loss 
on those houses is economic (loss of value), and this is an issue which will be discussed in more 
detail below. 
The remainder of the issues brought up in this section relate to actions which occurred to 
prior to Block purchasing the property (such as allegedly improperly placed storm water systems, 
Response, pp. 28 29, improper fill, id., pp. 29, 31 - 32, improperly placed or constructed 
detention ponds, id., pp. 30 - 31 ), which are discussed above. To the extent that Plaintiff alleges 
the City should have notified him of these issues, if they were unknown by the City, it couldn't. 
If they were known by the City, the issues were properly documented in the files which Plaintiff 
chose not to peruse. 
Plaintiff relies on the opinion testimony of John Swift to show that each of these actions 
contributed to the slope movement. Response, p. 29. Mr. Swift's testimony in his affidavit is 
directly contrary to his deposition testimony, in which he said "[W]ithout doing a detailed 
investigation, I could not tell you exactly what caused everything that's happened out there." 
Swift Dep., pp. 23 24. His current affidavit violates the sham affidavit rule and should be 
stricken. In any case, as he has not done a detailed geotechnical investigation, he can't say 
exactly what caused the slide, and his affidavit testimony should be disregarded. 
Finally, Plaintiff again makes an impermissible argument, stating that "although in 
response to 'the John Block issue', the City has begun to identify lots with large amounts of fill 
and put the information pertaining to that fill in 'property jackets for future reference."' 
Response, p. 31. This argument is a violation of I.R.E. 407, as subsequent remedial measures 
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may not be used to prove liability. 
G. PLAINTIFF CANNOT PROVE WHAT CAUSED HIS DAMAGES. 
Plaintiff next alleges that the Defendants caused him damages, as shown by Mr. Swift's 
testimony. Response, pp. 32 - 33. Plaintiff argues that an inference must be made that the 
Defendants' actions caused him damages because Defendants acted tortiously. Id. However, that 
is not how it works; the Court cannot simply "infer" one of the essential elements of Plaintiff's 
claims. There must be some evidence of causation, or else an essential element of a negligence 
claim is not met. See Walker v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 130 Idaho 824, 831 (1997); Nation v. State, 
144 Idaho 177, 189 (2007) (essential element of negligence claim is causation); Esterbrook v. 
State, 124 Idaho 680, 683 (1993) (burden of proof for negligence is on Plaintiff). The damages, 
if any, were caused by the slope movement. The City did not cause the slope movement. 
Plaintiff's expert does not know what caused the slope movement. See Swift Dep., pp. 23- 24. 
Therefore, Plaintiff cannot prove causation. Absent a scintilla of evidence regarding causation, 
no inferences would be appropriate. Fields v. State, 253 P.3d 692 (Idaho 2011). Because 
Plaintiff cannot connect the cause of the slope movement with the City's actions, Plaintiff's 
negligence claims should be dismissed. 
H. THE CITY IS ENTITLED TO IMMUNITY AGAINST PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS 
UNDER THE DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION IMMUNITY. 
Plaintiff contends that Defendants have misunderstood the discretionary function 
immunity. Response, pp. 34 - 38. This shows that Plaintiff has misunderstood Defendants' 
argument. "In order for an act to be immune under the discretionary function theory, the act must 
be discretionary, and must be a planning or policy formation decision. See Dorea Enters. v. City 
of Blackfoot, 144 Idaho 422, 425 (2007). Plaintiff argues that Defendants had a duty to require 
him to perform a geotechnical evaluation. Response, pp. 23 - 25. This simply isn't true, and 
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there should not be any liability related to claims arising out of the fact that the Defendants did 
not require a geotechnical analysis. Defendants contend that prior to 1997, the City did have 
mandatory requirements in the subdivision code for geotechnical evaluations. With the passage 
of Lewiston City Ordinance 4177, the duty to mandatorily require geotechnical evaluations was 
eliminated. See Defendants Statement of Facts, <J[ 5. The passage of Ordinance 4177 was a 
discretionary function of the Lewiston City Council, which falls under the exception in I. C. § 6-
904(1 ). Plaintiff's allegation that this discretionary decision fails to apply to the case is incorrect, 
as Plaintiff's main argument is that the City failed to require the geotechnical analysis. Clearly, 
the City determined in 1997 that it was the policy of the City to no longer mandatorily require 
geotechnical analysis. Therefore, this immunity applies to Plaintiff's claims. 
Next, the discretion of the Lewiston Engineer to require a geotechnical analysis is also a 
discretionary decision. As Mr. Stubbers points out, he had to consider a large number of factors 
in determining whether a geotechnical analysis was worth requiring. See Stubbers Dep., pp. 37-
38 (type of sewer system at issue, potential failure of fill, discussion with other experts in the 
area, review of the PUD agreement, etc.). The fact that the City only required Warren Watts to 
do two geotechnical analyses in the time he had been working in the City showed that it was not 
the type of decision that was made without significant consideration. Further, the amount of time 
that could be spent reviewing a subdivision was limited statutorily, and Mr. Stubbers indicated 
that what could be reviewed was limited by staff availability and training, budgetary concerns, 
and time. Stubbers Dep., pp. 52. See Dorea Enters. v. City of Blackfoot, 144 Idaho 422, 426 
(2007). These factors applied to the determination of whether to require a geotechnical analysis 
as part of the subdivision review process. Therefore, this was the type of decision to which the 
discretionary immunity applies. 
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Next, the evidence shows that the decision not to search past files was a discretionary 
decision by the City. Plaintiff relies on a statement by Laura Von Tersch that "there is 'very little 
traffic in subdivisions"' as a reason why the City acts in an ad hoc way toward subdivision 
development. Response, p. 36. This quote by Plaintiff is a gross misstatement of Ms. Von 
Tersch's testimony. She is the head of the Community Development Department, which has 
relatively little to do with subdivision development. Subdivision development is handled almost 
exclusively by the Public Works Department. The person in the Community Development 
Department who does address subdivisions is not Ms. Von Tersch. Therefore, her quote, when 
read in context, shows that the Community Development Department as a whole has little 
involvement in the development process. Von Tersch Dep., pp. 12- 13. 
The Public Works Department, on the other hand, has a very straightforward procedure. 
Sarah Redenbaugh opens the files, and sends the applications to the appropriate people. Sherri 
Kole only puts PUD agreements, previous subdivision plats, and easements in the new file, if any 
exist. Kole Dep., pp. 16- 17. They don't copy everything to put it in a new file to avoid having 
multiple copies of documents. This practice is not ad hoc, and is the result of the City's policy to 
avoid creating too many duplicates. 
Each of these actions is a discretionary function. There is no gross negligence exception 
to the discretionary function immunity. Defendants and Plaintiff do not disagree about the facts. 
Therefore, summary judgment is appropriate on this issue. 
I. THE CITY IS ENTITLED TO IMMUNITY AGAINST PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS 
UNDER I.C. 6-904(7). 
Plaintiff's only contention that the immunity under§ 6-904(7) does not apply is because 
he contends that there is no "public project" involved. Response, pp. 38 - 40. Plaintiff is 
incorrect. This immunity arises whenever there is a plan related to improvements to "other public 
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property." Each one of the cases cited by Plaintiff shows that there is public property involved. 
Response, p. 39. In this case, there is no doubt that public property is involved. Plaintiff 
complains that his damages are related to storm water drains, detention ponds, drainage 
improvements, etc. Response, pp. 28- 30. A brief look at the subdivision plats involved shows 
that these are all public improvements, easements, dedications, and rights of way. The 
Administrative Plat for SP 8 contains roads, storm sewer easements (the same ones complained 
of by Plaintiff), a storm drain easement connected to a public easement for a detention pond, and 
stream easements. Cutshaw Dep., Ex. 45. The Amended Administrative Plat for SP 8 shows the 
same, with additional public easements. Cutshaw Dep., Ex. 46. The Administrative Plat for CG 
shows the same, with additional public easements, and specifically shows the detention pond, 
which is labeled as "Storm Drain Pond Easement". Cutshaw Dep., Ex. 49. This is the same 
detention pond which Plaintiff's expert now alleges should not have been placed at the bottom of 
the slope beneath the houses, and yet it was Plaintiff expert Eric Hasenoehrl who requested that 
it be moved to its current location, and who put it on the subdivision plats. Id. It is difficult to 
comprehend how Plaintiff can conclude that the plats and plans at issue do not contain public 
property. A subdivision plat is clearly a "plan or design for construction or improvement to ... 
other public property". I.C. § 6-904(7). An easement is a property right, and the easements at 
issue are with regard to the storm drains, sewer lines, detention ponds, etc. These are the same 
storm drains, sewer lines, and detention ponds that Plaintiff alleges have caused the problems to 
his land. The fact that the public easements are over private property does not make the 
easements any less public property. Plaintiff does not dispute that all of these plats, with the 
public easements clearly marked on them, were approved in advance by the City Counsel. 
Plaintiff also fails to dispute that these plats were prepared in substantial conformance with 
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engineering or design standards. 
As there is no gross negligence exception to § 6-904(7), Defendants request that 
summary judgment be granted on all of Plaintiff's negligence claims that arise out of approval of 
the plats. 
J. THE CITY IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON IMMUNITY 
GROUNDS PURSUANT TO I.C. § 6-904B. 
Plaintiff's arguments as to why immunity does not apply under§ 6-904B miss the mark. 
Response, pp. 40- 43. Immunity only applies if there is no gross negligence or reckless, willful 
and wanton conduct. I.C. § 6-904B. Plaintiff alleges that there is gross negligence because the 
City should have been aware that it was its duty to notify Block of the landslide in 1999. 
Response, p. 41. As discussed above, no such duty exists. The City does not and cannot warn 
every developer of every known and unknown problem with property. The City does not take 
upon itself to give notice to a potential property purchaser of every defect with the property; that 
is the duty of the seller. It is unclear how the City could have given Plaintiff notice before he 
purchased the property. Plaintiff signed the purchase documents on August 10, 2005, and did not 
submit a subdivision application until December, 2005. The City did not have any duty to notify 
Plaintiff of problems before he purchased the property, and did not owe him any duty to take any 
specific actions with regard to the property until Plaintiff submitted a subdivision plat. 
Therefore, there was no gross negligence, because the Defendants could not have been 
inescapably drawn to recognize a duty to Plaintiff prior to him purchasing the property. The only 
duty which arose after purchasing the property was outlined in the Lewiston Subdivision Code, 
and Plaintiff has not alleged that the subdivision code has been breached. Further, there can be 
no reckless, willful and wanton conduct, because no one knew whether developing the property 
would result in a high degree of probability that harm would result. See I.C. § 6-904C(2). Even 
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Plaintiff's expert does not know what caused the slope movement, so it cannot be said with 
certainty that any harm was expected at all. Therefore, the immunity cannot be overcome on 
these grounds. 
Next, Plaintiff argues that the immunity does not bar negligent supervisiOn claims, 
relying on Sherer v. Pocatello Sch. Dist. # 25, 143 Idaho 486 (2006). There are a number of 
cases that plaintiffs often rely on to stand for the proposition that they can avoid immunity by 
pleading negligent supervision. See Sherer, 143 Idaho at 491; Doe v. Durtschi, 110 Idaho 466, 
472 (1986); Stoddart v. Pocatello Sch. Dist. # 25, 149 Idaho 679 (2010). The first problem with 
this argument is that it applies only to /.C. § 6-904A(2). In every case where the plaintiff 
attempts to avoid immunity using negligent supervision as a claim instead of negligence, the 
immunity at issues is § 6-904A(2). See Mareci v. Coeur D'Alene Sch. Dist. No. 271, 250 P.3d 
791, 794 (Idaho 2011); Coonse by & ex ref. Coonse v. Boise Sch. Dist., 132 Idaho 803, 806 
(1999). The § 6-904A(2) immunity is not applicable to or at issue in this case. 
Second, the Supreme Court has held numerous times that liability cannot be avoided by 
clever pleading. See Coonse by & ex rel. Coonse v. Boise Sch. Dist., 132 Idaho 803, 806 (1999) 
("a plaintiff could, in many cases, avoid the effect of [the immunity] by simply drafting the 
complaint to allege negligent supervision of the claimant," which is contrary to the purpose of 
the immunity). The statute clearly states that the immunity applies to any claim which "arises out 
of the failure to make an inspection, or the making of an inadequate inspection of any real 
property." J.C. § 6-904B(4). Whether Plaintiff calls it negligent supervision or negligent 
inspection, it is the same. Defendants contend that the immunities apply. 
Finally, Plaintiff alleges that he will prove that "the City knew there had been a landslide 
in 1999 and had record of such in its files." Response, p. 43. First, there is no dispute that the 
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Tim Richards memo was in the SP 4 file. The only issue is whether Defendants had an obligation 
to go searching through a publicly available file to tell Plaintiff everything that was wrong with 
the property. There is no such requirement under the Lewistion Subdivision Code. In any case, 
Defendants contend that it could not do so with the time constraints imposed and limited 
manpower available. Therefore, there is no issue of fact preventing the entry of summary 
judgment on immunity grounds pursuant to I. C. § 6-904B. 
K. THE CITY HAD NO DUTY TO PROTECT THE ECONOMIC INTERESTS OF 
PLAINTIFF JOHN BLOCK. 
Plaintiff contends that the damage at issue in this case is property damage, and therefore 
recoverable. Response, p. 43. Defendants disagree. Under Idaho law, all of Plaintiff's damages 
are economic damage, and therefore Defendants had no duty to protect against its loss. Plaintiff 
attempts to persuade the court that the property damaged was not the "subject of the transaction" 
at issue. Response, pp. 44- 45. This characterization is incorrect. Defendants and Plaintiff agree 
that the "subject of the transaction" in this case was the purchase of the lots. Response, p. 44; 
Complaint,~[ 11; Skinner Aff, Ex. 3. These lots include all of SP8, which was later subdivided 
into CG and CG2. The land had a defect in it when purchased. This is comparable with the 
defective duplexes in Tusch Enters. v. Coffin, 113 Idaho 37 (1987), the defective seed potatoes 
in Duffin v. Idaho Crop Improvement Ass'n, 126 Idaho 1002, 1007 (1995), the defective 
concrete slab in Blahd v. Richard B. Smith, Inc., 141 Idaho 296, 299 (2005), and the defective 
airplane engine in Ramerth v. Hart, 133 Idaho 194, 196 (1999). There was no negligently 
performed personal services at issue as in Brian & Christie, Inc. v. Leishman Elec., Inc., 244 
P.3d 166, 170 (2010), so that analysis does not apply. 
The issue then becomes whether the damages to the houses later built on the property 
constitute property damage. Plaintiff contends that the houses, retaining walls, fences, 
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foundations, etc., are "clearly non-transactional property", and thus any damage to them 
constitutes property damage. Response, p. 44. Plaintiff relies on Aardema v. U.S. Dairy Sys., 
147 Idaho 785 (2009) to show that there is an issue of fact precluding the entry of summary 
judgment. However, Aardema does not apply. In Aardema, there was a dispute as to whether the 
"subject of the transaction" was cows or milking machines. Id. at 791. Even though the Supreme 
Court found that it was clear that the subject of the transaction was the milking machines, it also 
found that there was an issue of fact regarding whether the milking machines damaged the cows, 
an already existing property on which the milking machines were to be used. Id. There is no such 
issue of fact in this case. All agree that the subject of the transaction was the property, to which 
Plaintiff planned improvements. 
Plaintiff also relies on a number of non-Idaho cases to show that the houses and other 
improvements to the property do not fall within the definition of economic loss. Response, p. 45. 
This is disingenuous. Plaintiff admits that he bought the lots with the intent of improving them. 
Block Dep., p. 87. The Idaho definition of economic loss "includes costs of repair and 
replacement of defective property which is the subject of the transaction, as well as commercial 
loss for inadequate value and consequent loss of profits or use." Salmon Rivers Sportsman 
Camps v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 97 Idaho 348,351 (1975). The houses, pools, retaining walls, etc. 
were not pre-existing property which was damaged by the slope movement (which would be 
identical to the issues in Aardema). The houses, pools, retaining walls, etc. were added to the 
property so that Block could sell the property at a profit. Thus, when the land suffered the slope 
movement, the damage to the houses, pools, etc. was not property damage, but was "loss of 
profit or use." Plaintiff cannot rely on an Arizona case or a United States Supreme Court case2 
2 See Response, p. 45. 
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which provide for a different rule than the clearly stated Idaho rule. 
The analysis in the Aardema and Brian & Christie, Inc. cases only apply if 1) there is 
damage to property outside the "subject of the transaction" whether caused by the defect in the 
subject matter of the transaction or some external factor, or 2) the "subject of the transaction" is a 
service, as opposed to a defective property. Neither of these factual scenarios applies to this case. 
There is no aspect of Plaintiff's damages that is not economic. The damage to CG was caused by 
the defect in the property (which was the "subject of the transaction"), and is therefore economic. 
Plaintiff's only explanation as to why he should get damages on the CG2 houses and the business 
loss is because they are "parasitic to an injury to person or property." Response, p. 46. But the 
only alleged property damage was on the 153, 155, and 159 properties, which, as discussed 
above, were improvements made for profit, and therefore are economic loss. When you consider 
that Plaintiff admits he purchased the defective property with the intent of improving the 
property, then it is clear that the improvements become an integral part of the "subject of the 
transaction". 3 
If Plaintiff's interpretation of the economic loss rule were to be adopted, it would deprive 
the economic loss rule of any force. Under Plaintiff's theory, any improvement to a property that 
is the "subject of the transaction" constitutes new and separate property. In other words, all a 
party would have to do to avoid the economic loss rule, in its entirety, would be to "improve" the 
"subject of the transaction." Under Plaintiff's interpretation, when the improvement is damaged 
by the defect in the property, the economic loss rule would be invalidated because there was 
"property damage" to the improvement. A party could purchase a defective piece of property, 
It should be noted that according to the purchase order, Plaintiff purchased all four lots of SP8 at the same 
time. Even though this was broken up into two separate subdivisions later on, the block of land Plaintiff 
purchased was defective. Therefore, CG2 was defective when purchased, and was part of the "subject -of 
the transaction". It cannot be considered separately from CG, even though it is a separate subdivision and 
suffered no slope movement or damage itself. 
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build a concrete slab on it, and wait for the slab to be damaged, and then claim damage of 
"separate property", voiding the effectiveness of the economic loss rule. All economic loss 
would become parasitic to the damage to the improvement, and the economic loss rule would be 
void. However, this interpretation does not fit with existing Idaho case law. 
Defendants agree that "Property damage encompasses damage to property other than that 
which is the subject of the transaction." Ramerth v. Hart, 133 Idaho 194, 196 (1999). This must, 
by definition, include improvements to the "subject of the transaction", or else the economic loss 
rule will be easily circumvented. If Plaintiff's interpretation is correct, then Duffin was decided 
incorrectly. The plaintiffs in that case purchased defective potato seeds, which they planted. 
Duffin v. Idaho Crop Improvement Ass'n, 126 Idaho 1002, 1005 (1995). The seed potatoes 
grew new potatoes (the improvement), which were damaged by the defect in the seed potatoes. 
Under Plaintiff's theory, the economic loss rule should not have applied, because the "subject of 
the transaction" was the seed potatoes, not the new potatoes, which were damaged. Under 
Plaintiff's theory, the new potatoes were new and separate property, and therefore damage to 
them would have been "property damage". 
The same is true in Blahd, where after purchasing the house, the plaintiffs remodeled and 
"improved" the property, including placing slate tile in the house, which slate tile later cracked 
and damaged. Blahd v. Richard B. Smith, Inc., 141 Idaho 296, 299 (2005). Under Plaintiff's 
theory, the addition of slate tiles was new property, and the damage to the slate tile would have 
been "property damage" other than to the subject of the transaction. The same is true in Tusch 
Enters., where after purchasing duplexes, the plaintiff spent money and time improving the 
duplexes. Tusch Enters. v. Coffin, 113 Idaho 37, 40 (1987). The same is true in Mitchell Constr. 
Co., where the damaged property was a roof for a building, which could not be put on the 
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building because it was defective. State v .. Mitchell Constr. Co., 108 Idaho 335, 336 (1984). 
In each of these cases, if Plaintiff's analysis were to be applied, the economic loss rule 
should not have been available because there was damage to "improvements" to the subject of 
the transaction, which constituted damage to separate property. However, in each of these cases, 
the economic loss rule was appropriately invoked, and summary judgment was granted. The only 
conclusion can be that the "subject of the transaction" includes any improvements, and that 
damage to the improvements is the same as damage to the "subject of the transaction". The scope 
of the improvements (from an entire potato crop in Duffin to some slate tile in a basement in 
Blahd) does not change an improvement to separate property. Therefore, the economic loss rule 
applies to not only the physical damage to 153, 155, and 159 Marine View Dr., but also to all 
improvements on the properties, including houses, pools, retaining walls, etc. It also applies to 
the business losses and lost profits on the undamaged houses in CG2 (which were also the 
subject of the transaction). As all of Plaintiff's damages arise out of damage to subject of the 
transaction, the economic loss rule applies to all of Plaintiff's damages. 
Based on the foregoing, the economic loss rule is properly invoked. The only actual 
physical damage which occurred, by Plaintiff's own admission, occurred to improvements to the 
land. Response, p. 45. Damages to these improvements are nothing more than "loss of profits", 
encompassed within the economic loss rule. As Plaintiff fails to argue that there is any applicable 
exception to the economic loss rule, Defendants request that summary judgment be granted on 
all of Plaintiff's claims. 
L. THE SUIT IS BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
The facts with regard to the statute of limitations are undisputed. A highly publicized 
landslide occurred within SP4 in 1999. Documentary evidence of this landslide was placed in the 
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City files in 1999. Plaintiff purchased the defective property at issue in 2005, without looking at 
any City files. The houses at 153, 155, and 159 allegedly suffered damage in October, 2007, and 
again in 2009 as a result of the defect in the property. Plaintiff was therefore damaged when he 
purchased the property, and was on constructive notice of the defect to the property when he 
purchased it (the documentary evidence of the defect was in a public document available to him 
which he chose not to look at). Therefore, the statute of limitations, pursuant to I.C. § 6-911, 




Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. There is no evidence 
that Lowell Cutshaw or any Lewiston employee had any duty toward Block other than what was 
owed under the Lewiston Subdivision Code. This code was complied with. Further, there is no 
evidence that the City, Cutshaw, or anyone else acted with gross negligence or reckless, willful 
and wanton conduct. Plaintiff has should not recover against these Defendants, and summary 
judgment should be entered on the issues outlined above. 
DATED this day of August, 2011. 
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP 
Brian K. Julian, 
Attorneys for City of Lewiston and 
Lowell J. Cutshaw, City Engineer 
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This cause coming on at this time on stipulation of the parties hereto, through their 
respective counsel of record, and good cause appearing therefor; 
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PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF TH ESTATE OF MAUREEN F. STREIBICK- 1 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED and this does ORDER that the above-entitled action be 
dismissed with prejudice as to Defendant Jack J. Streibick, a single man and as Personal 
Representative of the Estate of Maureen F. Streibick, on the ground and for the reason that the 
same has been fully compromised and settled, the parties to bear their own costs and attorney 
fees. 
DATED this 
Carl B. Kerrick 
District Judge 
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STREIBICK, as Personal Representative ) 
of the Estate of Maureen F. Streibick, ) 
deceased, CITY OF LEWISTON, a ) 
municipal corporation of the State of Idaho, ) 
and its employee, LOWELL J. CUTSHAW, ) 
City of Lewiston, Engineer, and DOES 1-20,) 
) 
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CASE NO. CV-09-02219 
AMENDED 
ORDER SETTING CASE FOR 
TRIAL Al\TD PRE-TRIAL 
CONFERENCE 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the above-named case be set for JURY TRIAL 
before the Honorable CARL B. KERRICK, District Judge, at the Nez Perce County 
Courthouse, at Lewiston, Idaho, at the hour of9:00 a.m. on the 6th day of February, 2012, 
for EIGHT to TEN (8-1 0) days. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED parties shall comply with the following: 
supplemental disclosure of Defendant's expert witnesses, including 
compliance with IRCP 26(b)(4)(A)(i), shall be on or before September 9, 2011; 
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CASE FOR TRIAL AND 
PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE 
all discovery shall be completed by December 9, 2011; 
that a pre-trial conference shall be held on January 27, 2012, at the hour of 
10:00 a.m. Lead counsel trying the case must be present at the pre-trial conference. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED at the pre-trial conference each party shall: 
1) Prepare in writing and submit to the Court in advance of the pre-trial 
hearing, a concise statement of the claims and/or defenses asserted by 
that party: 
2) Prepare a list of exhibits and bring all exhibits to the pre-trial 
conference to be marked; 
3) Each counsel shall make a request of opposing counsel for 
stipulations to as many facts and issues as possible, and be prepared to 
submit this stipulation to the Court at the pre-trial hearing; 
4) Be prepared to stipulate the admission of any exhibits or to make 
specific objections to its admissibility; 
5) Furnish opposing counsel with the names and addresses of all 
witnesses, the nature their testimony, experts' reports, and like 
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the pre-trial and trial of this case: 
6) Discuss the possibilities of settlement; 
7) Submit to the court at the pre-trial hearing all contentions of law relied 
upon: 
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8) Submit to the court and counsel a copy of all jury instructions counsel 
intends to request. The jury instructions shall consist of two copies, 
one copy containing citations of authority and one copy suitable for 
submission to the jury. The Court uses the following instructions from 
IDJI and it is not necessary for counsel to submit them: 1.00, 1.01, 
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) Case No. CV 09-02219 
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) ADDITIONAL AUTHORITY 
vs. ) 
) 
JACK J. STREIBICK, a single man, JACK J. ) 
STREIBICK, as Personal Representative of the ) 
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LEWISTON, a municipal corporation of the State of ) 
Idaho, and its employee, LOWELL J. CUTSHAW, ) 
City of Lewiston Engineer, and DOES 1-20, ) 
Defendants. ) 
-------------------------------- ) 
Plaintiff John G. Block, through counsel, hereby provides citation of its additional authority 
in support of Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant City's Second Motion for 
Summary Judgment ("Plaintiff's Memorandum"), as follows: 
1. Dale D. Goble, All Along the Watchtower: Economic Loss in Tort (The Idaho Case 
NOTICE OF CITATION OF ADDITIONAL AUTHORITY- 1 
Law), 34 Idaho L. Rev. 225 (1998) (Exhibit A) (pertains to economic loss issue; Plaintiffs 
Memorandum, pp. 43-46). 
2. Jackson v. City of Seattle, 158 Wash. App. 647, 655-60,244 P.3d 425,430-32 
(2010) (Exhibit B) (pertains to duty and economic loss issues; Plaintiffs Memorandum, pp. 25-32, 
43-46). 
3. Udyv. CusterCounty, 136Idaho386,388-89,34P.3d 1069, 1071-72(2001) 
(Exhibit C) (pertains to duty issue; Plaintiffs Memorandum, pp. 17-22, 23-32). 
4. Adams v. United States, 2010 WL 1248286, *2-*3 (D. Idaho) (Exhibit D) (pertains 
to economic loss issue; Plaintiffs Memorandum, pp. 43-46). 
DATED this 24th day of August, 2011. 
LANDECK & FORSETH 
By:~~ 
Danelle C. Forseth 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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*226 I. INTRODUCTION 
Recovery of solely economic losses in tort is problematic. There is an often-expressed concern that, if economic loss 
were recoverable in tort, "contract law would drown in a sea of tort." [FNI] There is also a belief that "[p]ermitting re-
covery of all foreseeable claims for purely economic loss could make a [tortfeasor] liable for vast sums." [FN2] Set off 
against such concerns is the tenet that "[t)he risk reasonably to be perceived defmes the duty to be obeyed." [FN3] The 
tension among these viewpoints and the policies and perspectives underlying the respective domains of tort and contract 
have combined to produce a rich and sometimes-contradictory body of case law. 
The dissension between tort and contract reflects in part alternative approaches to structuring human relations. Tort is 
a domain of socially imposed duties; contract, on the other hand, is based on nominally consensual duties created by 
agreement. Tort establishes and enforces those safety requirements society deems minimally necessary; contract enforces 
representations of the quality of the things to be exchanged between the parties. Tort generally - though not always - re-
quires fault (negligence or intent) as a predicate of liability; contract does not require fault, only a failure to perform the 
obligation as warranted. Tort protects interests in person, property, and relations by providing remedies designed to re-
store the status quo ante; contract protects the expectations of the parties at the time of the promise by providing benefit-
of-the-bargain remedies. In short, tort protects existing interests and entitlements against intrusions, while *227 contract 
permits the reallocation of those entitlements. In a society where ideas of individual autonomy often masquerade as 
founding principles, the socially imposed duties of tort may seem less congenial than the personally assumed duties of 
contract. This is particularly likely in an age when the myth of the individual is again abroad in the land and the glorific-
ation of self-interest and laissez-faire ideology is the order of the day. [FN4] The choice has a broader dimension as welL 
As Grant Gilmore noted, a legal system that emphasizes freedom of contract "must ultimately work to the benefit of the 
rich and powerful, who are in a position to look after themselves." [FN5] 
One of the leading Idaho cases on the recovery of economic loss in tort - Clark v. International Harvester Co. [FN6] -
strikes a balance between tort concerns for safety and contract's focus on quality: 
The law of negligence requires the defendant to exercise due care to build a tractor that does not harm person 
or property. If the defendant fails to exercise such due care it is of course liable for the resulting injury to person or 
property as well as other losses which naturally follow from that injury. However, the law of negligence does not 
impose on International Harvester a duty to build a tractor that plows fast enough and breaks down infrequently 
enough for Clark to make a profit in his custom farming business. This is not to say that such a duty could not 
arise by a warranty - express or implied - by agreement of the parties or by representations of the defendant, but 
the law of negligence imposes no such duty. [FN7] 
As the court states, one marker along the boundary between the realms of tort and contract is the nature of the loss 
plaintiff suffers: [FN8J as a general rule, a person who suffers "pure" economic loss [FN9J cannot *228 recover in tort; 
recovery for such losses is restricted to contract. More formally, there generally is no tort duty to avoid conduct that 
causes only economic harm; duty to prevent economic harm must generally be assumed in contract. When a person suf-
fers neither personal injury nor property damage - when she seeks to recover pure economic losses - the rationale for tort 
recovery is at its weakest because the plaintiff and her property were not endangered. In such cases, leaving the parties to 
© 2011 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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their bargained-for agreement reinforces the core principles of both domains of law: disappointed but not endangered 
plaintiffs are relegated to contract and their agreed-upon responsibilities. 
Not all cases involving pure economic loss implicate the tort/contract boundary. The absence of a contract between 
the parties renders the boundary issues largely irrelevant. That is, contract is not implicated when the parties are not in 
privity. Although this now seems obvious, it was not always understood. In fact, until the first decades of this century, 
the existence of a contract for the sale of product served to preclude the manufacturer's liability to a person not in privity 
with the manufacturer even for physical injuries to that person. [FNlO] In the leading case - Winterbottom v. Wright 
[FNll J - the court held that plaintiff, a coachman, could not sue the repairer of the stagecoach he was driving when its 
wheel fell off, laming him. The court thought the possible liability too expansive: 
There is no privity of contract between these parties; and if the plaintiff can sue, every passenger, or even any 
person passing along the road, who was injured by the upsetting of the coach might bring a similar action. Unless 
we confme the operation of such contracts as this to the parties who entered into them, the most absurd and out-
rageous consequences, to which I can see no limit, would ensue. [FN12] 
It was more than seventy years before Benjamin Cardozo authored MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. [FNI3] holding 
that the driver of an automobile could sue the remote manufacturer in tort for injuries when the wheel fell off his car: 
*229 We have put aside the notion that the duty to safeguard life and limb, when the consequences of negli-
gence may be foreseen, grows out of contract and nothing else. We have put the source of the obligation where it 
ought to be. We have put its source in the law. [FN14] 
Although the court in Winterbottom relied on the contract between the owner of the stagecoach and its repairer, it did 
so for liability-limitation reasons. The court did not fear the demise of contract but rather the unlimited damages that tort 
seemingly allowed: "[I]f the (driver of the coach J can sue, every passenger, or even any person passing along the road, 
who was injured by the upsetting of the coach might bring a similar action." [FN15] Privity of contract was important be-
cause it served to limit liability, not because the prohibition against a tort action reinforced contract principles. Similar 
concerns with unlimited liability still motivate courts. In a companion case to Clark - Just's, Inc. v. Arrington Construc-
tion Co. [FNI6]- the Idaho Supreme Court noted: 
Though the rule [against recovery of pure economic loss] has been expressed in different ways, the common 
underlying pragmatic consideration is that a contrary rule, which would allow compensation for losses of econom-
ic advantage caused by the defendant's negligence, would impose too heayy and unpredictable a burden on the de-
fendant's conduct. 
. . . In contrast to the recognized liability for personal injuries and property damage, with its inherent limita-
tions of size, parties and time, liability for all the economic repercussions of a negligent act would be virtually open 
- ended. [FN17] 
Economic loss cases thus may implicate two different concerns. On the one hand, when there is a contract between 
the parties, the socially imposed duties of tort are a potential threat to the bargained-for duties of contract: contract may 
"drown in a sea of tort." [FN18] On the other hand, when there is no contract between the parties, the expansive, rip-
pling-circle of potential economic loss with its specter of unlimited *230 and disproportionate liability gives courts justi-
fiable pause. [FN19] Although pure economic loss is present in both situations, the rationales for denying recovery are 
markedly different in the two situations. 
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At the same time, the per se rule against the recovery of economic loss in tort has long been riddled with exceptions, 
qualifications, and clarifications. This not only demonstrates the degree to which Idaho courts are uncomfortable with a 
per se no-duty rule, it also reveals the degree to which the nonliability rule is artificial when "[t]he risk reasonably to be 
perceived defmes the duty to be obeyed." [FN20] 
A recent decision by the Idaho Supreme Court- Duffm v. Idaho Crop Improvement Ass'n [FN21] - offers an oppor-
tunity to review the Idaho caseload on recovery for economic losses in tort. The court in Duffm presented its own review 
of the case law, concluding that the cases present "a general rule prohibiting the recovery of purely economic losses in all 
negligence actions" subject to two exceptions. [FN22] A more comprehensive review will demonstrate, however, that the 
law is actually a good deal less tidy than the court suggests. 
II. DUFFIN v. IDAHO CROP IMPROVEMENT ASS'N 
Eric and Melanie Duffm grew potatoes on their farm near Aberdeen, Idaho. Following discussions with the president 
of Crater Farms, Inc. (CFI), the Duffms agreed to plant seed potatoes produced by CFI if the seed was "certified." Certi-
fication is conferred by the Idaho Crop Improvement Association (ICIA), the delegatee of certain statutory authorities 
conferred on the University of Idaho. The certification program is intended to maintain genetic purity and to ensure that 
L~e seed is free of diseases and pests; it is conferred after a series of inspections and tests. ICIA certified the CFI seed 
potatoes; CFI delivered the potatoes to the Duffms in March and early April, 1988. At the end of April, however, an ad-
ditional ICIA inspection determined that the CFI potatoes were infected with bacterial ring rot. ICIA therefore informed 
CFI that no further shipments could be sold as certified. Neither CFI nor ICIA informed the Duffms of the problem. The 
Duffms subsequently discovered that their crop was also infected. They brought suit against CFI on various contractual 
theories and *231 against !CIA for negligence, alleging that they had suffered three types of economic losses: 
(1) the excess of the price paid for the seed because it was "certified"; (2) lost revenues which resulted from 
reduced yields; and (3) lost revenues which resulted from having to sell the crop immediately upon harvest, rather 
than by way of the more lucrative contracts the Duffms had already negotiated, or by waiting until the open market 
prices were higher. [FN23] 
The trial court granted ICIA summary judgment, holding that the Duffins' claim was for pure economic loss and thus 
could not be recovered in a tort action [FN24] and that the Duffms could not recover for negligent misrepresentation. 
[FN25] The Duffms appealed the dismissal of ICIA; the supreme court reversed the trial court's decision on the economic 
loss issue but affrrmed its decision on negligent misrepresentation. 
The supreme court began its analysis of the economic-loss issue with the two cases that defme the issue in Idaho, 
Clark v. International Harvester Co. [FN26] and Just's, Inc. v. Arrington Construction Co. [FN27] The court concluded 
that the decisions precluded recovery for pure economic loss in tort because in such cases "the defendant's conduct did 
not invade an interest of the plaintiff to which the law of negligence extended its protection." [FN28] That is, there was 
no duty in tort to avoid conduct that invades an exclusively economic interest: "Following Just's," the court wrote, "this 
Court has adhered to a general rule prohibiting the recovery of purely economic losses in all negligence actions." [FN29J 
This general rule applied only to "pure" economic loss. Economic losses are recoverable when they are accompanied 
by either personal injury or property damage. [FN30J Thus, if the Duffins had suffered either *232 personal injuries or 
property damage, they could also recover for any economic losses arising from the same event. The distinction between 
"pure economic loss" and other economic loss required the court to distinguish between personal injury, property dam-
age, and economic loss. It did so by reaffmning a distinction initially armounced in Salmon Rivers Sportsman Camps, 
Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co.: [FN31] damage to property that was the basis of the transaction between the parties is eco-
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nomic loss while damage to non-transactional property is property damage. Since the damage in Duffin was to the seed 
potatoes that were the basis of the transaction among the parties, the court held that the damages were economic loss 
rather than property damage. And since that loss was not accompanied by either personal injuries or property damage it 
presumptively fell within the ~eneral rule against the recovery of pure economic loss in tort. 
The rule against recovery of pure economic loss is not, however, absolute. The court therefore turned to two excep-
tions to the general rule against recovery of economic loss in tort that it recognized. 
The court's first exception - that economic loss "might be recovered in tort where the occurrence of a unique circum-
stance requires a different allocation of the risk" [FN32] - is enigmatic. At a trivial level, of course, all cases present "a 
unique circumstance" - what Paul Simon has aptly called "the myth of fmgerprints." [FN33] Presumably some "unique 
circumstances" are important and others are not. The court, however, fails to offer anything beyond a citation to Just's 
[FN34] and the assertion that "the certification of seed potatoes is not a 'unique circumstance' requiring a reallocation of 
the risk." [FN35] Neither the enigmatic phrase nor the mere assertion of its inapplicability are of much assistance in de-
termining the content or the scope of the exception. 
The second exception, the court stated, "is applicable in cases involving a 'special relationship' between the parties." 
[FN36] It was this exception that the court found applicable in Duffin: 
*233 ICIA has held itself out as having expertise in the performance of a specialized function (and] ... it has 
engaged in a marketing campaign ... the very purpose of which is to i..rtduce reliance by purchasers on the fact that 
seed has been certified. Under such circumstances, ICIA occupies a special relationship with t.hose whose reliance 
it has knowingly induced. [FN37] 
This relationship between ICIA and the Duffms imposed a tort duty on ICIA to take care to protect the Duffrns from 
economic loss. The court, therefore, reversed the grant of summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings. 
The Duffrns also brought a claim for negligent misrepresentation. The district court granted defendants a summary 
judgment on this claim; the supreme court affrrmed summarily: "we expressly hold that, except in the narrow confmes of 
a professional relationship involving an accountant, the tort of negligent misrepresentation is not recognized in Idaho." 
[FN38] 
The Idaho Supreme Court used Duffm to summarize the case law on recovery for economic loss in tort. In the court's 
analysis, although economic loss may be recovered when a plaintiff has also suffered either personal injury or property 
damage, it generally may not be recovered when it is the only loss suffered. Such losses - "pure" economic losses - may 
be recovered in tort in only two situations: when there is an undefrned "unique circumstance" that requires a different al-
location of the risk and when there is a "special relationship" between the parties. Finally, the court independently dis-
cussed and sharply limited the possible reach of the tort of negligent misrepresentation. 
The court's decision in Duffrn offers an accessible overview of the legal issues presented by economic loss. The 
court's preliminary map of the borderlands between contract-based and tort-based claims is, however, markedly incom-
plete. Rather than the relatively well-defrned domains it presents, the borderlands are a contested region of indistinct and 
shifting frontiers. To understand this terrain, it is helpful *234 to begin with an examination of the question of what 
counts as "economic loss." 
ill. UNCERTAINlY AT THE BORDER OF ECONOMIC LOSS AND PROPERTY DAMAGE 
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Tort damages come in three varieties: personal injury, property damage, and economic loss. In most cases, the classi-
fication of losses presents no conceptual difficulties: the driver of a delivery truck runs a stop sign and hits a car 
(property damage), injuring its driver (personal injuries), and causing the driver to miss work while recuperating 
(economic loss); a passenger in the car - although not injured - misses an important meeting and loses a sale (economic 
loss). In such cases, "economic loss" presents no defmitional issues: lost wages, lost profits, and the like are all "economic." 
Although the distinction between personal injury and other losses is clear- both factually and ethically [FN39] - the 
line between property damage and economic loss is more problematic because the two types of loss may overlap - some-
times substantially. The most significant area of overlap involves injury to a product. For example, if the delivery truck 
had been damaged in a single-vehicle accident caused by the failure of its own brakes, is the damage "property damage" 
or "economic loss" in a suit against the product seller? In other words: does the existence of a contract between the 
parties affect the characterization of the type of loss? If the delivery truck had been a car would the claim be for property 
damage? That is: does the fact that the property is held to produce income rather than for personal use, affect the charac-
terization of the type of loss? What is the justification if such external factors affect the characterization of the type of loss? 
As the court noted in Duffin, [FN40] the distinction between economic loss and property damage was given its 
present contours in Idaho in Salmon Rivers Sportsman Camps, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co. [FN41] The case was brought 
by the purchaser of an airplane to recover for extensive damages to the plane caused by engine failure during takeoff. 
Differing statutes of limitations required the court to distinguish between tort and contract actions - which in turn led the 
court to distinguish *235 between personal injuries, property damage, and economic loss: 
Although personal injuries stand distinctly apart from the other two categories, a delineation between the latter two is 
necessary. Property damage encompasses damage to property other than that which is the subject of the transaction. Eco-
nomic loss includes costs of repair and replacement of defective property which is the subject of the transaction, as well 
as commercial loss for inadequate value and consequent loss of profits or use. [FN42] 
The court in Salmon Rivers thus drew the line between property damage and economic loss based on the identity of 
the property: if the property that is damaged is the subject of the transaction - the delivery truck that crashes due to brake 
failure - the loss is "economic." The airplane engine that failed causing the craft to crash in Salmon Rivers thus was eco-
nomic loss. [FN43) Similarly, a tractor that was underpowered, [FN44J a roof coating that failed to perform, [FN45] and 
a rental unit with substantial structural problems [FN46] were economic losses in suits against sellers and manufacturers 
of the products. It is only when other, non-transactional property is injured that the loss is "property damage." 
Although the court enunciated a bright-line rule, its subsequent decisions have dimmed the distinction. The court has 
on occasion treated the loss of transactional property as property damage and on others has interpreted injury to non-
transactional property as economic loss. For example, in Oppenheimer Industries v. Johnson Cattle Co., [FN47) plaintiff 
sought to recover in negligence for the failure of a state brand inspector to demand proof of ownership of cattle being 
offered for sale. Under the State Brand Board's regulations, the inspector was required to demand proof of ownership 
when the brands on the cattle were "fresh." Despite the presence of fresh brands, the inspector failed to demand proof of 
ownership - and the seller was in fact a cattle rustler. The court allowed the negligence claim despite the fact that the loss 
involved property that was the subject of the transaction. It did so, not on the ground that the claim fell within an excep-
tion to the general no-duty rule, but rather on the ground that the injury was not economic loss: "Oppenheimer is not still 
in possession of defective *236 goods. Rather, Oppenheimer has suffered the loss of its property (i.e. the cattle) due to 
the negligence of the deputy brand inspector." [FN48] Since the loss was property da..'llage, a negligence action was per-
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missible. 
As the court in Duffin tacitly acknowledged, Oppenheimer's distinction between lost and damaged property is logic-
ally insupportable. [FN49] If a defective product entirely self-destructs - if the engine failure had demolished the airplane 
in Salmon Rivers rather than merely damaged it - would the loss thereby be transmuted into property damage? Or would 
the fact that the owner still had possession of the wreckage be sufficient to prevent a claim for property damage? If the 
crash had caused a loss of only ninety-five percent of the value, would the claim therefore be one for economic loss? A 
distinction that turns on such fortuitous results is nonsensical. 
The court has also wobbled in the opposite direction, refusing to allow tort claims in situations where non-
transactional property was damaged. For example, in G & M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., [FN50] plaintiff purchased an 
irrigation system that failed to deliver the necessary volume of water; plaintiff suffered reduced crop yields. The damage 
thus was to non-transactional property the growing crops - rather than to the transactional property - the irrigation sys-
tem. Nonetheless, the court asserted that this was an economic loss and refused to allow a negligence claim. 
Although the G & M Farms decision is inconsistent with the defmition announced in Salmon Rivers and reaffirmed 
in Duffm, it is eminently reasonable: the irrigation system was purchased in the course of the commercial endeavor of 
producing crops. The plaintiff hoped to make a profit from sale of the crop; the damages sought were not intended to re-
place the damaged property, but rather to compensate the company for its lost profits. The court would have exalted form 
over substance if it had focused on the fact that crops were non-transactional property and held the injury to be property 
drunage. [FN51] 
*237 A subsequent decision by the court of appeals offers a rationale for decisions such as G & M Farms. In Myers 
v. A.O. Smith Harvestore Products, [FN52] milk production at a dairy farm was reduced by problems with a feed storage 
and delivery system. The trial court granted defendants' motions for summary judgment on the tort claims, concluding 
that only economic loss was involved and that such losses could not be recovered in a tort action. Although the court of 
appeals cited the supreme court's defmition of "economic loss" from Salmon Rivers, it acknowledged that the Myers' 
losses did not fall within that defmition. Instead, the court recast the term: "Arguably, the Myers did allege property 
damage resulting from a defective product. However, these injuries did not result from a calamitous event or dangerous 
failure of the product. Rather, they arose from the failure of the product to match the buyers' commercial expectations." 
[FN53] Disappointed but not endangered purchasers are to be left to their contract remedies. The court therefore upheld 
the summary judgment on the tort claims. 
The defmition of pure economic loss as applied to damage to tangible property thus is more complicated than the 
court acknowledged in Duffm. Salmon Rivers as modified by Myers distinguishes "economic loss" from "property dam-
age" on the basis of two factors: first, damage to property that is the subject of the transaction forming the basis of the 
suit is economic loss - regardless of the manner in which the loss occurred; [FN54] second, damage to other, non-
transactional property is economic loss when the damage occurs through a non-calamitous event or a non-dangerous fail-
ure. [FN55] Stated from the opposite perspective: to be classified as property damage rather than economic loss, the 
property must be both non-transactional property and damaged as a result of a calamitous event or a dangerous failure. 
The Idaho courts have been less than clear on the principles underlying these defmitional lines. Since tort is con-
cerned with safety, the prohibition of tort claims for non-calamitous losses to non-*238 transactional property such as 
those in G & M Farms and Myers is consistent with policy underlying this body of law. Similarly, as the court of appeals 
noted in Myers, contract principles are applicable to non-calamitous losses to non-transactional property since such 
claims are "for lost profits and consequential business losses" resulting from an ineffective product. [FN56] These are the 
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types of losses that are appropriately addressed within a contract framework - a framework that has been developed pre-
cisely to allocate business losses. [FN57J The refusal to allow claims for such losses to be brought in tort thus accords 
with both fundamental tort principles - since safety was not at issue - as well as fundamental contract principles - since 
the allocation of such business losses is the raison d'etre for contract damage rules. 
The absolute prohibition against recovering for damage to transactional property, on the other hand, is more problem-
atic. For example, if plaintiff purchases an airplane that crashes, the fact that plaintiff is miraculously uninjured seems 
fortuitous - and the line prohibiting a tort claim seems on it face unprincipled. Nonetheless, on such facts the court in 
Salmon Rivers simply announced the distinction between transactional and non-transactional property without any dis-
cussion of its basis. [FN58] To the extent that the tort goal of risk reduction is relevant, then endangerment should be the 
touchstone for potential tort liability. As the Oregon Supreme Court decided when presented with a similar issue, "the 
distinction [is] between the disappointed users [who are relegated to contract] and the endangered ones [who may sue in 
tort]." [FN59] 
Although the line between "endangered" and "disappointed" corresponds to the difference between safety and quality 
that underlie the respective domains of tort and contract, most courts have concluded that the bright-line prohibition is a 
satisfactory balance of the *239 competing policies [FN60] - particularly when the efficiency advantages of a clear rule 
are added to the scales. [FN61] For example, the United States Supreme Court concluded that drawing the line between 
economic loss and property damage between endangered and disappointed was "too indeterminate to enable manufactur-
ers easily to structure their business behavior." [FN62] Furthermore, the Court thought that the distinction ignored the 
simple fact that, regardless of the nature of the event producing the loss, the loss "is essentially the failure of the pur-
chaser to receive the benefit of its bargain- traditionally the core concern of contract law." [FN63J Contract law - partic-
ularly its warranty provisions - offers a preferable method for allocating risks to economic expectations, the Court con-
cluded, because it provides tools for limiting the scope of otherwise unpredictable economic losses. [FN64] In short, the 
rule defining damage to transactional property as "economic loss" is justified by the concern with the potentially unlim-
ited liability that might arise in tort. 
This seems to be the position that has evolved in Idaho: Salmon Rivers defmes losses to transactional property as 
economic loss; Myers adds damage to non-transactional property that occurs from a noncalamitous event. Although there 
are inconsistent decisions, they are *240 aberrational [FN65] or poorly reasoned. [FN66] 
However the inconsistency in the case law is to be resolved, it is important to note that it involves a fairly narrow 
range of situations. The more common examples of economic loss - such as lost profits - are not in dispute: the problem 
stems solely from a sometimes uncertain boundary between tort and contract when tangible property is damaged. Fur-
thermore, this uncertainty is most likely to be present in only a single type of case involving economic loss: cases in-
volving the sale of goods. And economic loss may occur in a much more diverse group of cases. 
N. THE CASES: A TYPOLOGY 
Although the court in Duffin spoke of "a general rule prohibiting the recovery of purely economic losses" in tort 
[FN67J except in two situations -when "unique circumstances" or a "special relationship" are present [FN68] - the actual 
typology of the cases is more complicated. Rather than an orderly rule-with-two-exceptions, the Idaho economic-loss 
cases resemble a shifting map of the Balkans with their various factual patterns and the conflicting policies. Although it 
may not be true that the no-duty role is more honored in the breach than in the application, it is nonetheless true that the 
rule is subject to a significant number of exceptions and qualifications. 
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Pure economic loss cases can be divided into six categories: 
1. Cases involving shoddy goods in which there is a contract between plaintiff and defendant. Defendant con-
tracts with plaintiff for the sale of a product that fails to perform as expected. For example, defendant sells 
plaintiff a tractor which causes plaintiff economic losses when he is unable to plow the desired number of acres 
per hour. [FN69] 
2. Cases involving shoddy goods in which there is no contract between plaintiff and defendant. Most com-
monly, plaintiff contracts with a third party to purchase goods; the third party in *241 turn contracts with defend-
ant, who breaches the contract; plaintiff seeks to recover against the remote manufacturer in negligence. For ex-
ample, plaintiff seeks a metal building to house his business. He contracts with a local contractor to erect the struc-
ture. The contractor in turn orders the building from a fabricator. When the building turns out to be less-
than-desired, plaintiff seeks to sue the fabricator. [FN70J 
3. Cases involving the misperformance of a service contract between defendant and plaintiff Defendant, for 
example, contracts with plaintiff to insure plaintiffs business against the risk of flre. When the property is sub-
sequently destroyed by ftre, plaintiff discovers that defendant had failed adequately to insure the inventory. [FN71] 
4. Cases involving the misperformance of a service contract between defendant and a third party that causes 
economic loss to plaintiff. Defendant, for example, contracts with a city to redevelop its blighted urban core and 
agrees both to take steps to mitigate potential losses to businesses in the core and to complete the work by a spe-
cified date. A business in the redevelopment area suffers economic losses when customers avoid shopping at her 
store because of the inconvenience the construction causes. [FN72] A recurrent variation on this category of cases 
involves what are often characterized as "misrepresentations." For example, an accountant contracts with a com-
pany to prepare an opinion on the fmancial condition of a company. A third party loans money based on the opin-
ion. When the company defaults on its loans, the third party brings a negligence action against the accountant. [FN73] 
5. Cases in which economic loss is caused by damage to a relational interest: the breach of a tort - rather than 
a contract - duty owed to a third party causes economic loss to the plaintiff. For example, defendant allows a visit-
or to bring a greyhound onto fairgrounds where a horse race is being held. The dog decides to join the race with 
disastrous results for a jockey whose mount collides with the dog. The jockey's employer brings an *242 action for 
the losses he suffers because the jockey is unable to ride for him. [FN74] 
6. Cases involving economic loss in which a legislative standard creates the duty of care. Two examples sug-
gest the diverse range of the cases in this category. In the first, plaintiff contracts with a third party to care for 
plaintiffs cattle. The third party rebrands the cattle and sells them at auction. When plaintiff discovers its loss, it 
brings suit against the State Brand Board, contending that one of the Board's inspectors had violated its regulations 
which require inspectors to demand proof of ownership when brands were "fresh." [FN75] The second - and far 
more common - example involves the Idaho \Vrongful death statute: defendant, for example, runs a stop sign and 
kills a spouse and father, causing economic loss to his heirs. [FN7 6] 
A. Shoddy Goods: Contracts Between Plaintiff and Defendant for the Sale of Goods 
Shoddy goods often cause economic loss - if only because the purchaser fails to receive the value desired. This cat-
egory of case is the clearest situation in which the boundary between tort and contract is at issue: the relationship 
between the parties has its origin in contract and the losses suffered are exclusively economic. Not surprisingly, this is 
also the situation in which the no-duty rule has its most general application. 
In Taylor v. Herbold, [FN77] defendant purchased 7,000 cwt. of potatoes from plaintiff; he failed to take delivery as 
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required by the contract. Plaintiff brought a contract action for the potatoes purchased but unclaimed. He also brought a 
second action for "tortious damages" arising from the breach of the contract. Plaintiff sought these damages for the ap-
proximately 3,000 cwt. that remained in his cellar, contending that, because other buyers in the area knew of the dispute 
between plaintiff and defendant, they were unwilling to purchase the remaining 3,000 cvvt. in the undivided 10,000 cwt. 
pile. The supreme court affirmed the trial court's judgment n.o.v. for the defendant on the tort claim, holding that a 
breach of contract does not give rise to a tort unless the duty to act with due care arises independently of the contract. 
*243 The court predicated its decision on a "general rule": the breach of a contract - without more - does not give rise 
to a duty in tort. In explaining its decision, the court posited two types of situations in which "something more" would be 
present and a tort duty would arise independently of the contractual relationship between the parties. First, one of the 
parties might act negligently toward the other party without regard to the contract between them: the contract, in other 
words, would merely bring the parties into physical proximity. [FN78] Second, in at least some situations, a contract 
might itself give rise to a relationship that imposes a duty of due care on one of the parties. Such situations, the court 
wrote, "primarily involv[e] cases in which one of the parties was engaged in a public calling or public transportation." 
[FN79] In the case before it, the court concluded neither exception was applicable: Herbold had done nothing beyond 
breaching his contractual duty to take delivery of the potatoes. He therefore was not liable in tort. 
The court reached a similar conclusion in Clark v. International Harvester Co., [FN80] a negligence claim for a de-
fectively designed tractor. Plaintiff, a custom farmer, experienced recurrent difficulties in attaining sufficient pulling 
power from the tractor and he eventually *244 brought suit, seeking to recover for lost profits due to "down time" and for 
the costs of repairing and replacing allegedly defective parts. The court reversed a judgment for plaintiff, holding that 
such pure economic losses could not be recovered in a tort action. The issue, the court stated, was 
the nature of the responsibility a manufacturer must undertake in distributing his products. He can appropri-
ately be held liable for physical injuries caused by defects by requiring his goods to match a standard of safety 
defmed in terms of conditions that create unreasonable risks of harm. He cannot be held for the level of perform-
ance of his products in the consumer's business unless he agrees that the product was designed to meet the con-
sumer's demands. A consumer should not be charged at the will of the manufacturer with bearing the risk of phys-
ical injury when he buys a product on the market. He can, however, be fairly charged with the risk that the product 
will not match his economic expectations unless the manufacturer agrees it will. [FN81] 
The conjunction of Taylor and Clark creates a broad prohibition against tort [FN82] recovery of pure economic 
losses arising from the breach of a contract between plaintiff and defendant for the sale of goods. It is a rule that the court 
has almost consistently followed. The court has held that a negligence claim for shoddily constructed rental housing units 
did not state a cause of action because plaintiff suffered only economic loss, [FN83] that a plaintiff could not rely upon 
negligence in seeking to recover for the construction of a prefabricated building when the negligence caused neither per-
sonal injury nor property *245 damage, [FN84] that an irrigation system which failed to provide sufficient water volume 
because of an allegedly negligent design was not actionable in tort, [FN85] and that the cost of repairing or replacing an 
allegedly defe.ctive roof on a new building could not be recovered in either negligence or strict liability. [FN86] 
B. Shoddy Goods: Contracts for the Sale of Goods in Which There is No Privity Between Plaintiff and Defendant 
The court has reached the same no-duty conclusion when the purchaser of goods sues a remote manufacturer alleging 
pure economic loss. Given the length of the distribution chain for most products, this category of cases is a common one. 
Purchasers are unlikely to be in privity of contract with the actual manufacturer or assembler of a product. For example, 
Ronald Corrado contracted with Adkison Corporation for the construction of a building to house his aircraft mechanic 
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business. [FN87] Adkison in turn contracted with Rural Systems, Inc. (RSI) the dealer for American Building Company 
(ABC) to provide a built-to-order metal building. In placing the order with ABC, RSI made a mistake. The building as 
delivered also had additional problems. Corrado and Adkison sued ABC in both contract and tort for the economic losses 
they suffered. 
The court affirmed a directed verdict for the defendant on the tort claims. Holding that "the law of contract should 
control actions for purely economic loss and not the law of torts," the court concluded that "actions for purely economic 
losses must be viewed in a contract setting with relevant contract principles." [FN88] 
C. Poor Service: Contracts Between Plaintiff and Defendant 
Just as shoddy products can cause economic loss, so can poor service. Furthermore, service contracts present factual 
patterns that are superficially very similar to those in the sale of shoddy goods: plaintiff and defendant have a contract; 
defendant breaches the contract; plaintiff seeks to recover not (or not only) in contract but (also) in tort. Again, this is a 
situation in which the boundary between tort *246 and contract is at issue: the relationship between the parties has its ori-
gin in contract and the losses suffered are exclusively economic. 
Despite the seeming similarities, the differences between sales and service contracts are more significant. Most fun-
damentally, the difference between the sale/purchase of a product and the sale/purchase of a service is the difference 
between the mass-produced and the personal. [FN89] The purchaser of a product seldom obtains it directly from the 
manufacturer; the purchaser of a service, on the other hat"1d, is quite likely to deal directly with the provider. While the 
personal element in service contracts is declining with the rise of the service economy - and a concomitant increasing 
scale of service providers that is approaching something akin to mass-production - nonetheless, service contracts remain 
more personal and idiosyncratic: even taking a mass-produced VCR into the franchised warranty service provider re-
quires a level of personal interaction that the purchaser of a product seldom has with its manufacturer. 
These differences - as imprecise as they are - appear to lie at the core of the court's differing treatment of sales and 
service contracts - a difference that the court has often stated as a conclusion that service contracts can form the basis for 
a relationship between the parties that is sufficiently "special" to give rise to a tort duty to act with care in providing the 
service. [FN90] Thus, for example, the court *247 has held that agreements to send a telegraph message, [FN91] to in-
sure plaintiff's business, [FN92] or to repair his truck [FN93] are special relationships that do not to fall within the no-
duty-in-tort rule. Such situations are distinguishable from situations involving the sale of goods, the court has stated, be-
cause the sale of goods does "not involve the rendering of personal services by one with specialized knowledge and ex-
perience." [FN94] 
*248 In Duffln, the court stated its intention "to defme the parameters" of the "'special relationship' exception." 
[FN95] The term, it wrote, "refers to those situations where the relationship between the parties is such that it would be 
equitable to impose such a duty." [FN96] Unfortunately, this definition is singularly unhelpful because the key term -
"equitable" - provides so little guidance. Although the court does supplement its defmition with an examination of case 
law, it looks at a single case - McAlvain v. General Insurance Co. of A."llerica. [FN97] As a result, the court's analysis is 
incomplete and potentially misleading. [FN98} In part, the analytical problems with the opinion may be traceable to the 
fact that duty questions arise episodically and piecemeal in the process of deciding cases; to defme the category thor-
oughly requires an analysis of a large number of cases that are not easily collected. [FN99] In part, the problem is also 
due to the court's narrow focus on the relationship question as a subset of the economic loss issue rather than as a recur-
rent source of a duty of care. 
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Whatever the source of the problem, the court's definition is doubly under-inclusive. First, it failed to note that 
"special relationship" is a source of duty applicable to more than just economic loss cases: a special relationship, for ex-
ample, is an exception to the nonfeasance/misfeasance divide in negligence. That is, a special relationship may be the 
source of a duty to protect someone from a risk not of the duty-bound person's making. [FNlOO] The court's analysis thus 
does not include the full range of special-relationship cases. Second, the existence of a special relationship is not the sole 
source of exceptions to the no-duty-to-prevent-economic-loss-in-tort rule. Other factors - such as the status of the defend-
ant [FNIOIJ - may give rise to a duty to take care to prevent economic loss. Although the court stated that it *249 was 
canvassing the topic, [FN102] it in fact omitted a number of cases and categories that should be included in any complete 
summary. 
1. The Status of the Service Provider as a Source of Duty 
One of the earliest sources of duty in tort involved the so-called "public callings." At the common law, common car-
riers, innkeepers, and the like had tort duties of due care imposed on them beyond any duties they may have assumed in 
contract. [FN103] It thus is not surprising that businesses which fit within the category or which are sufficiently analog-
ous to it [FN104]- are also subject to liability for pure economic loss in tort. [FNI05] 
For example, in Strong v. Western Union Telegraph Co. [FN106] plaintiff brought an action for damages caused by a 
telegraph message that had inadvertently misquoted the price of cattle being bought and sold. Although the contract 
between the telegraph company and the sender expressly stated that the company would not be liable for the results of a 
mistransmission and offered the sender the opportunity to have the message verified for an additional charge, the court 
set aside the contractual limitation on the ground that public policy precluded defendant from contracting away liability 
for its own negligence. [FNI 07] In reaching this decision, the court emphasized the quasi-public nature of the company 
as evidenced by its charter: 
While [the telegraph company] may make rules and regulations in regard to the conduct of its business, the 
reasonableness or unreasonableness of such rules must be determined with reference to public policy, precisely as 
in the case of common carriers. Public policy is that principle of law under which freedom of contract or private 
dealing is restricted by *250 law for the good of the community - the public good. A stipulation in a contract 
which exempts the corporation from damages for its own negligence is void when applied to a telegraph company 
as well as when applied to a common carrier. [FN108] 
Having concluded that the company was precluded from disclaiming liability, the court invoked traditional tort prin-
ciples: transmission of messages - particularly transmissions involving commercial transactions involved a foreseeable 
risk ofharm and thus a duty to act with care. [FN109] 
Similarly, in Lane v. Oregon Short Line Railroad [FNllO] plaintiff was able to sue in tort for the loss of lambs 
shipped over the defendant's line - despite the fact that the contract with the carrier provided that the shipper would, "at 
his own risk and expense, load, unload, care for, feed and water the stock until delivery." [FNill] En route to their des-
tination, the lambs were unloaded for feeding into pens defendant provided. Plaintiff left the lambs unattended overnight 
in the pens. When he returned the following morning, thirty-eight lambs were missing. Although the court reversed a jury 
verdict for the plaintiff, it did so on the grounds that plaintiff had failed to prove that defendant was negligent rather than 
on the grounds that plaintiff could not recover for pure economic loss in tort: 
It is the duty of a carrier transporting livestock to furnish reasonable and proper facilities and opportunities for 
feeding, watering and resting them .... 
It is claimed that the failure to provide the gates with patented locks was negligence. No inference of negli-
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gence can be drawn from such failure, unless there was a showing of such circumstances that a prudent person 
would have provided locks, as, for example, that others in the community locked their pens and corrals in which 
livestock was kept at night, or that sheep or other livestock had escaped from the pens previously, or that it was 
customary for railroad stockyards to be provided with locks. [FN112] 
Such public calling cases emphasize the nature of one type of "special relationship." As the court in Strong noted, 
these cases share a common core: one individual is required to surrender control over a *251 risk to another person who 
therefore assumes responsibility for protecting the flrst individual -
the public are compelled to rely absolutely on the care and diligence of the company in the transmission of 
messages, and by reason of those powers and the relation it sustains to the public, it is obligated to perform the du-
ties it is chartered to perform with the care, skill and diligence [of] a prudent man .... [FN113] 
When a traveler checks into an inn and deposits his weapons (think broad swords and six shooters [FN114]) with the 
innkeeper, the traveler becomes dependent for his personal safety on the care of the innkeeper. [FN115] When a traveler 
books passage on a common carrier, the traveler is forced to rely upon the skill of the carrier. [FN116] When an indi-
vidual stores property in a warehouse, that person gives up her power to protect the property and the warehouseman be-
comes responsible for their safe storage. [FN117] 
The relationship has extended beyond the traditional common law public callings. Thus, when an individual leases 
personal property such as a barge, [FN118] a truck, [FN119] cattle, [FN120] or sheep [FN121] to another, the lessee has 
a duty to act with due care to return the property in reasonable condition to the lessor. In each of the cases, one person 
gives up the power to protect himself or his property against risk and necessarily relies upon another person to guard 
against that risk. The courts have responded to such control/dependence relationships by imposing a duty of care. 
2. Service Providers with Special Knowledge, Judgment, or Skill 
A closely related category of special relationships involve professionals and others with special knowledge, judg-
ment, or skill. Historically, *252 the public-calling category and the specialized-service-providers category were nearly 
synonymous. One early English legal treatise, for example, stated that 
if a Smith prick my horse with a nail, &c. I shall have my action of the Case against him, without any war-
ranty by the smith to do it well .... For it is the duty of every Artificer to exercise his art right, &c. truly as he 
ought. [FNl22] 
As Strong demonstrates, however, the rationales invoked in the public calling cases - the public nature of the busi-
nesses and the control/dependence nature of the relationship - have diverged from those applicable to service providers 
who possess special knowledge, judgment, or skill. While Strong emphasized the "public utility nature" of the telegraph, 
the leading Idaho case on the liability of service providers emphasized the special expertise of the defendant and the res-
ulting reliance of the plaintiff. 
a. Professional Service Providers 
In McAlvain v. General Insurance Co. of America, [FN123] plaintiff purchased a business through defendant, a real 
estate agent who also sold insurance. The agent handled both the sale and the plaintiffs subsequent insurance require-
ments. Plaintiff requested sufficient insurance to cover the business and its inventory fully. The agent, however, insured 
the business for less than the full amount - a fact that the owner discovered after the business burned. The court rejected 
the defendant's argument that it had only contractual duties to the plaintiff: 
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A person in the business of selling insurance holds himself out to the public as being experienced and know-
ledgeable in this complicated and specialized field. The interest of the state that competent persons become insur-
ance agents is demonstrated by the requirement that they be licensed by the state, pass an examination admin-
istered by the state, and meet certain qualifications. An insurance agent performs a personal service for his client, 
in advising him about the kinds and extent of desired coverage and in choosing the appropriate insurance contract 
for the insured. Ordinarily, an insured will look to his insurance agent, relying, not unreasonably, on his expertise 
in placing his insurance problems in the agent's *253 hands. When an insurance agent performs his services negli-
gently, to the insured's injury, he should be held liable for that negligence just as would an attorney, architect, en-
gineer, physician or any other professional who negligently performs personal services. [FN124] 
These factors - the expertise of the agent, the reliance of the client, and the personal relationship between them - the 
court asserted, distinguished the plaintiff's claim in McAlvain from that in Taylor which involved only the sale of pota-
toes and thus did not involve "the rendering of personal services by one with specialized knowledge and experience" 
present in McAlvain. [FN125] As the court in Duffm stated, in McAlvain the court "emphasized the fact that an insur-
ance agent holds himself out to the public as having expertise regarding a specialized function, and that, by so doing, the 
agent induces reliance on his superior knowledge and skill." [FN126] 
This rationale is generally applicable to professionals and the court has consistently applied tort standards of liability 
to a broad range of professionals - accountants, [FN127] architects, [FN128] attorneys, [FN129] surveyors, [FN130] not-
ary publics, [FN131] and title companies [FN132] - despite the contractual source of the relationship between the parties 
and the fact that the loss is purely economic. 
In such cases, the contract forms the basis of the relationship. As a result, the scope of the obligation assumed under 
the contract or the conduct of the parties pursuant to the agreement is potentially relevant *254 to a determination of 
whether the defendant breached the imposed duty in tort. For example, when the litigation involves situations in which 
defendant has not acted - situations that have traditionlly been labeled "nonfeasance" - questions of the existence of an 
agreement are potentially relevant. In Bales v. General Insurance Co. of America, [FN133] the agent for the insurance 
company agreed to renew an insurance policy on plaintiff's oats that were located in a warehouse. When the warehouse 
burned, it was discovered that the agent had failed to renew the policy. Noting that liability was predicated on "the negli-
gence of [defendant's] agent whereby he failed to execute an agreement to renew a policy of insurance," [FN134] the 
court evaluated and rejected a series of contract defenses - lack of mutuality and indefmiteness of terms - before conclud- ing: 
Again we call attention that this is not an action on a contract of insurance, but is an action for damages grow-
ing out of the breach of a duty which [defendant] owed [plaintiff] to renew the insurance on his oats . 
. . . The failure to perform [this duty] in this case caused [plaintiff] to be without the protection of a policy of 
insurance when his oats were destroyed, and rendered [defendant] liable for his resulting damage. [FN135] 
In the absence of a contract, defendant had no duty to do something for the plaintiff and, in the absence of an obliga-
tion to act, would not have breached a tort duty owed to plaintiff. [FN136J 
More commonly, the plaintiff and defendant will have engaged in conduct that will both provide evidence of the ex-
istence of a promissory relationship and surmount the misfeasance/nonfeasance dichotomy. For example, in a case in-
volving an attorney who contacted a former client about a potential investment and who then provided the requisite legal 
advice for the deal, plaintiff argued that the attorney had assumed a duty to exercise care to protect his interests - even 
though there was no formal relationship between the parties. The *255 court agreed that the facts could be so understood, 
noting that a letter from the client to the attorney "can be viewed as an offer for Runft [the attorney) to enter a unilateral 
© 2011 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
NOTICE OF CITATION OF ADDITIONAL AUTHORITY 
http://web2. westlaw .com/printlprintstream.aspx?mt=BusinessPrac&utid=2&prft=HTMLE... 8/12/2011 
Page 16 of46 
34 IDLR225 Page 16 
34 Idaho L. Rev. 225 
contract. Although the breach of an assumed duty claim sounds in tort, evidence to support the existence of an assumed 
duty can be contractual in nature." [FN137] Thus the letter and the attorney's subsequent actions were sufficient to create 
a triable issue on whether the attorney had assumed a duty to protect plaintiff from his subsequent economic losses in the 
business deal. 
Not all white-collar or professional services give rise to special relationships. For example, in Black Canyon Rac-
quetball Club, Inc. v. Idaho First National Bank, [FN138] plaintiff sought loans from the bank to expand and remodel its 
business. Following protracted negotiations, the bank refused to make the loans plaintiff sought. Plaintiff responded by 
filing suit alleging that defendant had made an oral contract to loan the funds and that it had also breached several tort 
duties. After concluding that there was no contract, the court turned to plaintiff's tort claims which were partially predic-
ated upon the argument that the relationship between the bank and a customer was analogous to that between an insurer 
and an insured. The court disagreed. The relationship between a bank and its customers was not a special relationship be-
cause it lacked the "personal" and "non-commercial" nature that characterized the relationship between insurer and in-
sured; "[r]ather, the transaction here was a commercial one, which would have created a debtor-creditor relationship." 
[FNI39) The lack of the "personal" element was fatal to the claim. 
Just as not all professional relationships are special, so all special relationships are not professional: as the court in 
Duffin recognized, [FN140] the McAlvain rationale has also been applied beyond the traditional bounds of what can be 
categorized as "professional" occupations. The extension of the duty of care beyond public callings and professionals 
has, however, proved more problematic. 
*256 b. Non-Professional Service Providers 
The court's handling of cases involving non-professional service providers has not been entirely consistent. Two lines 
of decisions reveal the contours of the problem. 
The first series of cases involve disputes that result from contracts to drill wells or install machinery or repair equip-
ment. For example, Knoblock v. Arenguena [FN141] was a dispute that arose out of an oral agreement to drill a well. 
After plaintiff completed the well, defendant refused to pay contending that the hole was not sufficiently straight to ac-
commodate a pump. The court began with the proposition that defendant's agreement to drill the well "carried with it an 
implied obligation to do the work in a good and workmanlike manner" because 
[a]ccompanying every contract is a common-law duty to perform with care, skill, reasonable expedience, and 
faithfulness the thing agreed to be done, and a negligent failure to observe any of these conditions is a tort, as well 
as a breach oftl1e contract. [FN142] 
After reviewing the evidence, the court concluded that the trial court's fmding that "the well was not such a well as 
would be drilled in a good and workmanlike manner so as to fulfill the purpose for which it was intended" was supported 
by substantial evidence and affirmed the judgment for plaintiff. [FN143] 
Similarly, in Dick v. Reese, [FN144] the court imposed a negligence standard onto a contract for the repair of a truck. 
The law, the court held, "implies a contract that the work shall be done with due care and competent skill." [FN145) 
Thus, the "garageman must exercise ordinary care and skill in making the repairs." [FN146] The court has reached a sim-
ilar conclusion in other cases. [FN147] 
*257 On the other hand, the court has on occasion adopted an extremely formalistic approach. [FN148] For example, 
in Steiner Corp. v. American District Telegraph, [FN149] defendant installed a fire alarm system in plaintiff's business 
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and contracted to maintain the system, including monthly inspections. When the building caught fire, the alann system 
failed. Defendant, it was subsequently determined, had not checked the system for eight months prior to the ftre. 
Plaintiff's argument that defendant was liable for negligently rendering a service was rejected by the court on the ground 
that defendant's conduct was "nonfeasance": 
The actions alleged to have caused damage to Steiner were clearly acts of omission or nonfeasance, as op-
posed to active negligence or misfeasance. Steiner alleges that ADT failed to properly perform its duty to inspect 
and maintain the frre alarm system. Thus, a clear duty must be shown to exist by operation of law, separate and 
apart from the contractual duty to maintain the equipment. It is clear from the allegations in this complaint that 
such a separate duty cannot be shown. Apart from this contract, ADT could not be said to have a duty to maintain 
equipment in Steiner Corporation's building. Steiner has not pointed to any statutory duty of suppliers of fire alarm 
systems, nor pointed to any common law duty of a supplier to his customer. The only duty to which ADT could be 
held under the facts of this case is that which arose by virtue of the contract obligating it to maintain this frre alann 
system. [FN150] 
The difficulty with this approach is its artificiality. Consider, for example, this parallel restatement of Knoblock: 
Arenguena's allegations that Knoblock failed to properly perform his duty to drill the well must fail in the absence of a 
clear duty, shown to exist by operation of law, separate and apart from the contractual duty to drill the well. But apart 
from his contract to drill the well, Knoblock had no duty to do so. 
The duty that the court found in Knoblock v. Arenguena- a duty to drill with due care- is no less a conclusory state-
ment than the opposite conclusion reached in Steiner Corp. v. American District Telegraph. For example, American Dis-
trict Telegraph had serviced the fue alanns for some period of time- it had, in other words, *258 "acted." Should the fact 
that it stopped "acting" be determinative of plaintiff's legal rights? If Knoblock had simply given up on his efforts to 
straighten the well at some point- stopped acting - would Arenguena have been limited to his contractual claim? The ul-
timate problem is that the misfeasance/nonfeasance dichotomy is highly manipulable; it often becomes a conclusory label 
rather than a factual description. 
The Steiner court alternatively held plaintiff's negligence claim was barred by the contract's exculpatory clause. The 
court rejected the argument that the exculpatory clause should be voided as contrary to public policy because there was 
neither "an obvious disadvantage in bargaining power" nor a "public duty" such as that imposed on public utilities and 
common carriers. [FN151J 
Another irrigation-well case reached a similar conclusion. In Rawlings v. Layne & Bowler Pump Co., [FN152] 
plaintiff contracted with defendant for the sale and installation of an irrigation pump. The pump was installed carelessly 
and plaintiff brought a negligence action for the resulting crop losses. Without commenting on the choice, the court 
treated the issue exclusively as a question of contract law and upheld an exculpatory clause in the contract. [FN153] 
It is possible to distinguish the cases based on the existence of an exculpatory clause in the service contract. Under 
this reading Knoblock and Steiner simply establish contrary presumptions: when a clause is included, it will generally be 
enforced; [FN154] when there is no clause, on the other hand, there is a presumption that a service contract includes "a 
common-law duty to perform with care, skill, reasonable expedience, and faithfulness the thing agreed to be done, and a 
negligent failure to observe any of these conditions is a tort, as well as a breach of the contract." [FN155] 
Similarly, the cases might be distinguished by the existence of a "special relationship" between the parties. Although 
it is possible to characterize the relationship between the pump repairer and the pump owner as "special" - it is predic-
ated upon a personal relationship involving the expertise of the repairer and the reliance of the *259 owner - the relation-
© 2011 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
NOTICE OF CITATION OF ADDITIONAL AUTHORITY 
http:/ /web2. westlaw .com/printlprintstream.aspx?mt=BusinessPrac&utid=2&prft=HTMLE... 8/12/2011 
Page 18 of46 
34 IDLR225 Page 18 
34 Idaho L Rev. 225 
ship does not seem intuitively to be any more special than that between the fire alarm installer and the building owner. 
The difficulty is that the designation of some relationships as "special" tends to be conclusory because the court has 
provided little explicitly on how to determine when a relationship is "special." Although the court has stated that "[t]he 
'special relationship' exception generally pertains to claims against professionals who perform personal services, such as 
physicians, attorneys, architects, engineers and insurance agents," [FN156] the court's application of the "special rela-
tionship" category has been broader than the traditional meaning of the term "professionals." The court has found a spe-
cial relationship not only when physicians, attorneys, architects, engineers and insurance agents are involved, but also 
when the service provider is a well driller, [FN157] a pump repairer, [FN158] an automobile repairer, [FN159] a boiler 
repairer, [FN160] a water-heater installer, [FN161] an aircraft mechanic, [FN162] a plumber, [FN163] and a title com-
pany. [FN164] 
The cases in which the court has found special relationships share a web of recurrent factors rather than a finite list of 
elements. As a threshold matter, the cases generally involve personal relationships. As the court has noted, it is this per-
sonal element that distinguished the case from cases involving the sale of goods, cases that do "not involve the rendering 
of personal services by one with specialized knowledge and experience." [FN165] In addition, the cases often involve 
some expertise on the part of the defendant and a corresponding reliance by the plaintiff coupled with a foreseeable risk 
that is within the expert's control. The court's statement in McAlvain about the relationship of the insured to the insur-
ance agent is broadly applicable to *260 these relationships: "Ordinarily, an insured will look to his insurance agent, re-
lying, not unreasonably, on his expertise in placing his insurance problems in the agent's hands." [FN166] It is possible 
to substitute "attorney" or "architect" or "accountant" for "insurance agent" without distorting the sentence or its point. 
"Well driller" and "automobile repairer" also do not significantly misstate the underlying relationship - nor, for that mat-
ter, does or should "frre alarm provider." 
D. Poor Service: Service Contracts Between Defendant and a Third Party 
The second category of service contract cases involve the misperformance of a service contract between defendant 
and a third party; breach of this contract results in economic loss to plaintiff. Can the plaintiff recover her losses? 
The cases fall into two, overlapping groups. In the first, defendant breaches a contract to perform a service owed to a 
third party. For example, a construction company contracts with a city to redevelop its blighted urban core and agrees 
both to take steps to mitigate potential losses to businesses in the core and to complete the work by a specified date. A 
business in the redevelopment area suffers economic losses when customers avoid shopping at her store because the con-
struction company fails to meet its contractual obligations. [FN167] 
The second group of cases is a variation that has traditionally been characterized as "misrepresentation." [FN168] For 
example, a bank contracts with an accounting f1rm to prepare a financial statement of its business. The accountant pre-
pares an audit; plaintiff subsequently loans the bank money based on the audit. After the borrower-bank goes into receiv-
ership, the lender sues the accountant. [FN169] 
Although there are paradigmatically pure cases - cases in which the misperformed service involves no misrepresenta-
tion and misrepresentation cases that involve no misperformed service - the two groups often overlap. That is, the mis-
representation in many *261 cases involves statements about a negligently performed service. Consider, for example, the 
famous Cardozo opinion Glanzer v. Shepard. [FN170] Plaintiff contracted to purchase 905 bags of beans from a third 
party, agreeing to pay a specified price per pound. The seller contracted with defendant to weigh the beans. Defendant 
provided both the seller and plaintiff with a statement of the weight. Defendant unfortunately had misweighed and 
plaintiff - who had overpaid - brought suit to recover his loss. Cardozo characterized the facts as involving a misrepres-
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entation. Defendant, in Cardozo's view, had misrepresented the weight of the beans; for Cardozo, the issue was whether 
defendant could be held liable for that misrepresentation in the absence of a contract with the plaintiff. Note, however, 
that the case can with equal accuracy be characterized as the negligent performance of service: defendant had negligently 
misweighed the beans. [FN171] Similarly, in McAlvain v. General Insurance Co. of America, [FN172] defendant's con-
duct can be viewed either as the negligent performance of a service (insuring the business) or as a negligent misrepres-
entation (representing that the business had been fully insured). 
1. "Pure" Services 
The leading Idaho case is Just's, Inc. v. Arrington Construction Co. [FN173] The construction company and the City 
of Idaho Falls entered into a contract for the renovation of the city's blighted urban core. The contract required defendant 
to take specified steps to minimize the disruption to businesses in the area being renovated. Defendant failed to comply 
with the mitigation measures and did not finish the renovation in a timely manner. Plaintiff brought a contract action 
claiming to be a third-party beneficiary of the contract between the company and the city; it also joined a tort claim, con-
tending that defendant's negligent conduct had caused it economic loss. Citing concerns for unlimited and disproportion-
ate liability, the court refused to allow plaintiff to recover in tort. [FN174] 
*262 The court's concern is the recurrent one: the fear that liability will exceed fault. As the court noted in Just's, the 
traditional tort liability-limiting mechanism - foreseeability - provides no real limit in many pure economic loss situ-
ations: "In contrast to the recognized liability for personal injuries and property damage, with its inherent limitations of 
size, parties and time, liability for all the economic repercussions of a negligent act would be virt'ually open-ended." 
(FN175] If Just's were permitted to recover, there would be no reason to deny recovery to Just's suppliers and creditors 
and its suppliers' suppliers and creditors ad infinitum. 
2. "Pure" Misrepresentation 
The current Idaho law on recovery of economic loss for negligent misrepresentation is traceable to two Cardozo de-
cisions: Glanzer v. Shepard (FN176]- the bean weighing case- and Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven & Co. [FN177] 
In Ultrarnares, a company contracted with the accounting firm Touche, Niven & Co. to prepare a certified balance sheet 
of its assets and liabilities. The firm prepared thirty-two copies of the audit, one of which was used to obtain a loan from 
illtramares. Unfortunately, the borrower was insolvent at the time of the audit and the loan became a loss. Ultramares 
sued the accounting firm for its negligence in completing the audit. 
In Glanzer, the court held the bean weigher liable; in Ultramares, the court refused to extend liability to the account-
ant because "a thoughtless slip or blunder ... may expose [defendants] to a liability in an indeterminate amount for an 
indeterminate time to an indeterminate class." [FN178] Cardozo distinguished Glanzer as involving a relationship 
between the bean weigher and the bean purchaser that was "so close as to approach privity." [FN179] For the court, the 
privity substitute served to limit the weigher's potential liability; no similar limit was present in Ultramares. 
The next significant case was decided in 1985 when the New York Court of Appeals handed down Credit Alliance 
Corp. v. Arthur Andersen & Co. [FN180] The case involved an extension of credit to a third party based on a consolid-
ated tmancial statement prepared by an accounting finn. The court reexamined and reaffrrmed its prior decisions in Glan-
zer and illtramares, concluding that an accountant could *263 be held liable to a noncontractual party if three require-
ments were satisfied: "(1) the accountant must have been aware that the fmancial reports were to be used for a particular 
purpose or purposes; (2) in the furtherance of which a known party or parties was intended to rely; and (3) there must 
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have been some conduct on the part of the accountants linking them to that party or parties." [FN181] The court thought 
that these requirements were a sufficient privity substitute that restricted potential liability within manageable bounds. 
The New York case law is relevant because of the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in Idaho Bank & Trust Co. v. First 
Bancorp. [FNI82] Idaho Bank & Trust was a negligence action brought by a lender against an accounting ftnn that had 
been employed by the borrower to prepare a fmancial statement of the borrower's business. The accountant prepared an 
audit; The lender loaned money based on it. After the borrower went into receivership, the lender sued the accountant. 
On appeal from an order dismissing the claim, the court noted the unlimited liability issue and then simply and without 
additional analysis adopted the decision of the New York Court of Appeals in Credit Alliance. [FN183] The tripartite test 
for liability for negligent misrepresentation thus became Idaho law. [FN184 J 
E. Tort Duties Owed to Third Parties 
Although many pure economic loss cases lie on the boundary between tort and contract, this is not universally true. 
When one person breaches a tort duty owed to a third party, that breach may affect the economic interests of others. For 
example, when a person is killed or injured in an automobile accident, the decedent's business partners may well suffer 
economic loss as a result of the death or injury. Such economic interests generally are not recoverable in tort. In Everett 
v. Trunnell, [FN185] for example, the court summarily rejected such a claim, noting that "a partnership has no right to 
recover for the negligent injury to a partner." [FN186] 
*264 The most extensive discussion of the rationale for this position was set out in Cain v. Vollmer. [FN187] Cain 
was the master of an apprentice jockey who sued for proftts he lost as a result of physical injuries to the apprentice. Al-
though the court had previously allowed the jockey to recover his lost wages, [FN188] it rejected the master's claim, em-
phasizing the distinction between the master's action for lost proftts and the jockey's action for personal injury and the 
resultant loss of earning capacity: 
In this case the one seeking damages is a race-horse man - one who follows the races and enters his horses and 
... depends on making his money by winning prizes in the various races. That there is a wide difference between 
the nature and character of damages asked in each of these cases cannot escape the attention of anyone. The one is 
direct; the other is proximate and dependant on innumerable secondary and intervening causes. The jockey earned 
a salary and certain sums for "outside mounts" whether he won the race or not. This was his earning capacity. On 
the other hand, the jockey alone cannot win the race; he must have a fleet horse ... and upon the whole these ima-
ginative proftts may dwindle into real losses. 
. . . [T]he proftts it is claimed appellant would have realized depend on so many intervening circumstances 
and contingencies, the unfavorable happening of any of which would dissipate these prospective gains. We are 
fully satisfted that prospective proftts to a race-horse man for races that have never been run and race meets and 
associations that have never been held and against all contestants, is entirely too remote, uncertain and indetermin-
able to be 
allowed. [FN189] 
The court's concern is apparent: the economic losses that the race-horse man sought were uncertain and therefore po-
tentially unlimited. 
In addition to this fear of speculative awards and unlimited liability, the decision in cases such as Everett rest upon 
the common law belief that tort actions are personal to the injured party [FN190) - a belief that reflected the concern with 
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limiting liability to reasonable *265 bounds. The combination of these concerns supports a broad prohibition against al-
lowing recovery for losses attributable to the breach of a tort duty owed to a third party rather than to the plaintiff. 
F. Legislative Standards as a Source of Duty 
An often-neglected category of cases involves a legislative standard that creates the applicable tort duty of care. This 
is a quite heterogeneous group of cases. 
The loss may be caused by the misperformance of a service contract between defendant and a third party when de-
fendant is under a statutory obligation to protect plaintiff's interests. For example, an abstracter prepared an abstract of 
title to a parcel of land for the landowner. The abstracter failed to note that the land had been mortgaged. Plaintiff pur-
chased the land relying on the abstract. When he was subsequently required to redeem the parcel, plaintiff brought an ac-
tion against the abstracter who argued that his liability was determined by contract and thus did not extend to plaintiff 
with whom it was not in privity. In Merrill v. Fremont Abstract Co., [FN191] the court held that this general rule had 
been abrogated by statute: "it was evidently the intention of the Legislature to include within its protection any person 
that might suffer damage by reason of the neglect or omission of the abstracter ... due to carelessness." [FN192] The 
statute, in other words, created a tort duty owed to people not in privity of contract with the title company. 
In other situations, the statutory duty to protect against economic loss may exist independently of contract. For ex-
ample, in Oppenheimer Industries v. Johnson Cattle Co. [FN193] plaintiff had contracted with Bohlen Cattle Company to 
care for cattle that Oppenheimer owned. Bohlen subsequently rebranded some 1,681 head of cattle and sold them at auc-
tion. When Oppenheimer discovered its loss, it brought suit against the State Brand Board, contending that one of the 
Board's inspectors had violated its regulations which required inspectors to demand proof of ownership when brands 
were "fresh." The court agreed: the regulation imposed a duty on brand inspectors to demand proof of ovmership - and 
the beneficiaries of that duty included cattle owners. [FN194] 
*266 By far the most common example of a legislatively created duty, however, is the state's wrongful death act. The 
common law viewed the claim arising from the breach of a tort duty as personal to the injured person; as a result, the law 
did not recognize claims for injuries resulting from the death of a third party. Decedent's heirs had no better claim for 
their losses than did decedent's partners. [FN195] This was reversed by statute. [FN196] As a result, a decedent's heirs 
may now recover for their economic losses attributable to tortious conduct resulting in the death. 
V. A TRANSITIONAL SUMMARY 
This brief review of the Idaho case law on recovery of economic loss demonstrates that it is a good bit more complex 
than the general-rule-with-two-exceptions explanation that the court presents in Duffm - and even this more complex ty-
pology suffers from over-precision. There are, for example, a not-readily-classifiable group of decisions such as Hudson 
v. Cobbs. [FN197] The case grew out of a complex real estate transaction gone bad. Plaintiff purchased an office com-
plex only to discover that some of his "tenants" had signed sham advance rental agreements into order to enable the 
seller to convert a short-term loan into long-term fmancing and sell the property to him. After the bank foreclosed, 
plaintiff brought an action seeking to recover for negligent misrepresentation as well as fraud. The court held that the 
only duty that the "tenants" had to the plaintiff was under the contract to lease office space; plaintiff's claim was in con-
tract and not in tort. [FN198] The examples could be multiplied. 
Although incomplete, the typology does contain the majority of economic loss cases. It also reveals the underlying 
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policy concerns. 
*267 VI. POLICY AND RATIONALES 
The case law reflects two dominant policy concerns. On the one hand, the court has sought to preserve contract 
against the encroachment of tort. The prohibition against recovering pure economic loss in tort serves this goal: 
The law of negligence requires the defendant to exercise due care to build a tractor that does not harm person 
or property. If the defendant fails to exercise such due care it is of course liable for the resulting injury to person or 
property as well as other losses which naturally follow from that injury. However, the law of negligence does not 
impose on International Harvester a duty to build a tractor that plows fast enough and breaks down infrequently 
enough for Clark to make profit in his custom farming business. [FN199] 
On the other hand, the court has also expressed repeated concern over the potential for unlimited liability inherent in 
pure economic loss situations. Again, the prohibition against recovering pure economic loss in tort serves this policy goal: 
[A] ... rule, which would allow compensation for losses of economic advantage caused by the defendant's 
negligence, would impose too heavy and unpredictable a burden on the defendant's conduct . 
. . . In contrast to the recognized liability for personal injury and property damage, with its inherent limitations 
of size, parties and time, liability for all the economic repercussions of a negligent act would be virtually open 
-ended. [FN200] 
The sometimes-conflicting, sometimes-reinforcing interaction of these policies on the underlying rationales for tort 
and contract liability accounts for at least part of the court's apparent scatter-shot approach to pure economic loss cases. 
A. Tort vs. Contract 
I. Shoddy Goods 
On a doctrinal level, cases involving the sale of goods present the clearest situation in which the core principles of 
both tort and contract *268 support the same result: neither the potato seller nor the tractor or shop buyer is endangered 
by their contractual partners - and when person or property is not endangered, society's interest in imposing safety stand-
ards through tort law is not implicated. [FN20 1 J Instead, the buyers were disappointed by the quality of their contractual 
partner's performance - and quality (i.e., warranty) is a contract concern. As the court stated in Clark, tort is concerned 
with protecting persons and property rather than with guaranteeing the purchaser a profit. [FN202] If plaintiff wants a 
profitable tractor, he must be sure that the seller promises to provide him such a tractor. 
Shoddy goods causing only economic loss thus creates the least tension between tort and contract - and presents the 
simplest case for the judiciary. [FN203] 
2. Poor Service 
Cases involving the misperformance of service contracts are impossibly diverse because the variety of services is so 
great: one person hires another to drill a well, to teach children reading and mathematics, to insure a business, to run a 
drill press, to install and maintain a fire alarm system, or to audit a company's books. Despite the diversity, however, ser-
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vice contracts do share underlying similarities. 
Most significantly, service contracts are employment contracts. As such, they have a different feel than contracts for 
the purchase of goods in which the purchaser and the manufacturer seldom meet face-to-face. While the personal element 
in service contracts is declining *269 with the rise of the service economy, service contracts remain more personal be-
cause they involve some direct contact between the contracting parties - a level of personal interaction that the purchaser 
of a product seldom has with its manufacturer. 
It is this rather imprecise difference - the personal nature of the relationship - that forms the basis for the differing 
treatment of service contracts. As the court has commented in a related context, "the special relationship that exists 
between insurer and insured" is based on "the unique 'personal' (non-commercial) nature of insurance contracts." 
[FN204] Of course not all service relationships give rise to a tort duty of care; something more than a personal relation-
ship is necessary. That something more is covered by the unhelpful label of "special relationships," a mixed group that 
includes relationships that embody at least two different sets of recurrent factors. On the one hand, there are relationships 
in which one person surrenders the power to protect himself against a risk and thereby becomes dependent upon another 
for his protection. Common carriers, innkeepers, and other falling within the common-law category of "public callings" 
are examples of this type of special relationship. The category, however, is broader than the common-law public-callings 
classification since it includes a range of "custodial" relationships. [FN205] On the other hand, there are relationships in 
which the service provider has some expertise, specialized judgment or skill. Although the court has not been either en-
tirely clear or entirely consistent in its decision& including or excluding service providers, the factors that appear to unite 
the cases include the service providers special knowledge, judgment, or skill in a field that lies outside the knowledge of 
the "reasonable person" and that involves a risk of harm. Although such service providers are often professionals - doc-
tors, lawyers, and architects - the category also includes providers of specialized services such as automobile mechanics, 
well drillers, boiler repairers, water-heater installers, and the like. Beneath the variability are a web of similarities: a per-
sonal relationship involving control/expertise of a risk on one side and dependence/reliance on the other. 
The conclusion that a service provider owes a duty of care to the service purchaser - that the relationship between 
them is "special" *270 -is often consistent with both tort and contract rationales. On the one hand, when a person (the 
service purchaser) either surrenders the power to protect himself against a risk (the passenger on a common carrier) or 
purchases the service because of the expertise of the provider in guarding against a risk (the la\\'Yer for her knowledge of 
the intricacies of drafting a will), imposition of a tort duty reinforces societal risk-reduction objectives. If the service pro-
vider were under no duty of care to protect the service purchaser, the purchaser would be largely unprotected. The impos-
ition of a duty in such cases thus is consistent with tort principles. 
On the other hand, contract objectives are also likely to be advanced in such cases because an obligation to act with 
due care is likely to correspond to the parties' implicit understanding of the relationship: one purchases the common car-
rier's best efforts or the lawyer's reasonable drafting ability. Indeed, courts are generally unwilling to find liability under 
contract's no-fault theories of recovery. As the court noted in a case involving an aircraft mechanic, 
[i]n circumstances involving the rendition of personal services the duty upon the actor is to perform the ser-
vices in a workmanlike manner. . . . "In both instances the standard of care is imposed by law and under either 
[tort or contract] theor[ies] there is no difference in the standard of care required of the party rendering the person-
al service." [FN206] 
Services, in short, generally are measured against a negligence, reasonable-care standard - regardless of whether the 
court writes in terms of contract or tort. [FN207] 
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B. Unlimited Liability 
The second recurrent policy concern is the possibility of unlimited or (at least) disproportionate liability. The com-
mercially interconnected nature of modem society has increased the possibility that a single event can spread decreasing 
economic ramifications like widening circles through a pond of water. A moment's inattention could *271 result in dev-
astating liability. The concern is not the size of the potential loss to any one person but rather the unknown potential ex-
tent of liability, the unknown number of persons and companies that might be injured. As the Idaho Supreme Court 
noted, allowing recovery of pure economic loss might "impose too heavy and unpredictable a burden" because, unlike li-
ability for personal injury or property damage, with their "inherent limitations of size, parties and time, liability for all 
the economic repercussions of a negligent act would be virtually open-ended." (FN208] 
This concern is insignificant in cases in which there is a contract between the parties. When defendant contracts to 
sell goods or to provide a service to plaintiff, privity provides a limit to potential liability. While the defendant doubtless 
takes the plaintiff as she finds him, [FN209] it is an identified plaintiff rather than an unknowable and indefinite group of 
plaintiffs. This limitation is not present when defendant contracts with a third party - particularly when the contract is for 
the provisions of services that involve representations that can pass along an unforeseeably convoluted chain. 
1. Shoddy Goods 
When A.'llerican Building Company (ABC) fabricated a metal building to specifications provided by its local dealer, 
[FN210] it doubtless knew (at least in general terms) that there was a contractor and an ultimate purchaser. Although 
ABC might not have known their actual identities, it at least knew that such entities existed and its potential liability to 
them was bounded by the passage of the goods down the distribution stream; the fact that ABC was unlikely to have 
known the purposes for which Corrado purchased the building - and thus the magnitude of his potential losses - is not 
problematic since his generic identity was known. If economic losses were restricted to these foreseeable parties - the 
contractor and ultimate purchaser - the concern with unlimited liability would not affect decisions in cases. Economic 
loss, however, is not so circumscribed: when the building was unsuitable for Corrado's aircraft maintenance business, 
Corrado was not alone in suffering economic losses. Commercial entities who would have used Corrado's service were 
forced to find alternative and potentially more costly alternatives; Corrado's parts suppliers *272 lost sales to Corrado for 
work that was not done; Corrado's suppliers' suppliers also lost sales - the losses rippled outward in nearly untraceable paths. 
The nearly untraceable, speculative nature of the losses raises a corollary concern: the potential for fraudulent claims. 
Corrado doubtless had a variety of potential suppliers. Which of those he would have chosen had the building not been 
defective so that he could have pursued his aircraft maintenance business is speculative - and the speculative nature mul-
tiplies at each stage of the distribution chain. Although this rippling effect is present in all economic loss cases involving 
shoddy goods, when there is no contract between the parties the courts lack a ready and principled reason (such as priv-
ity) to limit liability. These concerns originally supported rules limiting recovery in contract to parties in privity. While 
the significance of privity has been substantially reduced in contracts for the sale of goods, [FN2ll] there are doubly 
sound policy reasons for maintaining the barrier when the damages sought are such indirect economic losses. 
2. Poor Service 
When there is a contract between the parties for the provision of a service, privity of contract provides a limit for po-
tential liability by identifYing the affected party. When the court decides that a service-based relationship is sufficiently 
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"special" to be reinforced with a tort duty, the existence of a contract between the parties offers a principled limit to the 
potential liability of the service provider. 
\Vllen there is no contract between the parties, the threat of unlimited liability becomes the overriding concern. In 
"pure" service cases such as Just's, Inc. v. Arrington Construction Co., the widening circle of distributors and suppliers 
who lose sales raises this specter. Although the court might have fashioned a principled privity substitute in Just's it did 
.fmd the retailer to be a third-party beneficiary of the contract between Arrington Construction and the City of Idaho Falls 
[FN212] - the traditional negligence liability-limiting mechanism - foreseeability - does not do so because the ever-
widening circle of loss is eminently foreseeable. 
This problem is compounded when the service includes a representation. When an accountant contracts with a com-
pany to prepare a *273 .fmancial statement, she has no control over and is unlikely even to know of the uses to which the 
company may put the statement. If the accountant is careless in preparing the statement, she is exposed to potentially un-
limited liability. Such concerns initially led courts peremptorily to deny liability. The per se denial of any liability seems 
unfair, however, in some situations. For example, if the accountant knew the purposes for which the statement was pre-
pared, concerns for unlimited liability are less persuasive. In Glanzer v. Shepard, [FN213] the bean weigher not only 
knew of the purpose of his weighing but also knew the identity of the buyer; the relationship between weigher and pur-
chaser, the New York court subsequently wrote, was "so close as to approach privity." [FN214] When courts have found 
such principled limits on liability, they have been willing to impose liability on those whose negligent misrepresentations 
have caused economic loss to persons with whom they are not in privity. [FN215] This is, for example, the explicit ra-
tionale for the tripartite test in Credit Alliance: [FN216] the prongs of the test are designed to provide a nonarbitrary 
basis for rest.icting liability within manageable limits. 
3. Breach of Tort Duties Owed to Third Parties 
Concern for unlimited liability also lies at the center of the cases denying liability to third parties who suffer econom-
ic losses when a defendant breaches a tort duty to a third party. When the Lewiston Interstate Fair and Racing Associ-
ation allowed Norman and his sister Norma Vollmer to bring their greyhound onto the fair grounds, they breached their 
duty to Benjamin Franklin McClain, Jr., a jockey in the afternoon's races. McClain was permitted to recover for his eco-
nomic losses as well as his physical injuries when the Vollmer's dog decided to join the race. [FN217] McClain's em-
ployer, however, was denied recovery of his economic losses. The court's evident concern was the speculative and illim-
itable nature of the losses: 
We are fully satisfied that prospective profits to a race-horse man for races that have never been run and race 
meets and associations that have never been held and against all *274 contestants, is entirely too remote, uncertain 
and indeterminable to be allowed. [FN218) 
C. Some Conclusions 
When there is a contract between the parties, judicial concern focuses on preserving some space for contract in a tort 
universe; when there is no contract between the parties, judicial concern focuses on the potential for unlimited liability. 
Contrariwise, when there is a contract between the parties, there is no significant concern for unlimited liability; when 
there is no contract between the parties, the concern to preserve some breathing space for contract is minimal. 
Similarly, the tort concern for safety of person and property and the contract attention to representations about the 
quality of the bundles being exchanged interact in recurrent patterns. When safety is threatened - particularly human 
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safety - tort concerns are dominant; endangered persons are a primary concern. When safety is not an issue - when the 
person is disappointed rather than endangered - contract considerations are more important. 
Law, of course, is not mathematics. Individual cases require judgment. But in applying that judgment, judges should 
be attentive to underlying policies and the patterns they produce. 
VII. DUFFIN: A REPRISE 
Back to Duffm. 
Recall that the Duffms purchased seed potatoes from Crater Farms, Inc. (CFij on the condition that the seed was 
"certified" by the Idaho Crop Improvement Association (ICIA) as free of diseases and pests. CFI delivered the potatoes 
to the Duffrns in March and early April, 1988. At the end of April, however, an ICIA inspection determined that the CFI 
potatoes were infected with bacterial ring rot; ICIA therefore informed CFI that no further shipments could be sold as 
certified. Neither CFI nor ICIA informed the Duffms of the problem. The Duffins subsequently discovered that their crop 
was infected with bacterial ring rot. They brought suit against CFI in contract and against ICIA for negligence, alleging 
that they had suffered a variety of economic losses. [FN219] 
The supreme court reversed the trial court's summary judgment for ICIA, holding that ICIA had a duty to protect the 
Duff .. rns against economic loss because of the special relationship between the parties. *275 [FN220] The court also held 
that the Duffrns had failed to state a claim for misrepresentation. [FN221] These two conclusions merit additional atten-tion. 
A. Special Relationships 
Although the court stated its intention to use Duffrn "to defrne the parameters of [the special relationship] exception," 
its analysis is at best tantalizingly elliptical. "The term 'special relationship,"' the court wrote, "refers to those situations 
where the relationship between the parties is such that it would be equitable to impose such a duty. In other words, there 
is an extremely limited group of cases where the law of negligence extends its protections to a party's economic interest." 
[FN222] Unfortunately, however, the proffered standard - "equitable" - advances the analysis only marginally since it is 
itself subject to substantial uncertainty. Why, for example, is it equitable to hold ICIA liable to the Duffrns, a commercial 
enterprise with whom it had no dealings? Are there factors or patterns to the types of relationships that the court is will-
ing to characterize as "special"? In short, why is this relationship "special"? 
It is, of course, possible to construct several explanations for the court's use of the term: it may have felt, for ex-
ample, that the Duffins were less sophisticated than ICIA and thus deserving of additional judicial solicitude. The court 
has in the past suggested that "an obvious disadvantage in bargaining power" might justifY disregarding an exculpatory 
clause. [FN223J But such speculation is problematic for at least two reasons. Most fundamentally, it is speculation. The 
court has not stated that some factor such as unequal bargaining power or lesser commercial sophistication is the basis 
for its use of the term "equitable." Second, if such concerns underlie the court's conclusion, it could have as easily 
reached the conclusion within the context of contract law which has quasi-tort concepts such a "unconscionability" and 
"reasonableness" to handle such problems. 
The basic difficulty is precisely this point: the court does not offer guidance on the factors or factual patterns that 
give rise to the designation "special." This need not be a complete or a final list; it need not be set in stone. Judging re-
quires judgment and necessarily involves *276 an occasional false start or wrong tum. But the court does need to elucid-
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ate the factors that inform its judgment. [FN224] 
In place of an explicit discussion of parameters to the special-relationship exception, the court offers a discussion of a 
single case: McAlvain v. General Insurance Co. of America. [FN225] McAlvain was a suit by the purchaser of a hard-
ware store against the real estate agent who sold him the property. The defendant was also an insurance agent and 
plaintiff requested defendant obtain sufficient fire insurance to cover the property and its inventory. When a fire sub-
sequently destroyed the building, the purchaser discovered that it had not been completely insured; he brought an action 
in tort to recover his losses. The supreme court affmned a jury verdict for the purchaser emphasizing the relationship 
between insurer and insured: 
A person in the business of selling insurance holds himself out to the public as being experienced and know-
ledgeable in this complicated and specialized field. The interest of the state that competent persons become insur-
ance agents is demonstrated by the requirement that they be licensed by the state, pass an examination admin-
istered by the state, and meet certain qualifications. An insurance agent performs a personal service for his client, 
in advising him about the kinds and extent of desired coverage and in choosing the appropriate insurance contract 
for the insured. Ordinarily, an insured will look to his insurance agent, relying, not unreasonably, on his expertise 
in placing his insurance problems in the agent's hands. When an insurance agent performs his services negligently, 
to the insured's injury, he should be held liable for that negligence just as would an attorney, architect, engineer, 
physician or any other professional who negligently performs personal services. [FN226] 
The court also noted that the personal nature of the relationship was the factor that distinguished the case from cases 
involving the sale of goods, cases that do "not involve the rendering of personal services by one with specialized know-
ledge and experience." [FN227] 
The Duffm court characterized McAlvain as holding that a person such as an insurance agent who "holds himself out 
to the public as having expertise regarding a specialized function, and that, by doing so, ... induces reliance on his su-
perior knowledge and skill" has a *277 duty to protect the person whose reliance is sought. [FN228) That is, the Duffm 
court read McAlvain to establish the principle that an expert whose conduct induces reliance has a duty to protect the 
person who relies from economic loss. The relationship between the Duffms and ICIA was analogous: 
ICIA has held itself out as having expertise in the performance of a specialized function [and] it has engaged 
in a marketing campaign . . . the very purpose of which is to induce reliance by purchasers on the fact that seed has 
been certified. Under such circumstances, ICIA occupies a special relationship with those whose reliance it has 
knowingly induced. [FN229] 
Thus, the court concluded, there was a special relationship between the Duffms and ICIA that justified the imposition 
of a tort duty on ICIA to protect the Duffms from economic loss. 
In recapitulating McAlvain, the court subtly but significantly shifted emphasis. While the McAlvain court gave at 
least equal weight to the personal nature of the relationship between insured and insurer, the Duffm court emphasized the 
purchaser's reliance on the certifier's expertise. This shift in emphasis masks a dramatic shift in doctrine. 
Unlike all of the court's previous special-relationship cases, there was no personal relationship between ICIA and the 
Duffins. Indeed, there was no evidence that ICIA had ever had any contact with the Duffins or that it even knew of their 
existence. ICIA dealt with seed producers such as CFI; it did not deal with the purchasers of the seed. In fact, the district 
court had dismissed the Duffms' misrepresentation claim because they had no evidence that "ICIA knew the Duffms 
would rely on its representations." [FN230] 
Of course, the fact that the court has not previously found a special relationship in the absence of a personal relation-
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ship does not mean that it is powerless to do so or that the decision to do so is flawed. The court might well choose to 
treat the "personal relationship" element simply as one factor among several that are relevant to the conclusion that the 
relationship is sufficiently special to impose a duty. Nonetheless, the court abandons t.-,_e requirement without any discus-
sion of the role that this element has played in previous decisions - and thus appears not to have considered the potential 
problems that its new holding may encounter. 
*278 The personal nature of the relationship in special relationship cases plays at least two roles. On the one hand, it 
provides the moral justification for the imposition of a tort duty in addition to the assumed contractual duties. As the 
court in McAlvain stated, the personal element in "special relationships" is the distinguishing factor that sets special-
relationship cases apart from the sale of goods cases such as Taylor v. Herbold. [FN231] The court has emphasized "the 
unique 'personal"' nature of the concept in a variety of contexts. [FN232] There are, of course, other rationales that can 
justify the imposition of a duty - the court in Duffm, for example, emphasizes !CIA's conduct that was intended to induce 
reliance. 
A second - and perhaps even more important - role is that the personal nature of the relationship serves to limit po-
tential liability. The imposition of a duty without some limit raises the specter of "too heavy and unpredictable a burden" 
because liability for "the economic repercussions of a negligent act would be virtually open-ended." [FN233] When a 
service provider knows the service purchaser, the provider's potential liability is necessarily circumscribed. Abandoning 
the requirement that the relationship be personal also abandons the implicit liability limitation: ICIA, for example, is po-
tentially liable to all purchasers of certified seed - an indeterminate group. 
There are other mechanisms that the court might employ to limit liability in a principled manner. The court in Du:ffm 
offers that reliance as a limiting mechanism, stating that ICIA "occupies a special relationship with those whose reliance 
it has knowingly induced." [FN234] It seems unlikely, however, that induced reliance can successfully fill the role of li-
ability-limiting mechanism. The conduct cited by the court to justify its holding - ICIA held itself out, it knew that certi-
fied seed had a higher value, it engaged in a marketing campaign for certified seed [FN235] - does not provide a limita-
tion on potential liability comparable to the abandoned personal relationship. Under the court's approach, ICIA became 
potentially liable to every potato farmer in the *279 state - "a liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate 
time to an indeterminate class." [FN236] 
Furthermore, the court's citation of Glanzer as an example of such knowing inducement is problematic because Glan-
zer is inapplicable: both the crucial factual predicates and the justification for the decision tum on the personal relation-
ship between the bean weigher and the purchaser. The weigher not only knew the identity of the purchaser but also per-
sonally provided him with a copy of the weight receipt. [FN237] It was this fact that prompted Cardozo to characterize 
his decision in Glanzer as involving a relationship "so close as to approach privity." [FN238] It was this personal rela-
tionship between the weigher and purchaser that provided a substitute for privity and allowed the court to impose a tort 
duty on the weigher. In Duffm, the evidence indicates that ICIA had never had any contact with the Duffms or any know-
ledge of them as individuals. The reliance that ICIA induced in the Duffms was no different than the reliance it 
"induced" in thousands of potato farmers. This reliance provides no significant limitation to potential liability. The 
court's abandonment of the personal element of special relationships thus is problematic because it offers no apparent 
basis for limiting !CIA's liability. 
The potential thus created for unlimited liability is part of a more basic difficulty. The court has mischaracterized the 
essential nature of the case. Not only was there no personal relationship between ICIA and the Duffms, there was no 
privity between the parties: ICIA had not contracted with the Duffins to certify the potatoes. Rather, it had contracted 
with CFI to provide testing and certification services. The case thus involves a service contract between defendant and a 
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third party - it is, in other words, analogous to cases such as Just's [FN239] and Idaho Bank &Trust [FN240J rather than 
to McAlvain. [FN241] 
This problem implicates the court's second decision - the conclusion that the Duffins did not state a claim in negli-
gent misrepresentation. 
*280 B. Negligent Misrepresentation 
The Duffins also predicated their case on a claim for negligent misrepresentation. The district court had granted sum-
mary judgment on this claim and the supreme court affirmed summarily: "we expressly hold that, except in the narrow 
con!mes of a professional relationship involving an accountant, the tort of negligent misrepresentation is not recognized 
in Idaho." [FN242] 
The difficulty with this summary decision is that Duffin in fact is a negligent misrepresentation case. The defming 
characteristic of such cases is that defendant has a contract with a third party to provide that person with a service -
weighing beans in Glanzer, preparing a certified balance sheet in U1tramares, or preparing a financial statement in Idaho 
Bank & Trust - the service is performed negligently - the beans are misweighed or insolvency is undetected - and the rep-
resentation that embodies the completed service - the receipt or balance sheet or financial statement - reaches the plaintiff 
who relies upon it to her detriment. This is what occurred in Duffin: ICIA contracted with CFI to test its seed potatoes so 
that they could be certified if they met the requirements; ICIA failed to detect the presence of bacterial ring rot in the 
potatoes and negligently certified them; the Duffms relied upon the certification - a representation that they were disease-
free - to their detriment. 
The court, of course, has the power to extend liability and to craft new exceptions. In previous cases, the court has re-
lied upon the special-relationship concept to justify the imposition of a tort duty in addition to the parties' assumed con-
tract duties and there is nothing inherently troubling about relying upon the special-relationship concept as the basis for 
allowing recovery for negligent misrepresentation. A special relationship can readily serve as a privity substitute to limit 
liability - this was after all the rationale in Glanzer. [FN243] But Glanzer involved a personal relationship: the bean 
weigher not only knew the identity of the purchaser but also provided a copy of the weight receipt to him personally. 
This, then, is the ultimate problem with the court's decision in Duffm: the court both expanded the special-rela-
tionship concept by removing the requirement that there be a personal relationship between *281 the parties and exten-
ded it to a new group of cases in which there was no privity between the parties. This means that the court creates the po-
tential for unlimited liability because both the personal nature of the relationship and privity that had previously served to 
limit liability are no longer required. 
Additionally, the policy concerns that traditionally have dominated this area of law do not justify the extension. The 
Duffms were not endangered by the potatoes; the tort concern for safety of person or property was not implicated. In-
stead, the Duffins were disappointed by the quality of the seed potatoes because they were not as they were represented 
to be - the traditional contract concern. Given this, it is difficult to see why the Duffms should not be left to the contract 
they had with the seller, CFI. 
VIII. CONCLUSIONS 
There seems to be a natural desire to compose sweeping summaries: "the movement of the progressive societies has 
hitherto been a movement from Status to Contract"; [FN244] or: "Contract ... is dead"; [FN245] or, again: "economic 
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loss generally cannot be recovered in torts." [FN246] The difficulty with such statements - however much apparent order 
they may bring at a global level - lies in the loss of detail. 
The Idaho Supreme Court's desire to write a simple summation of the law on recovery of economic loss in tort led it 
into oversimplification. Not only has the court previously allowed recovery of economic loss in more than two limited 
exceptions, but it has also developed a far more complex body of law on the question. Duffm's oversimplification of that 
body of case law raises significant questions: what does the court mean when it speaks of a "special relationship"? Its 
nod to "equitable" and its emphasis on expertise and induced reliance, seem unbounded when stripped of the requirement 
that the relationship be personal. Similarly, the court's extremely summary disposition of the negligent misrepresentation 
claim is problematic, since Duffin itself seems to be such a claim. How is the court's rejection to be understood? And if 
Duffin is not a negligent misrepresentation case, does it sub silencio overrule Just's since both cases arise out of the 
breach of a contract with a third party? 
Ultimately, this article is a plea that the court require more. Idaho has more than a century's worth of tort cases. They 
form a rich narrative that examines recurring issues from a variety of perspectives. The question of whether economic 
loss should be recoverable in *282 tort actions, for example, has been discussed in the context of contract between the 
parties for the sale of goods or services, in the context of contract for the sale of goods or service where the parties to the 
suit are not the parties to the contract, and when there is no contract. Each of these situations involves different factual is-
sues; they raise different policy concerns. The court should not be too quick to lump this variety into a simple general-
rule-with-two-exceptions pigeonhole - to do so is to lose the learning that is embodied in the narrative. Rather, the court 
should add to the narrative, enriching the jurisprudence by adding its own stories, its ovm explanations. 
[FNal). Professor of Law, University of Idaho College of Law. J.D., University of Oregon; A.B., Columbia College. I 
appreciate the comments of Joarm Henderson, Debra Kronenberg, Monique Lillard, Jack McKinney, and Cathy Silak on 
earlier versions of this article. 
[FNl]. East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 866 (1986). See also Grant Gilmore, The 
Death of Contract 87 (1974) ('"contract' is being reabsorbed into the mainstream of'tort."'). 
[FN2]. East River Steamship, 476 U.S. at 874. 
[FN3]. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 100 (N.Y. 1928) (Cardozo, J.). As the Idaho Supreme Court long ago 
noted, "It is contrary to natural justice to say ... that the plaintiffs ... must suffer their loss in silence, and the defendant 
... is under no obligation to compensate plaintiffs for their loss." Wilson v. Boise City, 6 Idaho 391, 399, 55 P. 887, 890 
(1899). 
[FN4]. For ideologically pure statements, see Charles Fried, Contract As Promise (1981); Richard A. Epstein, A Theory 
of Strict Liability, 2 J. Legal Stud. 151 (1973). 
[FN5]. Gilmore, supra note 1, at 95. 
[FN6]. 99 Idaho 326, 581 P.2d 784 (1978). 
[FN7]. Id. at 336, 581 P.2d at 794 (footnote omitted). 
[FN8]. There are, of course, other markers along the boundary. For example, the Idaho Supreme Court has held that emo-
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tional distress cannot be sought when the relationship between the parties arises out of a contract. In such cases, plaintiff 
must seek punitive damages. See Brown v. Fritz, 108 Idaho 357, 669 P.2d 1371 (1985). But see Walston v. Monumental 
Life Ins. Co., 129 Idaho 211, 218-20, 923 P.2d 456, 463-65 (1996) (emotional distress may be recovered in a relationship 
based on contract when there is a special relationship between the parties). 
[FN9]. "Pure" economic loss is an economic loss independent of physical injury to the plaintiffs person or property. The 
qualification is essential because economic losses are fully recoverable when a plaintiff has also suffered personal injury 
or property da..'!lage. E.g., L & L Furniture Mart, Inc. v. Boise Water Corp., 120 Idaho 107, 813 P.2d 918 (Ct. App. 1991) 
(property damage); Rindlisbaker v. Wilson, 95 Idaho 752, 519 P.2d 421 (1974) (personal injury). 
[FNl 0]. This distinction has a long and particularly well-known history since it is the central storyline in the series of 
cases tracing the evolution of products liability. See Edward H. Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning 6-19 (1948). 
[FNll]. 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Exch. 1842). 
[FN12]. Id. at 405 (Abinger, C.B.); see also Huset v. J.I. Case Threshing Mach. Co., 120 F. 865 (8th Cir. 1903). 
[FN13]. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916). 
[FN14]. Id. at 1053. MacPherson and its progeny are examined in William L. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 
YaJe L.J. 1099 (1960). 
[FN15]. Winterbottom, 152 Eng. Rep. at 405 (Abinger, C.B.). 
[FN16). 99 Idaho 462,583 P.2d 997 (1978). 
[FN17]. Id. at470, 583 P.2dat 1005 (citations omitted); see also Cain v. Vollmer, 19 Idaho 163,112 P. 686 (1910). 
[FN18]. East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delval, Inc., 476 U.S. at 866. 
[FN19]. In the classic Cardozo phrase, to hold an accountant liable to non-contracting pa.'iies for negligently auditing 
books exposed the accountant to liability "in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate 
class." Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven & Co., 175 N.E. 441,444 (N.Y. 1931). 
[FN20]. Palsgrafv. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 100 (N.Y. 1928) (Cardozo, J.). 
[FN21]. 126 Idaho 1002, 895 P.2d 1195 (1995). A companion case- Feld v. Idaho Crop Improvement Ass'n, 126 Idaho 
1014, 895 P.2d 1207 (1995)- presented essentially identical facts and was decided on the basis ofDuffm. 
[FN22]. Duffin, 126 Idaho at 1007, 895 P.2d at 1200. 
[FN23]. Id. at 1005, 895 P.2d at 1198. 
[FN24]. Id. at 1006, 895 P.2d at 1199. 
[FN25]. Id. at 1009-10, 895 P.2d at 1202-03. The trial court also held that ICIA was an instrumentality of the state and 
that the Idaho Tort Claims Act therefore applied. Id. at 1008-09, 895 P.2d at 1201-02. The case presented additional is-
sues on the existence of warranties and the effectiveness of disclaimers in the dealings between the Duffms and CFI. The 
trial court denied cross-motions for summary judgment on these issues; the supreme court affmned those decision. Id. at 
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1010-13,895 P.2d at 1203-06. 
[FN26J. 99 Idaho 326,581 P.2d 784 (1978). 
[FN27]. 99 Idaho 462,583 P.2d 997 (1978). 
[FN28]. Duffm, 126 Idaho at 1007, 895 P.2d at 1200. 
[FN29]. Id. 
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[FN30]. The court actually writes that "there are exceptions to the general rule of non-recovery" of "purely economic 
losses in a negligence action." Duffm, 126 Idaho at 1007, 895 P.2d at 1200. The first of these, it states, is that "economic 
loss is recoverable in tort as a loss parasitic to an injury to person or property." Id. This "exception" is not in fact an ex-
ception to the "general rule prohibiting the recovery of purely economic losses in all negligence actions," since the losses 
are not "purely economic" when they are accompanied by either personal injury or property damage. 
[FN31]. 97 Idaho 348, 351, 544 P.2d 306, 309 (1975). 
[FN32]. Duffin, 126 Idaho at 1007-08, 895 P.2d at 1200-01. 
[FN33]. "Over the mountain/Down in the valley/Lives a former talk-show host! Everybody knows his name/He says 
there's no doubt about it/It was the myth of fmgerprints/I've seen them all and man/They're all the same." Paul Simon, 
All Around the World or The Myth of Fingerprints, on Graceland (Warner Brothers Records 1986). 
[FN34]. Just's simply states the same enigmatic "unique circumstances requiring a different allocation of risk" exception, 
Just's, Inc. v. Arrington Constr. Co., 99 Idaho 462, 470, 583 P.2d 997, 1005 (1978), and in tum cites Union Oil Co. v. 
Oppen, 501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974). 
[FN35]. Duffm, 126 Idaho at 1008, 895 P.2d at 1201. 
[FN36]. Id. 
[FN37]. Id. In addition, the court concluded that a second defendant - the Federal-State Inspection Service - had done 
nothing "actively ... to induce reliance" and therefore did not have a special relationship with the purchasers of certified 
seed. Id. 
[FN38]. Id. at 1010, 895 P.2d at 1203. The decision to which the court implicitly refers is Idaho Bank & Trust Co. v. 
First Bancorp, 115 Idaho 1082, 772 P.2d 720 (1989). Idaho Bank & Trust held that an accountant can be held liable for 
negligent misrepresentation under specific circumstances. Id. at 1083, 772 P.2d at 721. Although the court's statement in 
Duffin is absolute, the extent to which the prohibition applies to claims for personal injury or property damage, the lan-
guage is dicta. 
[FN39]. Cf. Salmon Rivers Sportsman Camps, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 97 Idaho 348, 351, 544 P.2d 306, 309 (1975) 
("A plaintiff can seek recovery of damages ... for personal injury, property damage, and economic loss. Although per-
sonal injuries stand distinctly apart from the other two categories, a delineation between the latter two is necessary."). 
[FN40]. Duffin, 126 Idaho at 1007, 895 P.2d at 1199. 
[FN41]. 97 Idaho 348,544 P.2d 306 (1975). 
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[FN42]. Id. at 351,544 P.2d at309. 
[FN43]. Id. 
[FN44]. Clark v. International Harvester Co., 99 Idaho 326, 581 P.2d 784 (1978). 
[FN45]. State v. Mitchell Constr. Co., 108 Idaho 335, 699 P.2d 1349 (1984). 
[FN46}. Tusch Enters. v. Coffin, 113 Idaho 37, 740 P.2d 1022 (1987). 
[FN47J. 112 Idaho 423, 732 P.2d 661 (1987). 
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[FN48]. Id. at 426, 732 P.2d at 664. Alternatively, the court might have held that the loss of the cattle was property dam-
age because the category "transactional property" applies only to transactions between a buyer and a seller. Such a dis-
tinction would narrow the term "transactional," but would do violence either to the term or to the rationale for the defini-
tion. 
[FN49]. Duffin, 126 Idaho at 1007 n.5, 895 P.2d at 1200 n.5. 
[FN50]. 119 Idaho 514, 808 P.2d 851 (1991). 
[FN51]. Counter-examples to G & M Farms are also available. For example, in Shields v. Morton Chemical Co., 95 
Idaho 674, 518 P.2d 857 (1974), a bean farmer who sought to recover for lost profits when he was required to recall a 
crop of seed beans rendered unusable by a defect in a pesticide-fungicide manufactured by defendant was permitted to 
proceed under alternative theories of strict liability in tort, negligence, and breach of warranty. In a subsequent case, the 
court categorized the losses in Shields as "property damage" - even though the loss occurred in the context of a commer-
cial transaction indistinguishable from that in G & M Farms. See Clark v. International Harvester Co., 99 Idaho 326, 332, 
581 P.2d 784,790 (1978). 
[FN52]. 114 Idaho 432, 757 P.2d 695 (Ct. App. 1988) (review denied). 
[FN53]. Id. at 436, 757 P.2d at 699. The holding in Myers was prefigured in Clark where the court quoted extensively 
from Prosser's Handbook on the Law of Torts that a seller might be liable in negligence for damage to the defective 
product where the damage is caused by an accident but not when "there is no accident." Clark v. International Harvester 
Co., 99 Idaho at 333, 581 P.2d at 791 (quoting William L. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 101, at 665 (4th ed. 
1971)). The court in Clark did not, however, emphasize the point, and the issue was not presented by the facts. 
[FN54J. Salmon Rivers Sportsman Camps, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 97 Idaho 348,351,544 P.2d 306,309 (1975). 
[FN55]. Myers, 114 Idaho 432, 757 P.2d 695. 
[FN56]. Id. at 436, 757 P.2d at 699. 
[FN57]. Id. 
[FN58]. See Salmon Rivers, 97 Idaho at 351, 544 P.2d at 309. Plaintiff in a subsequent case also involving a malfunc-
tioning aircraft raised the issue, arguing that the economic loss was caused by the plaintiff's refusal to use the aircraft 
given the "potential for calamitous personal injury or property damage" if it again fell out of the sky. Management Cata-
lysts v. Turbo West Corpac, Inc., 119 Idaho 626, 631, 809 P.2d 487, 492 (1991) (Bistline, J., dissenting) (quoting Appel-
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Iants Brief). The court did not reach the question. The court has reached a similar result at other points of contact 
between tort and contract. For example, in 1985 the court held that emotional distress could not be recovered in an action 
for breach of contract; if the conduct was sufficiently outrageous, recovery might be available in punitive damages. 
Brown v. Fritz, 108 Idaho 357, 699 P.2d 1371 (1985). In a subsequent decision the court refused to allow emotional dis-
tress for the negligent repair of an aircraft - even though the discovery of the problem occurred when the plane was air-
borne. Hathaway v. Krumery, 110 Idaho 515,716 P.2d 1287 (1986) (per curiam). 
[FN59]. Russell v. Ford Motor Co., 575 P.2d 1383, 1387 (Or. 1978) (Linde, J.). 
[FN60]. This appears to be the majority rule. E.g., East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delval, Inc., 476 U.S. 
858, 870-71 (1986); Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145, 151 (Cal. 1965). There is, however, substantial diversity on 
the topic. See Spring Motors Distribs., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 489 A.2d 660, 663 (N.J. 1985) (commercial buyer may re-
cover for pure economic loss only in contract); Santor v. A&M Karagheusian, Inc., 207 A.2d 305, 312 (N.J. 1970) 
(consumer may recover pure economic loss in strict liability in tort); Russell v. Ford Motor Co., 575 P.2d at 1387 (tort 
recovery for pure economic loss permitted when the user is "endangered" rather than "disappointed"); Berg v. General 
Motors Corp., 555 P.2d 818,822 (Wash. 1976) (pure economic loss may be recovered in negligence). 
[FN61]. The most frequently cited justification for rules is efficiency: by providing a clear line between competing uni-
verses, a rule reduces the costs of litigation over the boundary. Those whose claims fall on the contract side of the line 
will forebear when they can only hope to recover in tort. The gain, of course, is purchased at some loss of equity since a 
case-by-case determination produces fairer results. Contrariwise, the gains in equity are purchased at the cost of in-
creased indeterminacy and inefficiency. See East River Steamship, 476 U.S. at 870. 
[FN62]. Id. at 870. The rationale obviously assumes the conclusion: contract rules protect contract interests better than 
do tort principles. 
[FN63]. Id. 
[FN64]. "A warranty action also has a built-in limitation on liability, whereas a tort action could subject the manufacturer 
to damages of an indefinite amount" because "foreseeability is an inadequate brake. . . . Permitting recovery to all fore-
seeable claims for purely economic loss could make the manufacturer liable for vast sums." Id. at 874. 
[FN65). For example, in a decision decided before Salmon Rivers but reaffirmed after that decision, the court held that 
nontransactional property damaged in a non-calamitous event was "property damage" rather than "economic loss." 
Shields v. Morton Chern. Co., 95 Idaho 674, 518 P.2d 857 (1974); Clark v. International Harvester Co., 99 Idaho 326, 
332,581 P.2d 784, 790 (1978) (categorizing the losses in Shields as "property damage"). 
[FN66]. See Oppenheimer Indus. v. Johnson Cattle Co., 112 Idaho 423,426, 732 P.2d 661, 664 (1987). 
[FN67]. 126 Idaho at 1007, 895 P.2d at 1200. 
[FN68]. Id. at 1008, 895 P.2d at 1201. 
[FN69]. See Clark v. International Harvester Co., 99 Idaho 326, 581 P.2d 784 (1978). 
[FN70]. See Adkison Corp. v. American Bldg. Co., 107 Idaho 406, 690 P.2d 341 (1984). 
[FN71]. See McAlvain v. General Ins. Co. of Am., 97 Idaho 777,554 P.2d 955 (1976). 
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[FN72]. See Just's, Inc. v. Arrington Constr. Co., 99 Idaho 462, 583 P.2d 997 (1978). 
[FN73J. See Idaho Bank & Trust Co. v. First Bancorp, 115 Idaho 1082, 772 P.2d 720 (1989). 
[FN74]. See Cain v. Vollmer, 19 Idaho 163, 112 P. 686 (1910). 
[FN75]. Oppenheimer Indus. v. Johnson Cattle Co., 112 Idaho 423, 732 P.2d 661 (1987). 
[FN76]. E.g., Moon v. Bullock, 65 Idaho 594, 151 P.2d 765 (1944). 
[FN77]. 94 Idaho 133,483 P.2d 664 (1971). 
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[FN78]. See id. at 138, 483 P.2d at 669 (fmding an exception for "those situations in which misfeasance rather than non-
feasance was the issue"). For example, the court of appeals has held that a defendant who had contracted to install a wa-
ter heater could be liable in negligence if the water heater lacked a pressure relief valve: 
Negligence in the sense of nonperformance of a contract will not sustain an action sounding in tort, in the 
absence of a liability imposed by law independent of that arising out of the contract itself; rather, active negligence or 
misfeasance is necessary to support an action in tort based upon a breach of contract. Taylor v. Herbold .... Here Gal-
braith's claim does not assert nonperformance by Vangas of a contract to install a water heater. The water heater was, in 
fact, installed. Rather, the complaint, in substance, alleges misfeasance by Vangas in installing a water heater which 
lacked a pressure relief valve 
.... The contract for sale and installation of a water heater (complete with a pressure relief device) established 
the relationship, and certain obligations, between the parties. But each of them also brought into this relationship a more 
general duty. This is the duty that "one owes ... to every person in our society to use reasonable care to avoid injury to 
the other person in any situation in which it could be reasonably anticipated or foreseen that a failure to use such care 
might result in such injury." 
Galbraith v. Vangas, Inc., 103 Idaho 912, 914, 655 P.2d 119, 121 (Ct. App. 1982) (quoting Alegria v. Payonk, 101 Idaho 
617, 619, 619 P.2d 135, 137 (1980) (quoting Kirby v. Sonville, 594 P.2d 818, 821 (Or. 1979))). Because the Taylor court 
does not emphasize the fact that the loss was solely economic, it does not note that its first exception will rarely, if ever, 
produce exclusively economic loss. 
[FN79]. Taylor, 94 Idaho at 138,483 P.2d at 669. 
(FN80]. 99 Idaho 326, 581 P.2d 784 (1978). 
(FN81]. Id. at 334,581 P.2d at 792 (quoting Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145, 151 (Cal. 1965)). 
[FN82]. Although Clark was a negligence action, the court's discussion focused more broadly on "tort" actions including 
strict liability in tort claims. See id. at 333-36, 581 P.2d 791-94. The case has subsequently been cited as deciding that 
"economic loss ... will not support a tort action in either negligence or strict liability." State v. Mitchell Constr. Co., 108 
Idaho 335, 336, 699 P.2d 1349, 1350 (1984). The issue appears never to have been argued. This ambiguity may account 
for the Duffm court's seeming vacillation on the scope of the general rule. Although the court states that there is "a gen-
eral rule prohibiting recovery of purely economic losses in all negligence actions," it also writes that there are exceptions 
which allow recovery of such losses "in tort" under some circumstances. Duffm, 126 Idaho at 1007, 895 P.2d at 1200 
(emphasis added). The prohibition includes only non-intentional torts. Pure economic losses can be recovered in fraud, 
an intentional tort that is located on the fuzzy tort-contract boundary. See, e.g., Zuhlke v. Anderson Buick, Inc., 94 Idaho 
634, 496 P.2d 95 (1972); Edmark Motors, Inc. v. Twin Cities Toyota, Inc., 111 Idaho 846, 727 P.2d 1274 (Ct. App. 1987). 
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(FN83]. Tusch Enters. v. Coffin, 113 Idaho 37,40-41,740 P.2d 1022, 1025-26 (1987). 
[FN84). Adkison Corp. v. American Bldg. Co., 107 Idaho 406,411,690 P.2d 341,346 (1984). 
[FN85]. G & M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514, 527, 808 P.2d 851,864 (1991). 
(FN86]. State v. Mitchell Constr. Co., 108 Idaho 335, 336, 699 P.2d 1349, 1350 (1984). 
[FN87]. See Adkison, 107 Idaho 406,690 P.2d 341. 
[FN88). Id. at 410, 410-11, 690 P.2d at 345, 345-46. 
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(FN89]. The change from hand-made to mass-produced with its resulting depersonalization of the contract for the pur-
chase of products was one rationale for changing the law of products liability from contract to tort. Contract allowed the 
producer to avoid responsibility for the danger it built into a product by avoiding any contact with the actual purchaser/ 
user. See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Co., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1962) (Traynor, J.); Escola v. Coca Cola, 150 P.2d 
436, 440, 443-44 (CaL 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring); MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1053-54 (N.Y. 
1916) (Cardozo, J.). 
(FN90]. "Special relationships" as a source of the duty of care are not limited to cases involving economic loss. To un-
derstand the role of such special relationships in tort, it is helpful to note briefly the bigger picture. Duty in negligence 
can be conceived as falling into four broad categories: (1) a general duty to act with care when the actor creates a risk: 
when an individual acts in a manner that imposes a foreseeable risk of harm on others, the actor generally has a duty to 
act with due care to minimize the risk. E.g., Wilson v. Boise City, 6 Idaho 391, 55 P. 887 (1899). (2) a general no-duty 
when the individual does not create the risk: when the individual did not create the risk, she generally does not have a 
duty to act either to minimize the risk or to protect individuals subject to it. E.g., Fagundes v. State, 116 Idaho 173, 774 
P.2d 343 (Ct. App. 1989). The distinction is often characterized as the difference between misfeasance - which subjects 
the actor to a duty to act with care - and nonfeasance - which does not give rise to a duty to act to protect. The distinction 
between misfeasance and nonfeasance can be paper thin. See, e.g., Kunz v. Utah Power & Light Co., 526 F.2d 500 (9th 
Cir. 1975); Alegria v. Payonk, 101 Idaho 617, 619 P.2d 135 (1980). (3) exceptions to the no-duty-to-act rule: in some 
situations, the court has been willing to impose a duty to act when the individual did not herself create the risk. For ex-
ample, when the individual assumes a duty, e.g., Sharp v. W.H. Moore, Inc., 118 Idaho 297, 796 P.2d 506 (1990); Davis 
v. Potter, 51 Idaho 81, 2 P.2d 318 (1931), or there is a special relationship between defendant and plaintiff, e.g., S.H. 
Kress & Co. v. Godman, 95 Idaho 614, 515 P.2d 561 (1973); Clark v. Tarr, 75 Idaho 251, 270 P.2d 1016 (1954), or 
between defendant and a third party whose conduct is the source of the risk, e.g., Davis v. Potter, 51 Idaho 81, 2 P .2d 318 
(1931), the court has imposed duties to protect others from harm. (4) limited duty situations are situations in which the 
court has been unwilling to apply the general duty-to-act-with-care standard to activities that cause certain types of injur-
ies. The paradigm example is emotional distress: concern with unlimited liability and potentially fraudulent claims has 
led the court to fashion duty rules that stop far short of the traditional "foreseeability" limitations on tort liability. See, 
e.g., Brown v. Matthews Mortuary, Inc., 118 Idaho 830, 801 P.2d 37 (1990); Czaplicki v. Gooding Joint Sch. Dist. No. 
231, 116 Idaho 326, 775 P.2d 640 (1989). Economic loss falls into this category. In addition to the broad similarities 
among the different types of limited duty situations, there are also similarities between the types of factual patterns and 
policies that will lead to the creation of a duty-to-act under the third category and the patterns and policies that will lead 
to more expansive liability for the limited duty interests in the fourth category. The most striking of these is the "special 
relationship" category: the court has been willing to impose a duty-to-act when there is a sufficient relationship between 
either plaintiff and defendant, e.g., Sharp v. W.H. Moore, Inc., 118 Idaho 297, 796 P.2d 506 (1990) (landlord/tenant's 
employee); Bauer v. Minidoka Sch. Dist. No. 331, 116 Idaho 586, 778 P.2d 336 (1989) (school/student); Merritt v. State, 
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108 Idaho 20, 696 P.2d 871 (1985) Gailer/jailed); Straley v. Idaho Nuclear Corp., 94 Idaho 917, 500 P.2d 218 (1972) 
(quasi-common carrier/passenger); Clark v. Tarr, 75 Idaho 251, 270 P.2d 1016 (1954) (conunon carrier/passenger); Mc-
Clain v. Lewiston Interstate Fair & Racing Ass'n, 17 Idaho 63, 104 P. 1015 (1909) (race promoter/jockey), or between 
defendant and the third party who has created the risk, e.g., Alegria v. Payonk, 101 Idaho 617, 619 P.2d 135 (1980) 
(bartender/consumer); Davis v. Potter, 51 Idaho 81, 2 P.2d 318 (1931) (doctor/nurse). These "special relationships" are 
conceptually indistinguishable from the "special relationships" involved in the pure economic loss cases. One recurrent 
source of "special relationships" in the duty-to-act context are service contracts. See, e.g., S.H. Kress & Co. v. Godman, 
95 Idaho 614, 515 P.2d 561 (1973) (boiler repairer had a duty to inspect the external safety devices on boiler and thus 
was potentially liable for boiler explosion not caused by the repairer's work); Clark v. T&-r, 75 Idaho 251, 270 P.2d 1016 
(1954) (common carrier had a duty to protect passengers from risk of alternative transportation after bus broke down). 
[FN91]. Strong v. Western Union Tel. Co., 18 Idaho 389, 109 P. 910 (1910). 
[FN92]. McAlvain v. General Ins. Co. of Am., 97 Idaho 777,554 P.2d 955 (1976). 
[FN93]. Dick v. Reese, 90 Idaho 447,412 P.2d 815 (1966). 
[FN94]. McAlvain, 97 Idaho at 780, 554 P.2d at 958; see also Duffin, 126 Idaho at 1008, 895 P.2d at 1120. Although the 
court did not note it, the law applicable to the sale of products does offer an analogue to the factual patterns that charac-
terize "special relationships" - and the Uniform Commercial Code has provided an implied warranty that reflects such re-
lationships. The Code provides that, when a purchaser informs the seller of the purchaser's particular needs and the seller 
makes a recommendation upon which the purchaser relies, the seller has impliedly warranted the product to be fit for the 
purchaser's particular purposes. Idaho Code§ 28-2-315 (1995). 
[FN95]. Duffin, 126 Idaho at 1008, 895 P.2d at 1201. 
[FN96]. Id. 
[FN97). 97 Idaho 777, 554 P.2d 955 (1976). 
[FN98]. The court did not canvas the many decisions that have recognized relationships as sufficiently "special" to create 
a duty in negligence. Thus, it did not fully articulate the factors required to denominate a relationship as "special." 
[FN99). Cases involving special relationships are difficult to collect because they fall through the cracks in both the older 
digesting system and the newer computerized systems: the digests do not have a category for "special relationship" and 
not all cases that involve the issue employ the terminology. 
[FNIOOJ. See, e.g., S.H. Kress & Co. v. Godman, 95 Idaho 614, 515 P.2d 561 (1973). 
[FNlOl]. E.g., Strong v. Western Union Tel. Co., 18 Idaho 389, 109 P. 910 (1910). 
[FN102]. Duffm, 126 Idaho at 1007,895 P.2d at 1200. 
[FN103]. See generally Norman F. Arterburn, The Origin and First Test of Public Callings, 75 U. Pa. L. Rev. 411 (1927). 
[FN104]. See Straley v. Idaho Nuclear Corp., 94 Idaho 917, 500 P.2d 218 (1972) (a private bus line that acted like a 
common carrier would be treated as a common carrier). 
[FN105]. Public callings are exceptions to several doctrines. For example, the court has imposed liability on public call-
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ings in situations that would otherwise be characterized as nonfeasance. See, e.g., Clark v. Tarr, 75 Idaho 251, 270 P.2d 
1016 (1954); Rosendahl v. Lemhi Valley Bank, 43 Idaho 273, 251 P. 293 (1926); see also DavidS. Bogen, The Innkeep-
er's Tale: The Legal Development of a Public Calling, 1996 Utah L. Rev. 51, 51-53 (discussing theories on basis of pub-
lic callings and the extension of the category into other legal areas); Leslie E. John, Comment, Formulating Standards for 
Awards of Punitive Damages in the Borderland of Contract and Tort, 74 Cal. L. Rev. 2033, 2043-44 (1987) (exception to 
exclusion of punitive damages). 
[FN106]. 18 Idaho 389, 109 P. 910 (1910). 
[FN107J. Cf. Lee v. Sun Valley Co., 107 Idaho 976, 695 P.2d 361 (1984) (state-licensed outfitter could contractually lim-
it liability for its own negligence). 
[FN108]. Strong, 18 Idaho at 400-01, 109 P. at 913 (citation omitted). 
[FNI09]. Id. at402, 109 P. at 914. 
[FNllO]. 34 Idaho 37, 198 P. 671 (1921). 
[FNI I 1]. Id. at 39, 198 P. at 671. 
[FN112]. Id. at 40, 198 P. at 671. 
[FN113]. Strong, 18 Idaho at 404, 109 P. at 915 (emphasis added). 
[FNI 14]. As one commentary on public callings has noted: "Frequently in defming rules of law we must delve deeply in-
to the past to fmd the reason for the rule of conduct or liability." Arterburn, supra note 103, at 411. 
[FN115]. Although "[a]n inn is a refuge from the perilous world outside," the duties imposed on innkeepers flowed from 
the fact that the "[d]angers outside the inn were less significant than the dangers within." Bogen, supra note 105, at 91. 
[FN116]. See, e.g., Clark v. Tarr, 75 Idaho 251,270 P.2d 1016 (1954). 
[FN117]. E.g., Shockley v. Tennyson Transfer & Storage, Inc., 76 Idaho 131, 278 P.2d 795 (1955). Cf. Rosendahl v. 
Lemhi Valley Bank, 43 Idaho 273, 251 P. 293 (1926) (plaintiff stored bonds in a safe deposit box that was robbed). 
[FN118]. Carscallen v. Lakeside HighwayDist., 44 Idaho 724,260 P. 162 (1927). 
[FNI19]. Ford v. Transport Holding Corp., 96 Idaho 388, 529 P.2d 784 (1974). 
[FN120]. Glover v. Spraker, 50 Idaho 16, 292 P. 613 (1930). 
[FN121]. Cluerv. Leahy, 44 Idaho 320,256 P. 760 (1927). 
[FN122]. Anthony Fitz-herbert, The New Natura Brevium § 94d, at 225 (London: corrected & rev'd ed. 1666). 
[FN123]. 97 Idaho 777, 554 P.2d 955 (1976). 
[FN124]. Id. at 780, 554 P.2d at 958 (citations omitted); see also Bales v. General Ins. Co. of Am., 53 Idaho 327, 24 P.2d 
57 (1933) (insurance company was liable in negligence when its agent failed to renew an insurance policy on plaintiffs 
oats); Wallace v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 31 Idaho 481, 174 P. 1009 (1918) (insurance company was liable in negligence 
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when its agent failed to write an insurance policy on plaintiffs drugstore). 
[FN125]. McAlvain, 97 Idaho at 780, 554 P.2d at 958. 
[FN126]. Duffm, 126 Idaho at 1008, 895 P.2d at ll20. 
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[FN127]. Mack Fin. Corp. v. Smith, Ill Idaho 8, 720 P.2d 191 (1986); Streib v. Veigel, 109 Idaho 174, 706 P.2d 63 
(1985); Owyhee County v. Rite, 100 Idaho 91,593 P.2d 995 (1979). 
[FN128]. Twin Falls Clinic & Hosp. Bldg. Corp. v. Hamill, 103 Idaho 19, 644 P.2d 341 (1982). 
[FN129). E.g., Thompson v. Pike, 122 Idaho 690, 838 P.2d 293 (1992); Fitzgerald v. Walker, 113 Idaho 730, 747 P.2d 
752 (1987), following remand, 121 Idaho 589, 826 P.2d 1301 (1992); Marias v. Marano, 120 Idaho 11, 813 P.2d 350 
(1991); Zumwalt v. Stephan, Balleism & Slavin, 113 Idaho 822, 748 P.2d 406 (Ct. App. 1987). 
[FN130]. Williams v. Blakely, 114 Idaho 323, 757 P.2d 186 (1988). 
[FN131]. Osborn v. Ahrens, 116 Idaho 14,773 P.2d 282 (1989). 
[FN132]. Merrill v. Fremont Abstract Co., 39 Idaho 238, 227 P. 34 (1924); Hillock v. Idaho Title & Trust Co., 22 Idaho 
440, 126 P. 612 (1912). Cf. Anderson v. Title Ins. Co., 103 Idaho 875, 655 P.2d 82 (1982) (where defendant undertook to 
insure plaintiffs' title and did not undertake to abstract that title, it was liable in contract for the amount of the policy and 
was not liable in tort). 
[FN133]. 53 Idaho 327, 24 P.2d 57 (1933). 
[FN134]. Id. at 330, 24 P.2d at 57. 
[FN135]. Id. at 335, 337, 24 P.2d at 59, 60. 
[FN136]. The misfeasance/nonfeasance dichotomy recurs in cases such as Taylor v. Herbold where defendant agreed to 
purchase plaintiffs potatoes and then failed to remove them from the cellar. The court rejected tort liability in part be-
cause "active negligence or misfeasance is necessary to support an action in tort based on a breach of contract; mere non-
feasance ... is not sufficient." Taylor v. Herbold, 94 Idaho at 138, 483 P.2d at 669 (quoting 1 C.J.S. Actions § 49(c) 
(1955)). The existence of a "special relationship" thus overcomes the nonfeasance by obligating the duty-bound person to act. 
[FN137]. Jones v. Runft, Leroy, Coffm & Matthews, Chartered, 125 Idaho 607,612, 873 P.2d 861, 866 (1994). 
[FN138]. 119 Idaho 171,804 P .2d 900 (1991). 
[FN139]. Id. at 176, 804 P.2d at 905. The court has reiterated this conclusion on several occasions. E.g., Eliopulos v. 
Knox, 123 Idaho 400, 848 P.2d 984 (Ct. App. 1992), (review denied (1993)); Idaho First Nat'! Bank v. Bliss Valley 
Foods, Inc., 121 Idaho 266, 824 P.2d 841 (1991). 
[FN140]. "Although McAlvain dealt with the existence of a professional or quasi-professional relationship, we do not 
limit the 'special relations' exception exclusively to such cases." Duffm, 126 Idaho at 1008, 895 P.2d at 1201. 
[FN141]. 85 Idaho 503,380 P.2d 898 (1963). 
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[FN142]. Id. at 507-08, 380 P.2d at 901 (emphasis added) (quoting 38 Am. Jur. Negligence§ 20 at 662 (1954)). 
[FN143]. Id. at 505, 380 P.2d at 899. 
[FN144}. 90 Idaho 447,412 P.2d 815 (1966). 
[FN145). Id. at451, 412 P.2d at 817 (quoting 8 Am Jur. 2d Bailments § 220 (1963)). 
Page40 
[FN146]. Id. at 452, 412 P.2d at 817 (citations omitted); see also Beare v. Stowes' Builders Supply, Inc., 104 Idaho 317, 
658 P.2d 988 (Ct. App. 1983). 
[FN'147]. See, e.g., Chenery v. Agri-Lines Corp., 106 Idaho 687, 690-91, 682 P.2d 640, 643-44 (1984) (action seeking to 
recover for dropping a pump back into a well when defendant was seeking to remove the pump for repairs sounded in 
tort rather than contract). 
[FN148]. Cf. Ralph J. Mooney, The New Conceptualism in Contract Law, 74 Or. L. Rev. 1131 (1995). 
[FN149]. 106 Idaho 787, 683 P.2d 435 (1984). 
[FNI50]. Id. at 790-91, 683 P.2d at 438-39. 
[FN151]. Id. at 791, 683 P.2d at 439. 
[FN152]. 93 Idaho 496,465 P.2d 107 (1970). 
[FN153]. Id. at 498-99, 499-500, 465 P.2d at 109-10, 111-12. Cf. Anderson & Nafziger v. G.T. Newcomb, Inc., 100 
Idaho 175, 178-79, 595 P.2d 709, 712-13 (1979) (discussing Rawlings). See also Lee v. Sun Valley Co., 107 Idaho 976, 
695 P.2d 361 (1984). 
[FN154]. The court has stated that such clauses will not be enforced when there is "an obvious disadvantage in bargain-
ing power" or defendant is engaged in a "public calling." Steiner, 106 Idaho at 791, 683 P.2d at 439; Rawlings, 93 Idaho 
at 499-500,465 P.2d at 111-12; Strong, 18 Idaho 389, 109 P. at 913. 
[FNI55]. Knoblock, 85 Idaho at 507-08, 380 P.2d at 901 (quoting 38 Am. Jur. Negligence§ 20 at 662 (1954)). 
[FN156]. Eliopulos v. Knox, 123 Idaho 400, 408, 848 P.2d 984, 992 (Ct. App. 1992) (citations omitted) (review denied 
(1993)). 
[FNI57]. Knoblock, 85 Idaho 503, 380 P.2d 898. Cf. Hibbler v. Fisher, 109 Idaho 1007, 712 P.2d 708 (Ct. App. 1985) 
(expressing doubt on the application of the no-duty rule to construction of a water system at a trailer court - an issue not 
assigned as error). 
[FN158]. Chenery v. Agri-Lines Corp., 106 Idaho 687, 682 P.2d 640 (Ct. App. 1984) (review denied). 
[FNI59]. Dick v. Reese, 90 Idaho 447, 412 P.2d 815 (1966); see also Beare v. Stowes' Builders Supply, Inc., 104 Idaho 
317,658 P.2d 988 (Ct. App. 1983). 
[FNI60]. S.H. Kress & Co. v. Godman, 95 Idaho 614, 515 P.2d 561 (1973). 
[FN161]. Galbraith v. Vangas, Inc., 103 Idaho 912, 655 P.2d 119 (Ct. App. 1982). 
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[FN162]. Hoffman v. Simplot Aviation, Inc., 97 Idaho 32, 539 P.2d 584 (1975). 
[FN163]. Mico Mobile Sales & Leasing, Inc. v. Skyline Corp., 97 Idaho 408,415, 546 P.2d 54,61 (1975). 
[FN164]. Hillock v. Idaho Title & Trust Co., 22 Idaho 440, 126 P. 612 (1912). 
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[FN165]. McAlvain v. General Ins. Co. of Am., 97 Idaho 777, 780, 554 P.2d 955, 958 (1976) (emphasis added); see also 
Hoffman v. Simplot Aviation, Inc., 97 Idaho 32, 37, 539 P.2d 584, 589 (1975) ("In circumstances involving the rendition 
of personal services the duty upon the actor is to perform the services in a workmanlike manner."). 
[FN166]. McAlvain, 97 Idaho at 780,554 P.2d at 958. 
[FN167]. Just's, Inc. v. Arrington Constr. Co., 99 Idaho 462, 583 P .2d 997 (1978). 
[FN168]. Although these third-party cases are often categorized as negligent misrepresentation, it is important to note 
that these are not the only type of cases that can be so characterized. For example, if the owner of an automobile takes it 
into a repair shop complaining of strange noises and the repairer tells her, "Everything is just fme" when he has no basis 
for his statement, the repairer's conduct might also be characterized as a negligent misrepresentation. E.g., Pabon v. 
Hackensack Auto Sales, Inc., 164 A.2d 773 (N.J. 1960); see also Intermountain Constr. Co. v. City of Ammon, 122 Idaho 
931, 841 P.2d 1082 (1992) (allegations that city had negligently misrepresented the cost of building permits). 
[FN169]. Idaho Bank & Trust Co. v. First Bancorp., 115 Idaho 1082,772 P.2d 720 (1989). 
[FN170]. 135 N.E. 275 (N.Y. 1922). 
(FN171]. The alternative characterization question extends beyond the third party service contract context to include 
many service contracts in which there is a contract between the parties. For example, McAlvain v. General Insurance Co. 
of America, 97 Idaho 777, 554 P.2d 955 (1976), can be viewed either as a negligent performance of a service case 
(failing to insure the business fully) or a negligent misrepresentation case (misrepresenting the status of the insurance on 
the business). 
[FN172]. Id. 
[FN173]. 99 Idaho 462, 583 P.2d 997 (1978). 
[FN174]. Id. at 470, 583 P.2d at 1005. The court, however, did hold that plaintiff was a third-party beneficiary of the 
contract between defendant and the city. Id. at 467, 583 P.2d at 1002. 
[FN175]. Id. 
[FN176]. 135 N.E. 275 (N.Y. 1922). 
[FN177]. 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931). 
[FN178]. I d. at 444. 
[FN179]. Id. at 446. 
[FN180). 483 N.E.2d 110 (N.Y. 1985). 
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[FN181]. Id. at 118. 
[FN182]. 115 Idaho 1082, 772 P.2d 720 (1989). 
[FN183]. Id. at 1083-84, 772 P.2d at 721-22. 
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[FN184]. The court subsequently reaff11111ed its conclusion that negligent misrepresentation, "as recognized in Idaho 
Bank & Trust Co. v. First Bancorp., 115 Idaho at 1082, 772 P.2d at 720 (1989), is a viable cause of action in Idaho." 
Hudson v. Cobbs, 118 Idaho 474,479, 797 P.2d 1322, 1327 (1990). 
[FN185]. 105 Idaho 787, 673 P.2d 387 (1983). 
[FN186]. Id. at 790, 673 P.2d 390. Cf. Zaleha v. Rosholt, Robertson & Tucker, Chartered, 98 Idaho Sup. Ct. Rep. 205 
(1998) (plaintiff cannot recover for her collateral claims for injuries allegedly done to her husband). 
[FN187]. 19 Idaho 163, 112 P. 686 (1910). 
[FN188]. McClain v. Lewiston Interstate Fair & Racing Ass'n, 17 Idaho 63, 104 P. 1015 (1909). 
[FN189]. Cain, 19 Idaho at 167-69, 112 P. at 687-88. 
[FN190]. Moon v. Bullock, 65 Idaho 594, 151 P.2d 765 (1944); Kloepferv. Forch, 32 Idaho 415, 184 P. 477 (1919). 
[FN191]. 39 Idaho 238,227 P. 34 (1924). 
[FN192J. Id. at 244-45, 227 P. at 36. 
[FN193]. 112 Idaho 423, 732 P.2d 661 (1987). 
[FN194]. Id. at 425, 732 P.2d at 663. The court's analysis in Oppenheimer is less than clear. Although the court holds 
that the regulation creates a duty to protect cattle owners, its decision muddles the distinction between property damage 
and economic loss by holding that the loss of the cattle was property damage. This is incorrect under Salmon Rivers 
Sportsman Camps, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 97 Idaho 348, 544 P.2d 306 (1975), since the cattle were the transactional 
property. As the court in Duffin tacitly acknowledged, Oppenheimer's distinction between lost and damaged property is 
logically insupportable. Duffm, 126 Idaho at 1007 n.5, 895 P.2d at 1200 n.5. It thus is better to consider Oppenheimer to 
involve a statutory duty to protect against economic loss. In a subsequent decision, the court has seemingly confused du-
ties based on statutory standards and duties based on the relationship between the parties. In Tomich v. City of Pocatello, 
127 Idaho 394, 901 P.2d 501 (1995), the owners of a small airplane that was stored at a municipal airport brought an ac-
tion to recover for the destruction of the airplane when the tie-downs failed in a wind storm. The court aff11111ed a judg-
ment for the owner on the ground that there was a special relationship between the owner of the airplane and the owner 
of the airport. The court relied upon certain statutory obligation to support its conclusion that there was a special relation-
ship. The court, however, fails to explain why statutes create a special relationship, seeming to confuse these two sources 
of a duty in tort. 
[FN195]. See Everett v. Trunnell, 105 Idaho 787, 673 P.2d 387 (1983). 
[FN196]. Idaho Code§ 5-311 (1990). 
[FN197]. 118 Idaho 474, 797 P.2d 1322 (1990). 
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[FN198]. Id. at 477-78, 797 P.2d at 1325-26. 
[FN199]. Clark v. International Harvester Co., 99 Idaho 326,336, 581 P.2d 784,794 (1978). 
[FN200]. Just's, Inc. v. Arrington Constr. Co., 99 Idaho 462, 470, 583 P.2d 997, 1005 (1978) (citations omitted). 
[FN201]. In Taylor, the court stated this distinction as the difference between misfeasing and nonfeasing: where defend-
ant has not created a risk (misfeased) but simply failed to act, it has not endangered plaintiff and thus has not invaded any 
tort inter est. Taylor v. Herbold, 94 Idaho at 138-39, 483 P.2d at 669-70. The same concern is present in Myers where the 
court of appeals refused to allow a tort action for property damage because the "injuries did not result from a calamitous 
event or dangerous failure of the product." Myers v. A.O. Smith Harvestore Products, 114 Idaho 432, 436, 757 P.2d 695, 
699 (Ct. App. 1988) (review denied). 
[FN202]. Clark, 99 Idaho at 336, 581 P.2d at 794. 
[FN203]. In addition to this doctrinal basis, the court has also provided a rationale for restricting recovery to contract 
claims based on the constitutional allocation of powers between the judicial and the legislative/executive departments of 
state government. As the court noted in Clark, the legislature had enacted the Uniform Commercial Code which 
"contains a comprehensive and finely tuned statutory mechanism for dealing with the rights of parties to a sales transac-
tion." Id. at 334, 581 P.2d at 792; see also Duffm, 126 Idaho at 1007, 895 P.2d at 1200; Adkison Corp. v. American 
Bldg. Co., 107 Idaho 406, 410, 690 P.2d 341, 345 (1984). To replace these statutory mechanisms with tort law would al-
ter the balance struck by the legislature - the UCC, for example, with its tolerance, if not permissiveness, of disclaimers 
is generally more favorable to sellers - and would arguably have a "corrosive effect" on the constitutional power granted 
to that body. Clark, 99 Idaho at 335, 581 P.2d at 793. 
[FN204]. White v. Unigard Mut. Ins. Co., 112 Idaho 94, 99, 730 P.2d 1014, 1019 (1986). C£ Hoffman v. Simplot Avi-
ation, Inc., 97 Idaho 32, 37, 539 P.2d 584, 589 (1975) ("In circumstances involving the rendition of personal services the 
duty upon the actor is to perform the services in a workmanlike manner." (emphasis added)); McAlvain v. General Ins. 
Co. of Am., 97 Idaho 777, 780, 554 P.2d 955, 958 (1976) ("An insurance agent performs a personal service for his cli-
ent"; contracts for sale of goods do "not involve the rendering of personal services by one with specialized knowledge 
and experience."). 
[FN205]. See, e.g., Merritt v. State, 108 Idaho 20, 696 P.2d 871 (1985) (jailer/inmate); Bauer v. Minidoka Sch. Dist. No. 
331, 116 Idaho 586,778 P.2d 336 (1989) (school/pupil). 
[FN206]. Hoffman v. Simplot Aviation, Inc., 97 Idaho 32, 37, 539 P.2d 584, 589 (1975) (quoting Pepsi Cola Bottling Co. 
v. Superior Burner Serv., 427 P.2d 833, 840 (Alaska 1967}); see also Mico Mobile Sales & Leasing, Inc. v. Skyline 
Corp., 97 Idaho 408,415,546 P.2d 54,61 (1975}. 
[FN207]. The rationale is often stated most clearly in cases asserting that a doctor breached a contractual duty to cure the 
patient. In Flowerdew v. Warner, 90 Idaho 164, 168, 409 P.2d 110, 112 (1965), the court rejected such a claim, noting 
that "in the absence of a specific agreement, an agreement of a practitioner with his patient is one for services and treat-
ment, not for a particular result." See also Ogle v. De Sano, 107 Idaho 872, 693 P.2d 1074 (Ct. App. 1984); Trimming v. 
Howard, 52 Idaho 412, 16 P.2d 661 (1932). 
[FN208]. Just's, Inc. v. Arrington Constr. Co., 99 Idaho 462, 470, 583 P.2d 997, 1005 (1978); see also Cain v. Vollmer, 
19 Idaho 163, 112 P. 686 (1910). 
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[FN209]. See, e.g., Blaine v. Byers, 91 Idaho 665, 429 P.2d 397 (1967); Garrett v. Taylor, 69 Idaho 487, 210 P.2d 386 
(1949). There is no reason to assume that the traditional rule is inapplicable to economic losses. The driver who runs 
down a millionaire can expect to pay more than the driver who kills a bum. 
[FN210]. Adkison Corp. v. American Bldg. Co., 107 Idaho 406, 690 P.2d 341 (1984). 
[FN211]. The Uniform Commercial Code and the Idaho Products Liability Reform Act explicitly and implicitly remove 
privity requirements in transactions for the sale/purchase of goods. See Idaho Code § 28-2-318 (1995) (express and im-
plied warranties may not be limited by seller when personal injuries occur); Idaho Code § 6-1407(1) (1990) (product 
sellers other than manufacturers generally not liable when manufacturers are answerable for "harm" to claimants). 
[FN212]. Just's, 99 Idaho at 466-67, 583 P.2d at 1001-02. 
[FN213). 135 N.E. 275 (N.Y. 1922). 
[FN214]. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven & Co., 174 N.E. 441,446 (N.Y. 1931) (explaining the decision in Glanzer). 
(FN215]. E.g., Idaho Bank & Trust Co. v. First Bancorp., 115 Idaho 1082, 772 P.2d 720 (1989). 
(FN216]. Credit Alliance v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 483 N.E.2d 110 (N.Y. 1985). 
[FN217]. McClain v. Lewiston Interstate Fair & Racing Ass'n, 17 Idaho 63, 104 P. 1015 (1909). 
[FN218]. Cain v. Vollmer, 19 Idaho 163, 169, 112 P. 686,688 (1910). 
[FN219]. Duffm v. Idaho Crop Improvement Ass'n, 126 Idaho 1002, 1004-06, 895 P.2d 1195, 1197-99. 
[FN220]. Id. at 1008,895 P.2dat 1201. 
[FN221]. Id. at 1010, 895 P.2d at 1203. 
[FN222]. Id. at 1008, 895 P.2d at 1201. 
[FN223J. E.g., Steiner Corp. v. American Dist. Tel., 106 Idaho 787, 791, 683 P.2d 435, 439 {1984); Rawlings v. Layne & 
Bowler Pump Co., 93 Idaho 496, 499, 465 P .2d 107, 110 (1970). 
[FN224]. Cf. Dale D. Goble, Of Defamation and Decisionmaking: Weimer v. Rankin and the Abdication of Appellate 
Responsibility, 28 Idaho L. Rev. 1, 6-7 (1991). 
[FN225]. 97 Idaho 777, 554 P.2d 955 (1976). 
[FN226]. Id. at 780, 554 P.2d at 958 (citations omitted). 
[FN227]. Id. 
[FN228). Duffm, 126 Idaho at 1008,895 P.2d at 1201. 
~29}. Id. In addition, the court concluded that a second defendant - the Fedeml-State Inspection Service - had done 
nothing "actively ... to induce reliance" and therefore did not have a special relationship with the purchasers of certified 
seed. Id. 
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[FN230]. Id. at 1006, 895 P.2d at 1199. 
[FN231]. Cases involving the sale of goods do "not involve the rendering of personal services by one with specialized 
knowledge and experience." McAlvain v. General Ins. Co. of Am., 97 Idaho 777, 780, 554 P.2d 955, 958 (1976). Taylor 
involved the breach of contract to purchase potatoes. Taylor v. Herbold, 94 Idaho 133, 483 P.2d 664 (1971). 
(FN232]. White v. Unigard Mut. Ins. Co., 112 Idaho 94, 99, 730 P.2d 1014, 1019 (1986) (bad faith claim involving insur-
ance contract); Hoffman v. Simplot Aviation, Inc., 97 Idaho 32, 37, 539 P.2d 584, 589 (1975) (aircraft mechanic). 
[FN233]. Just's, Inc. v. Arrington Constr. Co., 99 Idaho 462, 470, 583 P.2d 997, 1005 (1978); see also Cain v. Vollmer, 
19 Idaho 163, 112 P. 686 (1910). 
[FN234]. Duffm, 126 Idaho at 1008, 895 P.2d at 1201 (emphasis added). But recall that the trial court had found that 
there was no evidence that "ICIA knew the Duffms would rely on its representations," id. at 1006, 895 P.2d at 1199, a 
finding that raises questions about "knowingly induc[ing]." 
[FN235]. Id. 
[FN236]. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven & Co., 174 N.E. 441,444 (N.Y. 1931). 
[FN237]. Glanzerv. Shepard, 135 N.E. 275 (N.Y. 1922). 
[FN238]. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441,446 (1931). 
[FN239J. Just's held that a business located in a city's blighted urban core could not recover in tort for business losses 
traceable to the breach of a contract between the city and a construction company that was redeveloping the core. Just's, 
99 Idaho 462,583 P.2d 997. 
[FN240]. Idaho Bank & Trust Co. v. First Bancorp., 115 Idaho 1082, 772 P.2d 720 (1989). 
[FN241 ]. In McAlvain, defendant had a contract with plaintiff to insure his business; that contract provided the basis for 
a relationship between the parties that the court thought sufficiently special to justify the imposition of a tort duty in ad-
dition to the contractually assumed duties. McAlvain, 97 Idaho 777,554 P.2d 955. 
[FN242]. Duffm, 126 Idaho at 1010, 895 P.2d at 1203. The decision to which the court implicitly refers is Idaho Bank & 
Trust Co. v. First Bancorp, 115 Idaho 1082, 772 P.2d 720 (1989), where the court held that an accountant can be held li-
able for negligent misrepresentation under limited circumstances. While the court's statement is absolute, the facts of the 
case do not rule out maintaining a claim for negligent misrepresentation where the person had suffered either personal in-
jury or property damage. 
[FN243]. Glanzer v. Shepard, 135 N.E. 275 (N.Y. 1922). 
[FN244]. HenryS. Maine, Ancient Law 182 (Frederick Pollock new ed. 1930) (1861). 
[FN245]. Gilmore, supra note 1, at 3. 
[FN246]. Duffin, 126 Idaho at 1007, 895 P.2d at 1200. 
34 Idaho L. Rev. 225 
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Court of Appeals of Washington, 
Division 1. 
James H. JACKSON and C.R. Hendrick, a marital 
community, Appellants, 
v. 
The CITY OF SEA TILE, a Washington municipal 
corporation; Plaintiffs, 
and 
Trenchless Construction Services, L.L.C., a Wash-
ington Limited Liability Company, and QPS, Inc., a 
Washington corporation, which does business in 




Background: Homeowners filed suit against con-
struction contractors, alleging that they negligently 
installed a waterline for the previous owner, which 
caused a landslide that damaged home and land-
scaping. Contractors filed motions for summary 
judgment dismissal. The Superior Court, King 
County, 2009 WL 4571546,Michael Trickey, J., 
granted motions. Homeowners appealed. 
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Becker, J., held 
that: 
(1) city ston:nwater code did not impose any duty 
on contractors; 
(2) contractors owed a common law duty of care to 
homeowners when installing waterline; and 
(3) economic loss rule did not apply to preclude 
homeowners' negligence claim. 
Reversed. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Negligence 272 €;::::::>202 
272 Negligence 
2721 In General 
272k202 k. Elements in general. Most Cited 
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To show actionable negligence, plaintiff must 
establish: (1) the existence of a duty owed to the 
complaining party, (2) a breach of that duty, (3) a 
resulting injury, and (4) that the claimed breach 
was the proximate cause of the injury. 
[2} Negligence 272 ~210 
272 Negligence 
272U Necessity and Existence of Duty 
272k210 k. In general. Most Cited Cases 
Duty in a negligence action is a threshold ques-
tion. 
[3] Negligence 272 ~210 
272 Negligence 
272II Necessity and Existence of Duty 
272k2IO k. In general. Most Cited Cases 
Negligence 272 ~222 
272 Negligence 
272II Necessity and Existence of Duty 
272k222 k. Duty based upon statute or other 
regulation. Most Cited Cases 
A duty may be predicated on violation of stat-
ute or of common law principles of negligence. 
[4] Negligence 272 ~1205{7) 
272 Negligence 
272XVII Premises Liability 
272XVII(G) Liabilities Relating to Construc-
tion, Demolition fu'"ld Repair 
272kl205 Liabilities of Particular Persons 
Other Than Owners 
272kl205(6) Contractors 
272kl205(7) k. In general. Most 
Cited Cases 
City ston:nwater code, setting forth require-
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ments for erosion control "for all land disturbing 
activities" as well as construction controls, and 
providing for enforcement actions for violations of 
code, did not impose any duty on construction con-
tractors who allegedly negligently installed water-
line for prior homeowner that caused a landslide 
that damaged current homeowners' home and land-
scaping, as code lacked language expressing a pur-
pose to protect a particular class of persons, and in-
stead stated that one of its remedial purposes was 
for the protection of life, property and the environ-
ment from erosion, and code contained language 
specifically disavowing an intention to protect a 
particular class of persons. 
[5] Negligence 272 ~210 
272 Negligence 
272II Necessity and Existence of Duty 
272k210 k. In general. Most Cited Cases 





272XVIII(C)l Burden ofProof 
272kl550 k. In generaL Most Cited 
A plaintiff asserting a negligence claim has the 
burden of establishing the existence of a duty. 
[6] Negligence 272 €::::=>1025 
272 Negligence 
272XVII Premises Liability 
272XVII(B) Necessity and Existence ofDuty 
272k1025 k. Duty based on statute or oth-
er regulation. Most Cited Cases 
Negligence 272 ~1202(1) 
272 Negligence 
272XVII Premises Liability 
272XVII(G) Liabilities Relating to Construc-
tion, Demolition and Repair 
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272k1202 Defects in Buildings and Struc-
tures in General 
272k1202(1) k. In general. Most Cited 
Cases 
Negligence 272 €::::=>1204(1) 
272 Negligence 
272XVII Premises Liability 
272XVII(G) Liabilities Relating to Construc-
tion, Demolition and Repair 
272kl204 Accidents and Injuries in Gen-
era I 
272k1204(I) k. In generaL Most Cited 
Cases 
Building codes and other similar municipal 
codes do not typically serve as a basis for tort liab-
ility because they are enacted merely for purposes 
of public safety or for the general welfare. 
[71 Negligence 272 €:;::::::>1205(7) 
272 Negligence 
272XVII Premises Liability 
272XVII(G) Liabilities Relating to Construc-
tion, Demolition and Repair 
272kl205 Liabilities of Particular Persons 
Other Than Owners 
272kl205(6) Contractors 
272kl205(7) k. In generaL Most 
Cited Cases 
Construction contractors who allegedly negli-
gently installed waterline for prior homeowner that 
caused a landslide that damaged current homeown-
ers' home and landscaping owed current owners a 
common law duty of care when installing waterline, 
as installation of waterline created a dangerous con-
dition on the hillside land above the home, the land 
had previously been designated as a potential land-
slide area by the city, and it was reasonably fore-
seeable that drilling and connecting a new waterline 
would cause damage to third persons if done 
without sufficient attention to compacting the dis-
turbed soil or stabilizing the newly bored waterline. 
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A builder or construction contractor is liable 
for injury or damage to a third person as a result of 
negligent work, even after completion and accept-
ance of that work, when it was reasonably foresee-
able that a third person would be injured due to that 
negligence. Restatement (Second) of Torts§ 385. 
[9} Negligence 272 €;;;:;;>1251 
272 Negligence 
272XVIT Premises Liability 
Cases 
272XVIT(J) Necessity and Existence ofin- jury 
272kl251 k Particular cases. Most Cited 
Economic loss rule did not apply to preclude 
homeowners' negligence claim against contractors 
who allegedly negligently installed waterline for 
prior homeowner that caused a landslide that dam-
aged current homeowners' home and landscaping, 
as the waterline itself worked as anticipated, and 
Page 3 of 10 
Page3 
homeowners' loss was damage to their home and 
landscaping, caused by the violent occurrence of a 
landslide, which was an event allegedly precipitated 
by the defective condition in which the contractors 
left the hillside. 
[10} Torts 379 €;;;:;;>118 
379 Torts 
379! In General 
379kll6 Injury or Damage from Act 
379kll8 k. Economic loss doctrine. Most 
Cited Cases 
The economic loss rule marks the fundamental 
boundary between the law of contracts, which is de-
signed to enforce expectations created by agree-
ment, and the law of torts, which is designed to pro-
tect citizens and their property by imposing a duty 
of reasonable care on others; if the rule applies, the 
party will be held to contract remedies, regardless 
of how plaintiff characterizes the claims. 
[llJ Negligence 272 <8:=>463 
272 Negligence 
272XIV Necessity and Existence ofinjury 
272k463 k. Economic loss doctrine. Most 
Cited Cases 
Products Liability 313A <8:=>156 
313A Products Liability 
313AII Elements and Concepts 
313Ak154 Nature oflnjury or Damage 
313Akl56 k Economic losses; damage to 
product itself. Most Cited Cases 
For purposes of the economic loss rule, an 
"economic loss" is a defect of quality as evidenced 
by internal deterioration; but when a loss stems 
from defects that cause accidents involving viol-
ence or collision with external objects, that is a 
physical injury susceptible of a tort remedy. 
[12] Products Liability 313A €;:;:;;;;>156 
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313A Products Liability 
313AII Elements and Concepts 
313Akl54 Nature of Injury or Damage 
313Akl56 k. Economic losses; damage to 
product itself. Most Cited Cases 
When a defective product mJures something 
other than itself, such as a person or other separate 
property, the loss is not merely an economic loss 
and tort remedies are appropriate. 
**427 Larry L. Setchell, Benjamin Ta-Shin Shih, 
Helsell Fetterman LLP, Seattle, WA, for Appel-
lants. 
Kathleen Boyle, Themis Litigation Group, Gregory 
Fuller, Seattle City Attorney's Office, Seattle, W A, 
Shellie McGaughey, McGaughey BridgesDunlap 
PLLC, Bellevue, W A, for Respondents. 
BECKER,J. 
*649 ~ 1 The trial court granted summary judg-
ment dismissal of a homeowner's negligence claims 
against two construction contractors whose al-
legedly negligent installation of a waterline for the 
previous owner caused a landslide, damaging the 
landscaping and house. We reverse. This is not a 
negligent construction case where the economic 
loss rule would apply and recovery would be *650 
limited to contract remedies. The contractors are li-
able in tort if their negligence caused the landslide. 
~ 2 "We affirm orders granting summary judg-
ment only when satisfied, after considering the 
facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 
party, that there is no genuine issue of material fact 
and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law." Burg v. Shannon & Wilson, Inc., 
110 Wash.App. 798, 803-04,43 P.3d 526 (2002). 
~ 3 The appellant homeowners are James Jack-
son and his wife, C.R. Hendrick. They bought their 
house from Corrine Otakie and moved in in 
November 2006. Earlier that year, Otakie had a 
problem with a leaking waterline. She contacted re-
spondent QPS, Inc., a plumbing company. After in-
Page 4 oflO 
Page4 
vestigating, QPS determined that fncing the old line 
would be too dangerous because it came down a 
steep hillside. QPS recommended installing a new 
waterline using the trenchless method. Otakie took 
the advice. She contracted with respondent Trench-
less Construction Services, LLC, to drill and install 
the new waterline. She contracted with QPS to con-
nect one end of the line to her house and the other 
end to the city water main at the top of the hill 
above her house, and to backfill any excavations. 
~ 4 Starting near the city water main above 
Otakie, Trenchless drilled a tunnel 5 inches in dia-
meter and 160 feet long, at an acute angle down the 
hill to her house. The drilled line began on city 
property and crossed at least one private lot that did 
not belong to Otakie. Trenchless installed a one and 
one quarter inch pipe for the length of the line. QPS 
dug a trench, 30 feet long and 5 feet deep, along the 
top of the hill above Otakie's house from the water 
main to the start of the waterline Trenchless in-
stalled. QPS backfilled the connection trench. QPS 
then connected the pipe to the house, completing 
the installation in March 2006. 
~ 5 In November 2006, a large sinkhole formed 
at the top of the hill above the **428 house-now 
owned and occupied by Jackson-near the water 
main where QPS had dug and backfilled the con-
nection trench. The sinkhole was reported *651 by 
a local homeowner and backfilled by the city. The 
sinkhole reformed in early December, but it was not 
reported or filled again. 
~ 6 In December 2006, heavy rains fell on 
Seattle. On December 14, a city catch basin 
clogged and water began to pool in the sinkhole. 
The pooling water burst from the sinkhole, scouring 
a path down the hill to Jackson's property. The 
scour path, 15 feet wide by 4 to 5 feet deep, 
roughly followed the waterline drilled by Trench-
less, causing the hillside above Jackson to slide 
down. The landslide caused considerable damage to 
the landscaping and house. 
~ 7 Jackson sued the city of Seattle, Trenchless, 
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and QPS. He sued Seattle for negligently inspecting 
and backfilling the first November sinkhole and for 
allowing the catch basin to fail. Jackson voluntarily 
dismissed all claims against Seattle after they 
reached a mediated settlement. 
~ 8 Trenchless and QPS each moved for sum-
mary judgment dismissal. In opposition to the mo-
tions, Jackson filed declarations by engineers who 
opined that the construction by Trenchless and QPS 
caused the landslide and that it would not have 
happened if QPS had properly compacted the soil 
when it backfilled the 30 foot water main connec-
tion trench at the top of the hill, or if Trenchless 
had used a better medium to stabilize the downhill 
tunnel it bored for the 160 foot long pipe, or if 
Trenchless and QPS had properly planned and co-
ordinated their project with each other and with the 
city. 
~ 9 The trial court granted the motions for sum-
mary judgment, orally ruling the contractors owed 
no duty to Jackson. Jackson appeals. 
[1][2][3][4] ~ 10 To show actionable negli-
gence, "a plaintiff must establish: (I) the existence 
of a duty owed to the complaining party; (2) a 
breach of that duty; (3) a resulting injury; and (4) 
that the claimed breach was the proximate cause of 
the injury." Burg, 110 Wash.App. at 804, 43 P.3d 
526. Duty in a negligence action is a threshold 
question. A duty may be predicated "on violation of 
statute or of common law principles of negligence." 
*652 Burg, llO Wash.App. at 804, 43 P.3d 526. 
Jackson offers both a city ordinance and the com-
mon law as predicates for a duty owed by contract-
ors. He relies on Wells v. City of Vancouver, 77 
Wash.2d 800, 467 P.2d 292 (1970). In Wells, a 
hangar at the municipal airport blew apart in a 
fierce storm. The plaintiff's leg was broken when he 
was hit by a flying piece of plywood. According to 
the experts who testified for the plaintiff, the con-
struction of the hangar fell short of the wind resist-
ance standards in the city building code. The trial 
court allowed the plaintiff's case to go to the jury 
on the theory that a violation of the wind resistance 
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standards breached a duty arising from the building 
code and also on the common law theory of a 
breach of a property owner's duty to an invitee. The 
Supreme Court affirmed. 
[5] ~ 11 The plaintiff has the burden of estab-
lishing the existence of a duty. Burg, llO 
Wash.App. at 804, 43 P.3d 526. Jackson first con-
tends the contractors breached a duty created by the 
Seattle stormwater code, analogous to the building 
code violations that were held to breach a statutory 
duty in Wells. 
~ 12 "In deciding when violation of a statute or 
administrative regulation shall be considered in de-
termining liability, this court has relied upon the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 286 (1965)." 
Melville v. State, 115 Wash.2d 34, 36-37, 793 P.2d 
952 (1990). Section 286 gives a four factor test: 
The court may adopt as the standard of conduct 
of a reasonable man the requirements of a legis-
lative enactment or an administrative regulation 
whose purpose is found to be exclusively or in part 
(a) to protect a class of persons which includes 
the one whose interest is invaded, and 
(b) to protect the particular interest which is in-
vaded, and 
(c) to protect that interest against the kind of 
harm which has resulted, and 
(d) to protect that interest against the particular 
hazard from which the harm results. 
**429 *653 ~ 13 The version of the stormwater 
code in effect at the time the contractors began their 
work set forth requirements for erosion control "for 
aU land disturbing activities." Former SMC 
22.802.015 (2006}. Compliance required the use of 
construction controls to achieve the following ob-
jectives: 
b. Before the completion of the project, per-
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manently stabilize all exposed soils that have 
been disturbed during construction. Methods such 
as permanent seeding, planting, and sodding may 
be specified by rules promulgated by the Direct- or. 
c. Prevent the transport of sediment from the 
site. Appropriate use of methods such as, but not 
limited to, vegetated buffer strips, stormdrain in-
let protection, silt fences, sediment traps, settling 
ponds, and protective berms may be specified in 
rules promulgated by the Director. 
Former SMC 22.802.015(C)(3)(b)-(c). The 
code authorized certain city agencies to investigate 
and initiate enforcement action against parties re-
sponsible for code violations. Former SMC 
22.808.030. An enforcement action could be initi-
ated either through the office of the hearing exam-
iner or in court, potentially leading to an order for 
corrective action or monetary penalties. Former 
SMC 22.808.040. The code also included a section 
on "Violations" making noncompliance with the 
code a "civil violation" and designating more egre-
gious activities, such as noncompliance with orders, 
as "criminal violations." Former SMC 22.808.090. 
Creating a dangerous condition was specifically 
designated as a civil violation: 
Dangerous Condition. It is a violation of this sub-
title to allow to exist, or cause or contribute to, a 
condition of a drainage control facility, or condi-
tion related to grading, stormwater, drainage or 
erosion that is likely to endanger the public 
health, safety or welfare, the environment, or 
public or private property. 
Former SMC 22.808.090(A)(5). Jackson con-
tends these provisions of the code demonstrate that 
its purposes satisfy the Restatement four-part test. 
[6] *654 ~ 14 The difficulty for Jackson is the 
lack of language expressing a purpose to protect a 
particular class of persons. Building codes and oth-
er similar municipal codes do not typically serve as 
a basis for tort liability because they are enacted 
merely for purposes of public safety or for the gen-
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eral welfare. Halvorson v. Dahl, 89 Wash.2d 673, 
677, 574 P.2d 1190 (1978). Halvorson was an ex-
ception to the traditional rule because it involved a 
housing code with a declaration of purpose that 
specifically mentioned a concern for the welfare of 
the "occupants" of buildings, not just the welfare of 
the public as a whole. Halvorson, 89 Wash.2d at 
677, 574 P.2d 1190. Seattle's stormwater code, on 
the other hand, comes v.'ithin the traditional rule. It 
declares that one of its remedial purposes is protec-
tion of "life, property and the environment" from 
erosion, flooding, landslides, and other hazards. 
Former SMC 22.800.020(A)(l). Almost identical 
language was discussed in Halvorson to show how 
the purpose of a typical building code is to protect 
the general public rather than a particular class of 
individuals. Halvorson, 89 Wash.2d at 677 n. 2, 
574 P.2d 1190. While the court in Wells did ap-
prove a duty instruction based on the city building 
code, the parties in that case apparently assumed 
the wind resistance standards were designed with a 
purpose to protect a particular class. The issue 
presented was whether the particular class was lim-
ited to persons directly injured by a collapsing 
building. In deciding that the protected class was 
broad enough to include anyone injured by flying 
debris, the court did not address the precise issue 
presented in this case-whether the code was inten-
ded to protect a particular class of persons rather 
than the general public. 
~ 15 Not only does the Seattle stormwater code 
employ the general purpose language of a typical 
building code, it also contains language specifically 
disavowing an intention to protect a particular class 
of persons. In the subsection on penalties and dam-
ages that can be awarded by the hearing examiner 
or by a judge, the code specifically states: "It is ex-
pressly the purpose of this subtitle to provide for 
and promote the health, safety and welfare of the 
general public. This subtitle is not intended to cre-
ate or *655 otherwise establish or designate any 
particular class or group of persons who will or 
should be especially**430 protected or benefitted 
by its terms." Former SMC 22.800.020(B). The 
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subtitle "does not establish a cause of action that 
may be asserted by any party other than the City. 
Penalties, damages, costs and expenses may be re-
covered only by the City." Former SMC 
22.808.060(C). 
, 16 When a court decides that a violation of a 
statute shall be considered in determining liability 
for negligence, the motivation for doing so is to 
give effect to the will of the legislature: 
It is not every provision of a criminal statute or 
ordinance which will be adopted by the court, in 
a civil action for negligence, as the standard of 
conduct of a reasonable person. Otherwise stated, 
there are statutes which are considered to create 
no duty of conduct toward the plaintiff, and to af-
ford no basis for the creation of such a duty by 
the court. The courts in such cases have been 
careful not to exceed the purpose which they at-
tribute to the legislature. This judicial self-
restraint is rooted in part in the theory of the sep-
aration of powers. 
W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on 
Torts § 36 at 222 (5th ed.l984) (footnote omitted). 
Jackson does not persuasively explain how we 
could view the stormwater code as a foundation for 
a negligence action in spite of the express disclaim-
er of a purpose to designate a protected class and 
the express terms making the code enforceable only 
by the city. We conclude he has not established the 
existence of a duty arising from the code. 
[7] ~ 17 This does not mean Jackson is without 
a remedy. Even if a violation of the city stormwater 
code is not negligence, this case does resemble 
Wells in that the facts support a common law theory 
of liability. We agree with Jackson that the con-
tractors owed him the common law duty of care re-
cognized in Davis v. Baugh Industrial Contractors, 
Inc., 159 Wash.2d 413, 417, 150 P.3d 545 (2007). 
[8] *656 ~ 18 In Davis, the crew foreman of a 
concrete company was accidentally crushed to 
death by falling cement blocks while he was in-
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specting leaking water pipes. A contractor had in-
stalled the pipes, allegedly without using reason-
able care. The trial court granted summary judg-
ment to the contractor on the ground that the com-
mon law completion and acceptance doctrine re-
lieved the contractor of liability for negligence after 
the work was completed by the contractor and ac-
cepted by the landlord. Abandoning the "ancient'' 
doctrine of completion and acceptance, the court in-
stead employed RESTATEMENT (SECO:NTI) OF 
TORTS§ 385 (1965): 
§ 385. Persons Creating Artificial Conditions on 
Land on Behalf of Possessor: Physical Harm 
Caused After Work has been Accepted 
One who on behalf of the possessor of land erects 
a structure or creates any other condition thereon 
is subject to liability to others upon or outside of 
the land for physical harm caused to them by the 
dangerous character of the structure or condition 
after his work has been accepted by the pos-
sessor, under the same rules as those determining 
the liability of one who as manufacturer or inde-
pendent contractor makes a chattel for the use of 
others. 
Under this section of the Restatement, "a build-
er or construction contractor is liable for injury or 
damage to a third person as a result of negligent 
work, even after completion and acceptance of that 
work, when it was reasonably foreseeable that a 
third person would be injured due to that negli-
gence." Davis, 159 Wash.2d at 417, 150 P.3d 545. 
~ 19 This statement in Davis defmes the duty 
that Trenchless and QPS owed to Jackson when 
they installed the waterline. Viewed in the light 
most favomble to Jackson, the evidence establishes 
that the installation of the waterline created a dan-
gerous condition on the hillside land above the res-
idence. The land had previously been designated as 
a potential landslide area by the city of Seattle, and 
it was reasonably foreseeable that drilling and con-
necting the new waterline would cause damage to 
third persons if done without sufficient attention to 
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compacting the disturbed*657 soil or stabilizing the 
newly bored waterline. See Schneider v. Strifert, 77 
Wash.App. 58, 63, 888 P.2d 1244 (1995) 
("Foreseeability is a question of fact **431 for the 
jury unless reasonable persons could reach but one 
conclusion."). 
[9] ~ 20 Trenchless and QPS argue that Davis 
is factually distinguishable. In Davis, the negli-
gently installed water pipes leaked, whereas in this 
case the new waterline remained intact and func-
tioned as promised. And in Davis, the negligence 
caused bodily injury, whereas in this case there was 
only property damage. But these are not material 
distinctions. They do not override the policy con-
cerns that motivated our Supreme Court to cast 
aside the completion and acceptance doctrine: 
The doctrine is also harmful because it weakens 
the deterrent effect of tort law on negligent build-
ers. By insulating contractors from liability, the 
completion and acceptance doctrine increases the 
public's exposure to injuries caused by negligent 
design and construction of improvements to real 
property and undermines the deterrent effect of 
tort law. Illinois long ago abandoned the doctrine 
specifically for this reason, stating that "[aJn un-
derlying purpose of tort law is to provide for pub-
lic safety through deterrence of negligent design-
ers and builders. This purpose cannot be accom-
plished if these persons are insulated from liabil-
ity simply by the act of delivery." Johnson v. 
Equip. Specialists, Inc., 58 Ill.App.3d 133, 373 
N.E.2d 837, 843, 15 Ill.Dec. 491 (1978). 
Davis, 159 Wash.2d at 419-20, 150 P.3d 545. 
Similarly here, the deterrent effect of tort law on 
negligent construction would be diminished by ab-
solving contractors of tort liability so long as they 
deliver a functional system and do not cause bodily 
injury. Contractors who install a waterline on a 
steep slope have to be concerned about the condi-
tion in which they leave the slope, not just the con-
dition of the waterline. And liability imposed under 
Restatement § 385 is "for physical harm"; this in-
cludes damage to property, not just personal injury. 
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[10] 'il 21 Trenchless and QPS insist that the 
economic loss rule bars Jackson's negligence ac-
tion. "The *658 economic loss rule marks the fun-
damental boundary between the law of contracts, 
which is designed to enforce expectations created 
by agreement, and the law of torts, which is de-
signed to protect citizens and their property by im-
posing a duty of reasonable care on others." Ber-
schauer/Phillips Const. Co. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 
I, 124 Wash.2d 816, 821, 881 P.2d 986 (1994). "If 
the economic loss rule applies, the party will be 
held to contract remedies, regardless of how the 
plaintiff characterizes the claims." Alejandre v. 
Bull, 159 Wash.2d 674, 683, 153 P.3d 864 (2007). 
'il 22 In a case involving a claim of negligent 
misrepresentation by homebuyers against an ap-
praiser hired by their lender, this court stated that it 
is error to apply the economic loss rule where no 
contractual relationship exists between the parties. 
Borish v. Russell, 155 Wash.App. 892, 901, 904, 
230 P.3d 646 (2010). Citing Borish, Jackson con-
tends the economic loss rule has no application in 
this case because he did not have a contract with 
Trenchless or with QPS. 
~ 23 The idea that there must be pnVlty 
between the parties before the economic loss rule 
comes into play would seem to be at odds with the 
leading case of Berschauer/Phillips. In that case, 
the court made the economic loss rule the founda-
tion of its decision to deny a tort remedy to a gener-
al contractor even though the damages, costly 
delays in the construction of a school project, were 
allegedly caused by negligent preparation of archi-
tectural plans and negligent inspection of the work 
by individuals with whom the contractor did not 
have a direct contractual relationship. The court 
denied the contractor's tort claims because the dam-
ages caused by the construction delays were only 
economic losses. Notwithstanding Borish, we con-
clude it is appropriate to consider the economic loss 
rule here, even though Trenchless and QPS did not 
directly contract with Jackson. 
~ 24 Based on the economic loss rule, Trench-
© 2011 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
NOTICE OF CITATION OF ADDITIONAL AUTHORITY 
http:/ /web2. westlaw.com/print/printstream.aspx?utid=2&prft=HTMLE&pbc=BC6E23F9&... 8/12/2011 
244 P.3d425 
158 Wash.App. 647,244 P.3d 425 
(Cite as: 158 Wash.App. 647, 244 P.3d 425) 
less and QPS argue that any duty they had to install 
the waterline safely arose solely by means of their 
contracts with Otakie *659 and accordingly Jackson 
must be limited to a contract remedy. We disagree. 
As discussed above, a duty in tort to use due care in 
installing the waterline arose from the common law. 
**432 ~ 25 The contractors contend Jackson's 
claim is precluded by Stuart v. Coldwell Banker 
Commercial Group, Inc., 109 Wash.2d 406, 745 
P.2d 1284 (1987). In Stuart, a condominium 
homeowners' association, suing on behalf of origin-
al and subsequent unit purchasers, attempted to im-
pose tort liability upon the builder and vendor of 
the units for construction defects that resulted in 
rotting and impairment of the units. Stuart, 109 
Wash.2d at 422, 745 P.2d 1284. Applying the eco-
nomic loss rule, the court refused to recognize a tort 
cause of action for negligent construction. Beyond 
the terms expressed in the contract of sale, "the 
only recognized duty owing from a builder-vendor 
of a newly completed residence to its first pur-
chaser is that embodied in the implied warranty of 
habitability." Stuart, 109 Wash.2d at 417, 745 P.2d 
1284. Stuart does not stand for the proposition that 
a building contractor can only be sued for contract 
remedies. The court was concerned with preventing 
the consumer from using a tort theory to obtain 
compensation for a defective "product" (the con-
dominium) that did not meet the consumer's mar-
ket-based economic expectations. The court was 
careful to preserve tort liability for physical damage 
caused when the "product" does not meet a stand-
ard of safety defined in terms of conditions that cre-
ate unreasonable risks of harm. Stuart, 109 
Wash.2d at 419, 745 P.2d 1284, quoting Seely v. 
White Motor Co., 63 Cal.2d 9, 45 Cal.Rptr. 17, 403 
P.2d 145 (1965). 
[II] 'II 26 Under Stuart, Jackson's loss was not 
an "economic" loss. An economic loss is a defect of 
quality as evidenced by internal deterioration. But 
when a loss stems "from defects that cause acci-
dents involving violence or collision with external 
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objects," that is a physical injury susceptible of a 
tort remedy. Stuart, 109 Wash.2dat 420, 745 P.2d 
1284.FN1 If the new waterline *660 had not func-
tioned properly and had to be reinstalled or fixed, 
that would be an economic loss. But the waterline 
itself worked as anticipated. Jackson's loss was 
damage to his house and landscaping, caused by the 
violent occurrence of the landslide-an event al-
legedly precipitated by the defective condition in 
which the contractors left the hillside. 
FNI. See also Eastwood v. Horse Harbor 
Foundation, Inc., 170 Wash.2d 380, 241 
P.3d 1256 (2010); Affiliated FM Ins. Co. v. 
LTK Consulting Servs., Inc., 170 Wash.2d 
442, 243 P.3d 521 (2010). These two de-
cisions, issued after oral argument in this 
case and cited by Jackson as supplemental 
authority, confirm our decision and our ra-
tionale. 
[12] 'l)27 In short, we agree with the distinction 
stated in Stieneke v. Russi, 145 Wash.App. 544, 
556, 190 P.3d 60 (2008), review denied, 165 
Wash.2d 1026, 203 P.3d 381 (2009): "When a de-
fective product injures something other than itself, 
such as a person or other separate property, the loss 
is not merely an economic loss and tort remedies 
are appropriate." The same is true of a defective in-
stallation of a product. The nature of Jackson's loss 
is injury to property resulting from the allegedly 
negligent installation of an otherwise functional 
waterline. Because Jackson establishes that Trench-
less and QPS owed him a duty of care under Davis, 
the trial court erred in treating his case as if it were 
a claim for negligent construction precluded by Stu-
art. 
'II 28 In addition to arguing lack of duty, QPS 
contends the dismissal can be affirmed on the al-
ternative ground of lack of proximate cause. This 
argument was not properly raised below and we 
will not consider it. White v. Kent Med. Center, 
Inc., 61 Wash.App. 163, 168-69,810 P.2d 4 (1991). 
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~ 29 The record shows genuine issues of mater-
ial fact remain concerning breach of duty. Summary 
judgment was inappropriate. 
~ 30 Reversed. 
WE CONClJR: SCHINDLER and GROSSE, JJ. 
Wash.App. Div. 1,2010. 
Jackson v. City of Seattle 
158 Wash.App. 647, 244 P.3d 425 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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Supreme Court of Idaho, 
Pocatello, May 2001 Term. 
David Leslie UDY, Plaintiff, 
v. 
CUSTER COUNTY, Defendant. 
Roy Chivers and Susan Chivers, husband and wife, 
and Fred McDonald and Roxanna McDonald, hus-
band and wife, Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
v. 
Custer County, Idaho, and Mickey Roskelley, in his 
official capacity as Sheriff of Custer County, Idaho, 
Defendants Respondents. 
David Leslie Udy, Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
Custer County, Defendant-Respondent. 
Roy Chivers and Susan Chivers, husband and wife, 
and Fred McDonald and Roxanna McDonald, hus-
band and wife, Plaintiffs, 
v. 
Custer County, Idaho, and Mickey Roskelley, in his 
official capacity as Sheriff of Custer County, Idaho, 
Defendants. 
Nos. 26345, 26346. 
Oct 24,2001. 
Injured driver and his passengers brought ac-
tion against county and its sheriff, alleging sheriff 
observed and negligently failed to remove from the 
highway the rock driver later struck with his 
vehicle. The District Court, Seventh Judicial Dis-
trict, Custer County, Richard T. St. Clair, J., gran-
ted summary judgment to defendants, and plaintiffs 
appealed. The Supreme Court, Walters, J., held 
that: (1) State, rather than county sheriff, had a stat-
utory duty to remove rocks and other obstructions 
from highway; (2) sheriff did not voluntarily as-
sume a duty to remove the rocks from highway the 
night before the accident; and (3) common law duty 
to remove or warn of the rocks on highway would 
not be imposed on sheriff. 
Affirmed. 
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Kidwell, J., filed a specially concurring opin-
ion. 
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48A Automobiles 
48A VI Injuries from Defects or Obstructions in 
Highways and Other Public Places 
48A VI(A) Nature and Grounds of Liability 
48Ak255 k. Cause of or Responsibility for 
Defects, Obstructions, or Dangerous Conditions. 
Most Cited Cases 
Statute suggesting county sheriff was to work 
with State Police to protect the highways surfaces 
from damage did not imply that sheriff owed a duty 
to remove rocks or other obstructions from the 
State's highways, or to communicate to some other 
person or entity the need for removal of rocks or 
obstructions. I.C. § 31-2022(13). 
[2] Appeal and Error 30 ~842(1) 
30 Appeal and Error 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, m 
General 
30k838 Questions Considered 
30k842 Review Dependent on Whether 
Questions Are of Law or of Fact 
30k842(1) k. In General. Most 
Cited Cases 
An issue of statutory construction is subject to 
the Supreme Court's free review. 
[31 Statutes 361 ~189 
361 Statutes 
361VI Construction and Operation 
361 VI( A) General Rules of Construction 
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Interpretation of a statute begins with an exam-
ination of the statute's literal words. 
[4] Statutes 361 0=190 
361 Statutes 
361VI Construction and Operation 
361VI(A) General Rules of Construction 
36lkl87 Meaning of Language 
36lk190 k. Existence of Ambiguity. 
Most Cited Cases 
If the language of the statute is unambiguous, 
the clear expressed intent of the legislature must be 
given effect and there is no occasion for construc-
tion. 
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48A Automobiles 
48A VI Injuries from Defects or Obstructions in 
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200kl87(3) k. Liability of State. Most 
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Highways 200 0=198 
200 Highways 
200IX Regulation and Use for Travel 
200IX(C) Injuries from Defects or Obstruc-
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200kl98 k. Liabilities of Local Authorit-
ies and Officers. Most Cited Cases 
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State, through its Department of Transporta-
tion, rather than county sheriff, had a statutory duty 
to remove rocks and other obstructions as part of its 
maintenance of the State's highways. I.C. §§ 
40-201, 40-502. 
[61 Negligence 272 ~210 
272 Negligence 
272II Necessity and Existence of Duty 
272k210 k. In General. Most Cited Cases 
No liability arises from the law of torts unless 
the defendant owes a duty to the plaintiff. 
[7] Appeal and Error 30 ~842(4) 
30 Appeal and Error 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in 
General 
30k838 Questions Considered 
30k842 Review Dependent on Whether 
Questions Are of Law or of Fact 
30k842(4) k. Questions as to Negli-
gence. Most Cited Cases 
Generally, the question whether a duty exists is 
a question of law, over which the Supreme Court 
exercises free review. 
[8] Negligence 272 C':=>210 
272 Negligence 
272II Necessity and Existence of Duty 
272k210 k. In GeneraL Most Cited Cases 
One owes no affirmative duty to act to assist or 
protect another absent unusual circumstances, 
which justifY imposing such an affirmative respons-
ibility. 
[9} Automobiles 48A €=::::>255 
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Even if county sheriff had voluntarily removed 
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the rocks from highway the night before the acci-
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form the act in a non-negligent manner; however, 
liability for an assumed duty can only come into be-
ing to the extent that there is in fact an undertaking. 
[11] Negligence 272 €=::::>218 
272 Negligence 
272II Necessity and Existence of Duty 
272k217 Voluntarily Assumed Duty 
272k218 k. In General. Most Cited Cases 
Although a person can assume a duty to act on 
a particular occasion, the duty is limited to the dis-
crete episode in which the aid is rendered; past vol-
untary acts do not entitle the benefited party to ex-
pect assistance on future occasions, at least absent 
an express promise that future assistance will be 
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forthcoming. 
[12] Automobiles 48A €:;:=255 
48A Automobiles 
48A VI Injuries from Defects or Obstructions in 
Highways and Other Public Places 
48A VI(A) Nature and Grounds of Liability 
48Ak255 k. Cause of or Responsibility for 
Defects, Obstructions, or Dangerous Conditions. 
Most Cited Cases 
State retained exclusive custody and control 
over the maintenance of the highway by virtue of 
statutory authority and thus the Supreme Court 
would decline to impose a common law duty on 
county sheriff to remove or warn of the rocks on 
highway, where sheriff had no special relationship 
with driver or passengers who were injured after 
vehicle struck rock in highway. I.C. §§ 40-201, 
40-502,73-116. 
**1070 *387 Douglas W. Crandall, Boise, argued 
for appellants Chivers and McDonald. 
Cooper & Larsen, Pocatello, for appellant Udy. 
Reed W. Larsen argued. 
Naylor & Hales, P.C., Boise, for respondents. 
Kirtlan G. Naylor argued. 
WALTERS, Justice. 
This is an appeal from the district court's de-
cision granting summary judgment in a negligence 
action in favor of Respondents Custer County and 
Sheriff Mickey Roskelley. The district court held 
that Sheriff Roskelley did not have a legal duty to 
remove or warn of rocks on a State highway. We 
afftrm. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACK-
GROUND 
On March 1, 1998, David Udy was driving his 
truck on Highway 7 5 approximately two miles 
north of Clayton in Custer County. Roy Chivers 
and Roxanna McDonald were passengers in Udy's 
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truck. While driving, Udy encountered a large rock 
in the road. Udy was unable to avoid hitting the 
rock as another vehicle was approaching in the op-
posite lane. Udy's vehicle struck the rock, blowing 
out the right front tire and causing Udy to lose con-
trol. The truck subsequently rolled, causing injuries 
to Udy and his passengers. 
On the night before the accident, Custer 
County Sheriff Mickey Roskelley and his wife had 
traveled on Highway 75 to Clayton to serve some 
papers. Roskelley admitted that on his return from 
Clayton, he observed several small rocks on the fog 
line approximately one-third of a mile from the 
scene of Udy's subsequent accident. Sheriff Roskel-
ley did not remove the rocks or notify other depu-
ties or the Idaho Transportation Department (lTD) 
of the presence of the rocks. 
On January 8, 1999, Udy filed a complaint 
against Sheriff Roskelley and Custer County al-
leging that Roskelley observed and negligently 
failed to remove from the highway the rock Udy 
later struck with his vehicle. The Chivers and Me-
Donalds also filed a complaint against Roskelley 
and the county alleging injuries as a result of Ro-
skelley's negligence in leaving the rock on the high-
way. The defendants subsequently filed a motion 
for summary judgment. On February 8, 2000, the 
district court granted the defendants' motion, ruling 
tl1at as a matter of law, Sheriff Roskelley owed no 
duty to remove or warn of the rock struck by Udy's 
vehicle. Udy, the Chivers, and the McDonalds ap-
peal the district court's decision. The question 
presented on appeal is whether Sheriff Roskelley 
owed a duty of care to the Appellants to warn of or 
remove the rocks on Highway 75. 
DISCUSSION 
A. Sheriff Roskelley's Duty 
1. Statutory Duty Under Idaho Code Section 
31-2202 
[1] We initially examine the Appellants' argu-
ment that the district court erred by ruling that 
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Sheriff Roskelley does not have a statutory duty to 
remove obstructions from **1071 *388 the high-
way. It is clear that there is no statute explicitly pla-
cing a duty on county sheriffs to remove rocks or 
obstructions from highways, and the Appellants do 
not assert otherwise. In addition to the absence of 
such an express mandate, the district court held that 
there was no duty implicitly existing by virtue of 
any other statutory authority. The Appellants dis-
agree and challenge the district court's conclusion 
that the IDT has an exclusive duty to maintain 
Custer County's highways. They assert that the le-
gislature, through Idaho Code section 31-2202, in-
tended to impose a duty on county sheriffs to pro-
tect against hazards on the physical surface of the 
highway. The Appellants, however, acknowledge 
that there is no authority for their argument. In-
stead, focusing on I.C. § 31-2202(13), they assert 
that a common sense reading of the statute implies 
that a county sheriff owes a duty to remove or alert 
someone of the presence of the rocks on the surface 
of the road if the rocks pose a hazard to the travel-
ing public. We disagree. 
[2][3][4] The Appellants' arguments raise an is-
sue of statutory construction, which is subject to 
our free review. See City of Sun Valley v. Sun Val-
ley Co., 128 Idaho 219, 221, 912 P.2d 106, 108 
(1996); Harris v. Dep't of Health & Welfare, 123 
Idaho 295, 297, 847 P.2d 1156, 1158 (1992). Inter-
pretation of a statute begins with an examination of 
the statute's literal words. See In re Permit No. 
36-7200, 121 Idaho 819, 823, 828 P.2d 848, 852 
(1992); Ada County v. Gibson, 126 Idaho 854, 856, 
893 P.2d 801, 803 (Ct.App.l995). If the language 
of the statute is unambiguous, "the clear expressed 
intent of the legislature must be given effect and 
there is no occasion for construction." Ada County 
Assessor v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 123 Idaho 
425, 428, 849 P.2d 98, 101 (1993). See also Wolfe 
v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 128 Idaho 398, 404, 913 
P.2d 1168, 1174 (1996); State v. Watts, 131 Idaho 
782,784,963 P.2d 1219, 1221 (Ct.App.l998). 
Idaho Code section 31-2202 provides, among a 
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lengthy list of duties, that each county sheriff shall: 
13. Work in his county with the Idaho state po-
lice in the following respects: 
(a) Require all persons using the highways in the 
state to do so carefully, safely and with exercise 
of care for the persons, property and safety of 
others; 
(b) Safeguard and protect the surface and other 
physical portions of the state highways .... 
The plain and ordinary meaning of this statute 
suggests that a sheriff is to work with the Idaho 
State Police to protect the highways surfaces from 
damage. This would not appear to include a duty to 
remove rocks or other obstructions from the State's 
highways, nor a duty to communicate to some other 
person or entity the need for removal of rocks or 
obstructions. The language instead indicates that 
law enforcement personnel are to make sure that 
vehicles do not damage the physical surface of the 
highway. Had the legislature intended to impose a 
duty on county sheriffs to remove or notifY 
someone of the presence of highway obstructions, it 
could easily have done so. As the district court ob-
served in this case, adding a phrase like 
"maintaining the state highways for traffic safety" 
to I.C. § 31-2202 could reasonably be interpreted to 
include the removal of obstructions. The Court 
must assume, however, that the legislature did not 
include such a phrase because it did not want to im-
pose this duty on county sheriffs as a matter of stat-
utory liability. 
[5] Instead, the legislature has placed the re-
sponsibility of maintaining State highways,FN1 
such as Highway 75, on the ITD.FN2 Idaho Code 
section 40-201 imposes upon the **1072 *389 
State the duty to "improve and maintain the high-
ways" within its jurisdiction. LC. § 40-201. See 
also I.C. § 40-502 (stating that all state highways 
shall be maintained by the ITD); Roberts v. Transp. 
Dep't, 121 Idaho 727, 731, 827 P.2d 1178, 1182 
(Ct.App.1991); State v. Smith, 124 Idaho 671, 674, 
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862 P.2d 1093, 1096 (Ct.App.1993) (noting that the 
duty to maintain U.S. Highway 95 falls within 
lTD's jurisdiction as inside the boundaries of the 
State of Idaho). The presence of this statute indic-
ates that the State of Idaho, through its Department 
of Transportation, has a statutory duty to remove 
rocks and other obstructions as part of its mainten-
ance of the State's highways. We therefore hold that 
Sheriff Roskelley did not have a statutory duty to 
remove the rocks from Highway 7 5 or to notifY 
anyone else of the need for removal of the rocks. 
FNI. Idaho Code section 40-120(4) defmes 
"State highway system" to mean "the prin-
cipal highway arteries in the state, includ-
ing connecting arteries and extensions 
through cities, and includes roads to every 
county seat in the state." Clearly, Highway 
75, which is the primary route running 
north from Shoshone to Challis and is 
defmed in the "Official Highway Map" is-
sued by the ITD as a "Major State High-
way" is one of the "principal highway ar-
teries in the state." 
FN2. We note that Idaho's counties are 
charged by statute with the duty of main-
taining the highways within the county 
highway system. See I.C. § 40-604; Free-
man v. Juker, 119 Idaho 555, 557, 808 
P.2d 1300, 1302 (1991). Additionally, 
Idaho Code §§ 40-202, 40-203, 40-203A 
a.11d 40-203B describe how counties and 
highway districts may establish highway 
systems of their own within their 
"respective jurisdiction[s]." These statutes 
also provide that, by agreement, mainten-
ance duties may be shifted among the state, 
counties, cities and highway districts on 
certain highways. See State v. Smith, 124 
Idaho 671, 674, 862 P.2d 1093, 1096 
(Ct.App.l993). In this case, however, no 
evidence was offered by the Appellants or 
is evident from the record to show that 
some other entity or agency besides the 
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State was involved in the maintenance of 
any part of Highway 75. 
2. Duty Under the Common Law 
(6][7][8] No liability arises from the law of 
torts unless the defendant owes a duty to the 
plaintiff. See Hoffinan v. Simplot Aviation, 97 Idaho 
32, 539 P.2d 584 (1975). Genemlly, the question 
whether a duty exists is a question of law, over 
which we exercise free review. See, e.g., Freeman 
v. Juker, I 19 Idaho 555, 808 P.2d 1300 (1991). 
This Court follows the rule that "one owes the duty 
to every person in our society to use reasonable 
care to avoid injury to the other person in any situ-
ation in which it could be reasonably anticipated or 
foreseen that a failure to use such care might result 
in such injury." Alegria v. Payonk, 101 Idaho 617, 
619, 619 P.2d 135, 137 (1980). Further, there is a 
"general rule that each person has a duty of care to 
prevent unreasonable, foreseeable risks of harm to 
others." Sharp v. W.H Moore, Inc., 118 Idaho 297, 
300, 796 P.2d 506, 509 (1990). However, one also 
owes no affirmative duty to act to assist or protect 
another absent unusual circumstances, which justifY 
imposing such an affrrmative responsibility. See 
Coghlan v. Beta Theta Pi Fraternity, 133 Idaho 
388, 399, 987 P.2d 300, 311 (1999). With these 
principles in mind, we next examine whether Sher-
iff Roskelley owed a common law duty to warn of 
or remove the rocks from Highway 75. 
a. Voluntary Assumption of Duty 
[9] The Appellants first assert that the district 
court erred in fmding that Sheriff Roskelley did not 
voluntarily assume a duty. They contend that be-
cause Sheriff Roskelley testified that it was his 
pmctice to remove or contact someone to remove 
obstructions from the highway, Sheriff Roskelley 
assumed a duty to remove the rocks, even if he did 
not have a statutory duty to do so. We disagree with 
the Appellants' argument. 
[10][11] This Court has recognized that it is 
possible to create a duty where one previously did 
not exist. "If one voluntarily undertakes to perform 
an act, having no prior duty to do so, the duty arises 
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to perform the act in a non-negligent manner." 
Featherston v. Allstate Ins. Co., 125 Idaho 840, 
843, 875 P.2d 937, 940 (1994) (citing Bowling v. 
Jack B. Parson Cos., 117 Idaho 1030, 1032, 793 
P.2d 703, 705 (1990)). Liability for an assumed 
duty, however, can only come into being to the ex-
tent that there is in fact an undertaking. See Bowl-
ing, 117 Idaho at 1032, 793 P.2d at 705. Although a 
person can assume a duty to act on a particular oc-
casion, the duty is limited to the discrete episode in 
which the aid is rendered. See City of Santee v. 
County of San Diego, 211 Cal.App.3d 1006, 259 
Cal.Rptr. 757 (1989).FN3 **1073 *390 In other 
words, past voluntary acts do not entitle the be-
nefited party to expect assistance on future occa-
sions, at least in the absence of an express promise 
that future assistance will be forthcoming. See id. at 
762. See also, Fort Bend County Drainage Dist. v. 
Sbrusch, 818 S.W.2d 392, 397 (Tex.l991) ("A per-
son's duty to exercise reasonable care in performing 
a voluntarily assumed undertaking is limited to that 
undertaking, and will not normally give rise to an 
obligation to perform additional acts of assistance 
in the future."). 
FN3. In Santee, a bicyclist suffered injur-
ies when struck by an automobile in an im-
properly lighted intersection. The bicyclist 
sued the City of Santee, which sought in-
demnity from the County. The City argued 
that inasmuch as County sheriff deputies 
had previously reported street light out-
ages, the County was obligated to continue 
performing these acts of assistance because 
the City detrimentally relied on the County 
for this assistance. The court pointed out 
that if a future obligation to assist can be 
imposed based upon past acts, "an act of 
humanitarian assistance can become an al-
batross of mandatory obligation in the fu-
ture," and the natural consequence will be 
to discourage people from assisting others 
in the first instance. Santee, 259 Cal.Rptr. 
at 763. In Santee, there was no evidence 
that any express promise was made to City 
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officials to report light outages in the fu-
ture, and the court therefore refused to find 
a duty to report the light outage on the oc-
casion in question. See id. at 759-62 & n. 3. 
Thus, while Sheriff Roskelley may have volun-
tarily removed rocks and other debris from the 
State's highways on prior occasions, the Court con-
cludes that Sheriff Roskelley, by way of these prior 
actions, did not voluntarily assume a duty to re-
move the rocks from Highway 75 the night before 
the accident. There is nothing in the record indicat-
ing that Sheriff Roskelley increased the risk created 
by the rocks on Highway 75; instead, the risk cre-
ated by the rocks remained unchanged. As the court 
noted in Santee, "nonfeasance which results in fail-
ure to eliminate a preexisting risk is not equivalent 
to nonfeasance which increases a risk of harm." 259 
Cal.Rptr. at 762. 
Accordingly, we hold that Sheriff Roskelley, 
despite evidence of prior acts of removal or notific-
ation, did not voluntarily assume a duty to remove 
the rocks he observed on Highway 75 the night be-
fore Udy's accident. To hold otherwise would be 
tantamount to holding that Sheriff Roskelley had a 
permanent duty to remove obstructions from the 
highway. 
b. General Duty to Exercise Ordinary Care 
[12] Udy argues that Sheriff Roskelley has a 
general common law duty to remove or warn of ob-
structions on the highway. Udy first contends that a 
series of Idaho cases holding that a municipality 
has a duty to exercise "reasonable and ordinary care 
to keep its streets in a reasonably safe condition for 
ordinary travel," demonstrates that a similar, com-
mon law duty exists with respect to county sheriffs. 
See, e.g., Smith v. City of Preston, 97 Idaho 295, 
298, 543 P.2d 848, 851 (1975). Udy, however, cites 
no authority, Idaho or otherwise, either establishing 
or recognizing a common law duty for county sher-
iffs to remove or warn of obstructions on the State's 
highways. 
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also asserts that cases from New York and 
Indiana establish that a state or county made be li-
able for a dangerous condition in a highway, if it 
has actual or constructive knowledge of the unsafe 
condition. See Boger v. Lake County Commission-
ers, 547 N.E.2d 257 (Ind.l989); Siegel v. State of 
New York, 56 Misc.2d 918, 290 N.Y.S.2d 351 
(N.Y.Ct.Cl.1968). What Udy ignores, however, is 
that the source of the duty for the public entity, be 
it city, state, or county, stems from its custody and 
control over the road. This is true in New York, see 
Ham v. Giffords Oil Co., 235 A.D.2d 457, 652 
N.Y.S.2d 747, 748 (1997) ("A County owes a gen-
eral duty of care to the wayfarers on the roads it 
owns, controls, or maintains."), Indiana, see Tem-
pleton v. City of Hammond, 679 N.E.2d 1368 
(Ind.Ct.App.l997) ("The State and its counties have 
a duty to maintain and repair the roads within their 
control."), and elsewhere. See Wells v. Stephenson, 
561 So.2d 1215, 1217 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.l990) 
("Cases holding an entity liable for failure to report, 
repair, or maintain a traffic control device are based 
on the premise that the entity had some duty, cus-
tody, or control over the sign at the intersection."); 
Schomp v. Averette, 591 So.2d 56 (Ala.l991) 
(holding that county corrilllission had no duty to 
maintain intersection where accident occurred be-
cause intersection was under exclusive control of 
State of Alabama Highway Department). 
As noted above, the ITD is charged with the re-
sponsibility of Highway 75. See I.C. § 
40-201; I.C. § 40-502. Because the ITD retains ex-
clusive custody and control over the maintenance of 
the highway by virtue of statutory authority, Sheriff 
Roskelley car,not be assessed with responsibility 
for the same activities through application by the 
courts of a common law principle. I.C. § 73-116; 
State v. Iverson, 79 Idaho 25, 310 P.2d 803 (1957); 
Industrial Indemnity Co. v. Columbia Basin Steel & 
Iron, Inc., 93 Idaho 719, 471 P.2d 574 (1970) 
(common law principles abrogated by statutory en-
actments). 
**1074 *391 We also take care to note that this 
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is not a situation where Sheriff Roskelley created a 
foreseeable risk of harm through his own affmnat-
ive conduct. Udy's argument is instead predicated 
on the notion that Sheriff Roskelley, because he is a 
law enforcement officer, owes a greater duty to the 
public than the average person. The District of 
Columbia Court of Appeals addressed a similar ar-
gument in Warren v. District of Columbia, conclud-
ing that: 
[T]he allegations of negligence in the present 
case derive solely from defendants' status as po-
lice employees and from plaintiffs' contention 
that defendants failed to do what reasonably 
prudent police employees would have done in 
similar circumstances. The difference is between 
ordinary negligence on one hand and a novel sort 
of professional malpractice on the other. A per-
son does not, by becoming a police officer, insu-
late himself from any of the basic duties which 
everyone owes to other people, but neither does 
he assume any greater obligation to others indi-
vidually. The only additional duty undertaken by 
accepting employment as a police officer is the 
duty owed to the public at large. 
444 A.2d 1, 8 (D.C.1981). See also Williams v. 
State, 34 Cal.3d 18, 192 Cal.Rptr. 233, 664 P.2d 
137, 139-40 (1983) (noting general principles that 
"one has no duty to come to the aid of another'' and 
that "[a] person who has not created a peril is not li-
able in tort merely for failure to take affmnative ac-
tion to assist or protect another unless there is some 
relationship between them which gives rise to a 
duty to act" are often "muddied by widely held mis-
conceptions concerning the duty owed by police to 
individual members of the general public."). 
Viewed in this sense, Udy's claims are in real-
ity claims for negligent police protection for which 
there can be no recovery absent a special relation-
ship with the victim. See Lundgren v. City of Mc-
Call, 120 Idaho 556, 557-58, 817 P.2d 1080, 
1081-82 (1991). Cf Isabella County v. Michigan, 
181 Mich.App. 99, 449 N.W.2d 111 (1989) (state 
police officer who failed to report downed traffic 
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sign was not liable to motorist who was injured in 
collision with that sign absent evidence of special 
relationship between officer and injured motorist 
giving rise to duty on officer's part); Alderman v. 
Lamar, 493 So.2d 495 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.l 986) (no 
duty to decedent absent special relationship to re-
port or place upright a leaning stop sign causing 
fatal automobile collision). Here, the record does 
not establish, nor does Udy argue that he or his pas-
sengers were in a special relationship with Sheriff 
Roskelley. Thus, the fact that Udy's accident may 
have been prevented through reasonable law en-
forcement actions is insufficient to establish a duty 
to the Appellants or otherwise form the basis for 
SheriffRoskelley's liability in tort. 
The Chivers and McDonalds, on the other 
hand, citing the Court's decision in Ransom v. 
Garden City, 113 Idaho 202, 743 P.2d 70 (1987), 
argue that where an officer of the law should fore-
seeably know that his failure to act may create an 
unusual risk of harm to others, he is under a duty to 
take reasonable precautions to avoid the harm from 
occurring. Their reliance on Ransom, however, is 
misplaced. 
Ransom was a negligent entrustment case in 
which the plaintiffs were injured when their vehicle 
was struck by another vehicle that was bei..'lg driven 
the wrong way down a one-way street. See id. at 
203, 743 P.2d at 71. The driver of the vehicle had 
been the passenger when the vehicle had been pre-
viously stopped by a police officer. The officer, al-
though concluding that both the driver and the pas-
senger were intoxicated, gave the keys to the pas-
senger with instructions not to drive. See id. 
A close examination of the Court's decision in 
Ransom reveals that the source of the duty in that 
case was the officer's control over the vehicle at the 
time of the stop. See id. at 208, 743 P.2d at 76 
("Where a person has a right to control a vehicle, 
he must exercise ordinary care and not permit an-
other to use it in circumstances where he knows or 
should foreseeably know that such use may create 
an unreasonable risk of harm."). Because the officer 
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exercised legal control over the vehicle at the time 
of the stop, the Court rejected the defendant's argu-
ment that the tort of negligent entrustment requires 
ownership of the vehicle. See id. Here, as we men-
tioned above, the duty to maintain, and therefore 
the custody and control,**l075 *392 of Highway 
75 lay with the ITD. We therefore decline to im-
pose a common law duty on Sheriff Roskelley to 
remove or warn of the rocks on Highway 75. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, we affirm the district 
court's summary judgment in favor of Sheriff 
Mickey Roskelley and Custer County. Costs, but 
not attorney fees are granted to the Respondents 
pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 40. 
Chief Justice TROUT and Justice SCHROEDER 
and EISMANN concur. 
Justice KIDWELL, specially concurring. 
The analysis of the opinion appears to 
reflect the law of Idaho and probably most other 
jurisdictions. To be more specific, no common law 
or statutory duty is owed or due to the plaintiffs in 
this case under the facts presented. Therefore, I 
have no alternative, but to concur. 
However, I am concerned that the factual situ-
ation in the present case could be cited as precedent 
for the proposition that a public official has no civil 
duty, no matter how hazardous the situation, to take 
any action to prevent possible i.1jury to members of 
the public. An example is appropriate to illustrate 
my concerns: a sheriff in his patrol car sees a haz-
ardous rockslide around a blind curve. Although his 
radio works, he does not use it to notify those 
charged with maintaining the roadway. A person is 
killed or seriously injured because the rockslide 
was not removed from the road. In this situation, a 
question arises as to whether the legal system 
should impose some minimal duty on a public offi-
cial charged with a caretaking responsibility. The 
question of whether there should be a duty looms 
larger when the hazard is great and the action ne-
cessary to rectify the problem is minimal. 
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The concept of when the legal system does or 
should impose a legal duty is elusive. 
There is a duty if the court says there is a duty; 
the law, like the Constitution, is what we make it. 
Duty is only a word with which we state our con-
clusion that there is or is not to be liability .... In 
the decision whether or not there is a duty, many 
factors interplay: the hand of history, our ideas of 
morals and justice, the convenience of adminis-
tration of the rule, and our social ideas as to 
where loss should fall. 
William L. Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 
Mich. L.Rev. 1, 15 (1953) (footnote omitted). 
By analogy, Judge Learned Hand, speaking for 
the majority in a classic tort case, provides some 
guidance. See The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d 
Cir.l932). The facts of this case are well known: 
two tugboats lost their barges and cargoes during a 
predicted storm in the Atlantic Ocean. Had the tugs 
been equipped with working radios, the tug masters 
would have known about the storm and could have 
likely avoided it. At issue in the case was whether 
the tugboat owners had a duty to equip the tugs 
with working radios. Although at the time, only one 
tugboat line equipped its tugs with radios, the court 
held that not using available technology to avoid 
the storm was a cause of the injury sustained by the 
Therefore, a duty to use the means 
available to avert an accident existed. 
In the present case, if Sheriff Roskelley had 
used a communication device to inform the Depart-
ment of Transportation that a hazard existed on the 
road, the accident and subsequent litigation could 
have been prevented. It seems that placing a duty 
upon Sheriff Roskelley to make a very brief tele-
phone call for the protection of motorists is appro-
priate. 
Idaho,200 1. 
Udy v. Custer County 
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D. Idaho. 
Tirmn ADAMS, et al, Plaintiffs, 
v. 
UNITED STATES of America, et al., Defendants. 
Civ. No. 03-0049-E-BLW. 
March 24, 2010. 
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Growers failed to demonstrate that corporation's 
failure to follow through on its offers of assistance 
regarding the planting of crops created an increased 
risk of harm to support its assumed duty claim. The 
damage caused by corporation, a manufacturer of 
agricultural products, was caused by its advice to use 
its product and plant crops as normal, rather than by its 
failure to follow through on offers of assistance after 
the product was applied to the crops. Fed.Rules 
Civ.Proc.Rule 50(b), 28 U.S.C.A. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 
B. LYNN WINMILL, Chief Judge. 
INTRODUCTION 
*1 The Court has before it DuPont's motion for 
judgment as a matter of law or for a new trial. The 
Court heard oral argument, and the motion is at issue. 
The Court will grant the motion to the extent it seeks 
(1) a dismissal of the assumed duty claim, and (2) a 
new trial on damages as to DuPont. The motion is 
denied in all other respects. 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law-Rule 
50(b) 
In resolving DuPont's Rule 50(b) motion, the 
Court may not make credibility determinations or 
weigh the evidence. EEOC v. Go Daddy Software, 
Inc., 581 F.3d 951 (9th Cir.2009). Rather, the court 
must view the evidence in the light most favorable to 
plaintiffs and draw all reasonable inferences in their 
favor. Id. "The test applied is whether the evidence 
permits only one reasonable conclusion, and that 
conclusion is contrary to the jury's verdict." Id. 
Motion for New Trial-Rule 59( a) 
Rule 59( a) states: "A new trial may be granted ... 
in an action in which there has been a trial by jury, for 
any of the reasons for which new trials have heretofore 
been granted in actions at law in the courts of the 
United States." Historically recognized grounds in-
clude, but are not limited to, claims that the verdict is 
against the weight of the evidence, that the damages 
are excessive or inadequate, or that, for other reasons, 
the trial was not fair to the party moving. Molski v. 
MJ. Cable, Inc., 481 F.3d 724 (9th Cir.2007); 11 
Wright, Miller and Kane, Federal Practice & Pro-
cedure§ 2807 at p. 78 (1995). 
The Court has the "duty to weigh the evidence as 
the court saw it," and to grant a new trial and set aside 
the verdict of the jury, "even though supported by 
substantial evidence, where, in [the court's] conscien-
tious opinion, the verdict is contrary to the clear 
weight of the evidence." Molski; 481 F.3d at 729. 
ANALYSIS 
The Court has filed, contemporaneously with this 
decision, its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
with regard to the Plaintiff's claims against the BLM. 
A detailed explanation of the litigation background is 
contained in those Findings and Conclusions will 
therefore not be repeated here. In addition, many of 
the legal issues raised by DuPont in its Rule 50 Motion 
were also raised by the BLM in its post-trial motions 
and have been addressed in detail in the Court's 
Findings and Conclusions, which are incorporated by 
reference into this decision. 
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Product Defect & Superseding Cause 
DuPont argues that plaintiffs must point to a 
specific, identifiable defect in Oust and failed to do so. 
The Court disagrees. A design defect may be proved 
by direct or circumstantial evidence of a malfunction 
of the product, the absence of evidence of abnormal 
use, and the absence of evidence of reasonable sec-
ondary causes which would eliminate liability of the 
defendant. Mortensen v. Chevron Chemical Co., 107 
Idaho 836, 693 P.2d 1038 (Jd.Sup.Ct.l984). Plaintiffs 
satisfied this burden. As set forth in more detail in the 
Findings of Fact, the plaintiffs showed that (I) Oust 
was toxic in minute quantities to crops, (2) DuPont 
knew of the dry and windy conditions at the applica-
tion sites, (3) Oust was erodible by the wind and sus-
ceptible to being carried long distances, (4) Oust did 
so erode, and persisted for several growing seasons in 
the growers' fields, damaging crops (5) DuPont rec-
ommended Oust's use yet did not test the product for 
use in southern Idaho soils, and (6) reasonably likely 
alternative causes were ruled out. 
*2 DuPont argues, however, that the BLM's 
conduct was a superseding cause constituting an ab-
normal use. However, under the Idaho Product Lia-
bility Reform Act, product misuse is merely a defense 
that results in apportionment under comparative fault 
principles. See I.C. § 6-1405(3). DuPont argued that 
the BLM was responsible, and the jury allocated 40% 
of the fault to the BLM. The BLM's choice and ap-
plication of Oust cannot be deemed a superseding 
cause, vitiating DuPont's fault, when DuPont actively 
promoted the use of Oust to the BLM. See Findings of 
Fact. 
Failure to Warn 
DuPont argues that the jury verdict on the failure 
to warn claims must be set aside. The Court disagrees. 
The testimony of Drs. Benbrook and Gardisser estab-
lished that Oust was mislabeled and supports the jury 
verdict on these claims. 
Various Jury Instructions 
During the trial, the Court resolved all issues 
concerning jury instructions. Nothing in the briefing 
or argument warrants revisiting these issues. 
Damages for 2000, 2002-2004, and Hansen Wheat 
Crop 
The Court can fmd no reason to change its prior 
Page2 
ruling on the plaintiffs' damages for 2000 and 2002 to 
2004, and so will reaffirm that decision. See Memo-
randum Decision (docket no. 1436). That same deci-
sion discussed the Hansen wheat crop damages. The 
Court fmds that those damages were properly 
awarded. 
Debt-Based Costs 
In the Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, the Court sets forth in detail its ruling that 
plaintiffs properly proved their claim to debt-based 
costs. DuPont's challenge to this shall therefore be 
denied. 
Economic Loss 
DuPont argues that Idaho's economic loss rule 
bars all damages in this case. DuPont has, however, 
waived this argument by waiting until after the trial 
was completed to raise this argument. EEOC v. Go 
Daddy Software, Inc., 581 F.3d 951 (9th Cir.2009). 
Nevertheless, both plaintiffs and DuPont urge the 
Court to decide the issue to give guidance for the 
upcoming damages trial. The Court will do so. 
Idaho originally adopted the economic loss rule to 
bar the purchaser of a defective product who has only 
suffered economic loss from recovering those losses 
in a negligence action against the manufacturer. Clark 
v. International Harvester Co., 99 Idaho 326, 581 P .2d 
784 (1978). The Idaho Supreme Court has held that 
the recovery of economic losses in negligence actions 
is limitoo "to those situations involving personal in-
jury or property damage." Just's Inc. v. Arrington 
Canst. Co., 99 Idaho 462, 583 P.2d 997 
(I d. Sup.Ct.l978). 
Economic loss is defined as including "costs of 
repair and replacement of defective property which is 
the subject of the transaction, as well as commercial 
loss for inadequate value and consequent loss of 
profits or use." Id. at 1200, 583 P.2d 997. Property 
loss, which is recoverable, is defmed as "damage to 
property other than that which is the subject of the 
transaction." I d. 
*3 The crops grown on plaintiffs' farms are the 
property of those growers. Damage to those crops is 
property damage. Hence, the economic loss rule does 
not apply. 
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Yet DuPont argues that the loss of these crops 
does not constitute a property loss, and they cite Duf-
fin v. Idaho Crop Imp. Ass'n., 126 Idaho 1002, 895 P. 
2d 1195 (Jd.Sup.Ct.l995). There, the court applied the 
economic loss rule to bar a purchaser of defective 
potato seed from recovering lost revenues resulting 
from lost crop yields. 
In Duffin, the plaintiff had purchased the seeds 
from the defendant and hence had a contractual rela-
tionship with the defendant. Economic loss cannot be 
recovered in that instance because the relationship is 
governed by the Uniform Commercial Code and "the 
economic expectations of parties have traditionally 
not been protected by tort law." !d. at 1200. A product 
seller "cannot be held liable for the level of perfor-
mance of his products in the consumer's business 
unless he agrees that the product was designed to meet 
the consumer's demands." Clark, 581 P.2d at 792 
(quoting Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal.2d 9, 45 
Cal.Rptr. 17,403 P.2d 145 (1965)). While the law of 
negligence would impose on the seed seller a duty to 
avoid harm to person or property, it does not impose a 
duty to produce seed that allows the purchaser to make 
a profit. !d. at 794. A contrary rule "would subject the 
defendant to claims based upon remote or speculative 
injuries which he could not foresee in any practical 
sense of the term." Just's, 583 P .2d at 1005. 
In contrast, the plaintiffs here are innocent vic-
tims of DuPont's negligence. They purchased nothing. 
They had no opportunity to bargain in the market over 
matters of price and risk Thus, plaintiffs are not 
seeking to realize their economic expectations from a 
commercial transaction as was the case in Duffin. 
Because it was foreseeable that downwind crops could 
be damaged by an application of Oust in dry and 
windy conditions, DuPont is not being subjected to 
remote and speculative damages as was the case in 
Just's. 
As stated by each of the Idaho cases cited above, 
the law of negligence imposes a duty to use ordinary 
care to avoid damage to the person or property of 
another. DuPont's negligence damaged the growers' 
crops, their property. Hence, the economic loss rule 
does not apply. 
Assumed Duty Claim 
The assumed duty claim rests on a simple prin-
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ciple: "If one voluntarily undertakes to perform an act, 
having no prior duty to do so, the duty arises to per-
form the act in a non-negligent manner." Bowling v. 
Jack B. Parson Cos., 117 Idaho 1030, 793 P.2d 703, 
705 (/d.Sup.Ct.1990). To prove the elements of this 
claim, plaintiffs must show that (1) DuPont owed a 
"duty recognized by law" with regard to stewardship, 
(2) DuPont breached that duty, (3) a "causal connec-
tion" existed between DuPont's conduct and the re-
sulting injury; and (4) there was "actual loss or dam-
age." Brizendine v. Nampa Meridian Irrigation Dist., 
97 Idaho 580, 548 P.2d 80, 83 (Idaho 1976). No spe-
cial relationship is necessary between plaintiffs and 
DuPont. See Memorandum Decisions (docket nos. 825 
& 1393). 
*4 There is evidence from which a reasonable 
juror could fmd that DuPont assumed a duty to the 
growers generally and breached that duty. Rile Miller, 
DuPont's Vice-President of Global Marketing, testi-
fied that (1) DuPont owes a "stewardship duty" to the 
growers, see Transcript at p. 976; (2) the duty extends 
even after application of the product to the "perfor-
mance" of the product, id. at p. 975, including the 
"environmental fate" of the product, id. at pp. 982-83; 
(3) the stewardship duty would include gathering "as 
much information as possible" and "provid[ing] in-
formation to help independent agencies ... help in their 
... investigation," when faced with growers' allega-
tions of off-target movement of Oust that harmed 
crops, id. at p. 986-87; (4) the stewardship duty would 
include the taking and analysis of soil samples after 
being notified of off-target movement, id. at pp. 
1053-54; and (5) as part of the stewardship commit-
ment, DuPont "make[s] every attempt available to 
open our books up on information that's available on 
how our products act in the environment .... " !d. at p. 
992. 
This stewardship duty thus consists of an obliga-
tion to gather and share information that would assist 
the growers in determining what was killing their 
crops. DuPont, having undertaken to perform this 
duty, must perform it in a non-negligent manner. 
Brizendine, 548 P.2d at 83. DuPont breached that duty 
by not providing information or aid to the growers, 
and by telling the growers to "plant as normal," when 
DuPont knew that it had no basis for such advice. See 
Transcript at pp. 7517-22, 548 P.2d 80 (testimony of 
Dr. Miller). 
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DuPont argues that a corporate practice or policy 
"is legally insufficient to create an assumed duty under 
Idaho law." See DuPont Opening Brief (docket no. 
1644) at p. 26. In support, DuPont cites Udy v. Custer 
County, 136 Idaho 386, 34 P.3d 1069 
(/d.Sup.Ct.2001). But Udy simply stated that "past 
voluntary acts do not entitle the benefitted party to 
expect assistance on future occasions, at least in the 
absence of an express promise that future assistance 
will be forthcoming." ld. at p. 1073. Plaintiffs'as-
sumed duty claim does not seek to set up a duty based 
on DuPont's conduct in other Oust incidents; rather, it 
claims DuPont assumed a duty when it affirmatively 
undertook to provide assistance and advice to the 
growers in this incident. 
However, Udy is relevant for another reason. It 
held that "nonfeasance which results in failure to 
eliminate a preexisting risk is not equivalent to non-
feasance which increases a risk of harm." !d. (quoting 
City of Santee v. County of San Diego, 211 Cal.App.3d 
1006, 259 Cal.Rptr. 757, 762 (1989)). This statement 
in Udy reveals the true weakness in plaintiffs' assumed 
duty claim. 
That weakness lies in the third element of the 
claim: Plaintiffs must show a "causal connection" 
between DuPont's conduct and the resulting damage to 
plaintiffs' crops. Brizendine, 548 P.2d at 83. Theoret-
ically, the causal connection could be sho\\n if the 
plaintiffs relied on DuPont's promises of assistance 
and advice to plant as normal, and that crop damage 
resulted. Yet, as the Court has previously held in 
connection with the fraud claim, none of the bell-
wether plaintiffs relied on DuPont's advice. See 
Memorandum Decision (docket no. 1336).FN1 
FNI. Although that decision examined reli-
ance in the context of a fraud claim that had 
to be proved by clear and convincing evi-
dence, the evidence of reliance is equally 
absent for this claim that need only be proved 
by a preponderance. 
*5 Plaintiffs argue that they are not required to 
show reliance. They are correct. Idaho has adopted § 
323 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts that offers 
an alternative if reliance is missing: 
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for considera-
tion, to render services to another which he should 
Page4 
recognize as necessary for the protection of the 
other's person or things, is subject to liability to the 
other for physical harm resulting from his failure to 
exercise reasonable care to perform his undertaking, 
if (a) his failure to exercise such care increases the 
risk of such harm, or (b) the harm is suffered be-
cause of the other's reliance upon the undertaking. 
See Fagundes v. State, 116 Idaho 173, 774 P.2d 
343, 346 (!d. App.Ct.1989) (citing § 323 with ap-
proval). Thus, even without reliance, plaintiffs could 
prevail on their assumed duty claim if they can show 
that DuPont's failure to follow through on its offers of 
assistance created an increased risk of harm. The Re-
statement explains plaintiffs' burden of proof as fol-
lows: 
Where, however, the actor's assistance has put the 
other in a worse position than he was in before, ei-
ther because the actual danger of harm to the other 
has been increased by the partial performance, or 
because the other, in reliance upon the undertaking, 
has been induced to forego other opportunities of 
obtaining assistance, the actor is not free to discon-
tinue his services where a reasonable man would not 
do so. He will then be required to exercise reason-
able care to terminate his services in such a manner 
that there is no unreasonable risk of harm to the 
other, or to continue them until they can be so ter-
minated. 
See Comment c. 
The plaintiffs have not sho\\TI how DuPont's of-
fers of assistance put them "in a worse position than 
[they were] in before." I d. Plaintiffs concede that "[n]o 
damage flowed solely from post-2001 stewardship 
failures," but argue that "it was th~ combination of the 
pre- and post-application conduct that combined to 
cause Oust damage in the 2002-2004 crop years." See 
Plaintiffs' Brief(docket no. 1658) at p. 33. 
This argument, however, begs the question: How 
did DuPont's post-application offers of assistance 
combine with pre-application conduct to cause dam-
age? The record provides no answer. Rather, it reveals 
that 100% of the damage testified to by Hofman was 
caused by DuPont's pre-application conduct. 
The analysis, at this point, circles back to Udy. 
Because DuPont's pre-application conduct was re-
sponsible for 100% of plaintiffs' damage, DuPont's 
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failure to follow through on post-application offers of 
assistance is, at most, "nonfeasance which results in 
failure to eliminate a preexisting risk." Udy, 34 P.3d at 
1073. Under Udy, such nonfeasance cannot support an 
assumed duty claim. Consequently, the Court will 
grant DuPont's Rule 50(b) motion as to the assumed 
duty claim. 
Damages for Assumed Duty 
The Court's Special Verdict Form instructed the 
jury that if they awarded damages on the assumed duty 
claim for DuPont's post-application conduct, they 
were to award those damages separately from the 
damages awarded on the claims for DuPont's 
pre-application conduct. The jury calculated the total 
damages and then allocated them 75% to the 
pre-application claims and 25% to the post-application 
claim for breach of an assumed duty. 
*6 Because the Court has dismissed the assumed 
duty claim, the damages awarded on that claim must 
be dismissed as well. This leaves plaintiffs with an 
award of 75% of their total damages on the 
pre-application claims. 
There is no evidence whatsoever for awarding 
plaintiffs only 75% of their damages on the 
pre-application claims for relief against DuPont. The 
Court describes in detail the damages suffered by 
plaintiffs in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law filed with this decision. There is no support in 
this record for taking that total damage figure as 
against DuPont and reducing it by 25%. 
The Court's instructions were responsible for this 
error. As there was no evidence supporting a separate 
allocation of damages to the assumed duty claim, the 
Court should not have left open to the jury the option 
to make that allocation. 
This analysis leads to an anomalous result. On the 
one hand, the Court's dismissal of the assumed duty 
claim requires it to strike the 25% of damages the jury 
assigned to that claim. On the other hand, the Court is 
powerless to increase the allocation of damages to the 
pre-application claims from 75% to 100%, as that 
would constitute an impermissible additur. See U.S. v. 
4.0 Acres of Land, 175 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir.l999). 
The Court does, however, have the authority to 
grant a new trial as to damages if the verdict is inad-
Page 5 
equate as a matter of law. See 11 Wright, Miller and 
Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure§ 2807 at p. 78 
(1995). Moreover, erroneous jury instructions, as well 
as the failure to give adequate instructions, are also 
grounds for a new trial. Murphy v. City of Long Beach, 
914 F.2d 183, 187 (9th Cir.l990). Here, both justifi-
cations exist for granting a new trial: The damages for 
DuPont's pre-application conduct are inadequate as 
discussed above due to the Court's erroneous instruc-
tions. For that reason, the Court will grant a new trial 
as to DuPont only on the issue of damages. 
While plaintiffs have not filed a motion for new 
trial, the Court may grant a new trial on its own initi-
ative "[ n ]o later than I 0 days after entry of judgment 
... for any reason that would justify granting one on a 
party's motion." See Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e). No judgment 
has yet been entered and so the I 0-day deadline has 
not yet passed. Had plaintiffs' moved for a new trial, 
the Court would have the authority, as discussed 
above, to order a new trial due to inadequate damages. 
Thus, the Court has the authority to grant a new trial 
on a ground not raised by the parties. 
The Court considered giving DuPont the option of 
agreeing to an additur as an alternative to a new trial. 
However, the Court's research indicates that the Court 
has no authority to condition the grant of a new trial in 
that manner. See 11 Wright, Miller and Kane, Federal 
Practice & Procedure supra § 2807 at p. 86. 
The new trial will be limited to issues of damages 
as all liability issues have been settled and vvill not be 
retried. See Larez v. Holcomb, 16 F.3d 1513 (9th 
Cir.1994) (granting new trial as to damages only). The 
Court has the authority to grant such a partial new trial 
when "the issues of damages and liability are not so 
interwoven as to require a new trial on both." See Lies 
v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 641 F.2d 765 (9th Cir.l981). 
Here, the issues of damages and liability are not in-
terwoven and so a new trial on all issues is not re-
quired. 
*7 Of course, certain damage claims which were 
foreclosed by the Court's pretrial and trial rulings may 
be re-opened and subject to reconsideration. The 
Court would envision the new trial on damages as to 
DuPont on the bellwethers to be folded into the up-
coming trial on damages with the BLM. One notable 
difference between the re-trial of the bellwether's 
damage claims and the trial of the non-bellwethers' 
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claims is that the former will involve damages only 
while the latter will be a trial of specific causation and 
damages. See In Re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Lit., 
292 F.3d 1124, 1133 (9th Cir.2002). 
\Vhile the jury's allocation of damages is flawed, 
their allocation of fault is fully supported by the rec-
ord. The jury allocated fault 60% to DuPont and 40% 
to the BLM. The Court sustains that fmding and it will 
not be retried. 
ORDER 
In accordance with the Memorandum Decision 
above, 
NOW THEREFORE IT IS HEREBY OR-
DERED, that the motion for judgment as a matter of 
law or for new trial (docket no. 1644) is GRANTED 
IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. It is granted to 
the extent it seeks a(l) dismissal of the assumed duty 
claim and (2) a new trial on the issue of damages only 
as to DuPont. The motion is denied in all other re-
spects. 
D.Idaho,20 10. 
Adams v. U.S. 
Slip Copy, 2010 WL 1248286 (D.Idaho) 
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Attorneys for Defendants City of Lewiston and 
Lowell J. Cutshaw, City Engineer 
I 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND 
FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
JOHN G. BLOCK, a single man, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JACK J. STREJBICK, a single man, JACK 
STREIBICK as Personal Representative of 
the Estate of Maureen F. Streibick, 
deceased, CITY OF LEWISTON, a 
municipal corporation of the State of 
fdaho, and its employee LOWELL J. 
CUTSHAW, City of Lewiston Engineer, 
and DOES 1 - 20, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV 09-02219 
ORDER EXTENDING 
DEFENDANTS' EXPERT WITNESS 
DISCLOSURES 
This matter having come before the Court on Stipulation of the parties, and 
good cause appearing therefor, 
ORDER EXTENDING DEFENDANTS' EXPERT WITNESS DISCLOSURES - 1 
AUG-26-2011 14:03 
It is hereby order that Defendants' Expert Witness Disclosures shall be 
extended to October 21, 2011 . 
DATED this 2. f{;;y of August, 2011. 
District Judge 
ORDER EXTENDING DEFENDANTS' EXPERT WITNESS DISCLOSURES - 2 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
JOHN G. BLOCK, a single man, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JACK J. STREIBICK, a single man, JACK 
STREIBICK as Personal Representative of 











deceased, CITY OF LEWISTON, a ) 
municipal corporation of the State of Idaho, ) 
and its employee LOWELL J. CUTSHAW, ) 




CASE NO. CV 09-02219 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
AND ORDER ON SECOND 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
This matter came before the Court on Defendants City of Lewiston and Lowell J. 
Cutshaw's Second Motion for Summary Judgment. 1 The Plaintiff was represented by 
Ronald Landeck and Danelle Forseth, of the firm Landeck & Forseth. Defendants City of 
1 The City subsequently filed a Motion to Strike Portions of Second Affidavit of John Block, Second 
Affidavit of Eric Hasenoehrl, Affidavit of John R. "Hank" Swift, and Plaintiffs Memorandum in 
Opposition to Defendant City's Second Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court has several affidavits 
before it on this matter. The Court has only considered relevant admissible evidence as it applies to the 
pending motion fOI,summary judgment. 
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 1 
ON SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Lewiston and City of Lewiston Engineer, Lowell Cutshaw, were represented by Brian 
Julian, of the firm Anderson, Julian & HulL The Court heard oral argument on this 
matter on August 9, 2011. The Court, having heard the argument of cow1sel and being 
fully advised in the matter, hereby renders its decision. 
BACKGROUND 
A detailed factual background of this case is found in this Court's Afemorandum 
Opinion and Order on Motionfor Summary Judgment dated September 14,2010. The 
City's first motion for summary judgment was denied because a question of material fact 
existed concerning whether Block reasonably should have discovered his claim against 
the City prior to 2009. On August 5, 2011, the parties entered into a stipulation to 
dismiss with prejudice Defendant Jack J. Streibick, individually and as the personal 
representative of the Estate of Maureen Streibick. An order to this effect was entered on 
August 8, 2011, leaving only the City of Lewiston and its employee, Lowell Cutshaw, as 
remaining defendants (hereinafter referred to as "the City"). 
There are eleven claims of negligence against the City and Cutshaw. These 
claims assert the City and Cutshaw breached a duty of care by: 
(i) failing to notify and/or warn Block at the time he sought building 
permits for 153, 155 and 159 and Lots 1,2,3,4,5,6 and 7 of Canyon 
Greens No. 2 of earth movement that the City of Lewiston, 
Cutshaw and others knew had occurred in 1999 within the area of 
153, 155 and 159 and that such earth movement had neither been 
eliminated nor properly abated in any manner; 
(ii) failing to take any action to prevent, restrict or regulate 
development within the area of 153, 155 and 159 until such earth 
movement had been eliminated or properly abated; 
(iii) failing to require that such earth movement in the area of 153, 155 
and 159 be eliminated or properly abated by Streibick and/or 
others prior to Block's purchase of the Property; 
(iv) failing to prevent Streibick from developing and selling 153, 155 
and 159 to Block without notice and/or warning to Block that such 
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earth movement had occurred in 1999 or without having 
eliminated or properly abated such earth movement; 
(v) failing to require Streibick to complete the required storm water 
improvements in 1994 for Palisades No. 4 subdivision and 
approving and allowing Streibick' s construction of a storm water 
detention pond within the area of 15 3 where the City of Lewiston, 
Cutshaw and/or others knew earth movement had occurred in 
1999, thereby contributing to the instability of soil in that area; 
(vi) approving the plats of Canyon Greens and Canyon Greens No. 2 
without notifying and/or warning Block that earth movement had 
occurred on 15 3, 15 5 and 15 9 in 1999 and had not been eliminated 
or properly abated; 
(vii) failing to require an approved design or plan incorporating 
engineering standards applicable to the grading, filling, 
compacting of soil, detaining of storm water and constructing of 
residences on the property and failing to approve such a design or 
plan and/or to require compliance with such design or plan prior to 
any such improvements being allowed by the City of Lewiston, 
Cutshaw and/or others and/or undertaken to eliminate or properly 
abate such earth movement within the area of 153, 155 and 159; 
(viii) failing to act with ordinary care to protect against the likely risks, 
danger and adverse consequences from such earth movement the 
City of Lewiston, Cutshaw, and/or others knew had occurred in the 
area of 153, 155, and 159 in 1999; 
(ix) failing to require and/or compel Streibick to eliminate or properly 
abate the dangerous condition caused by and/or existing as a result 
of such earth movement in the area of 15 3, 15 5 and 159; 
(x) failing to supervise Streibick's development activities within the 
area of 153, 155, and 159 between 1999 and 2006 thereby allowing 
concealment of such earth movement and the creation of a 
dangerous condition and risk of harm; and 
(xi) failing to inspect and/or make inadequate inspection of Streibick's 
development activities within the area of 153, 155 and 159 
between 1999 and 2006 thereby allowing concealment of such 
earth movement and the creation of a dangerous condition and risk 
of harm. 
Complaint, at 14-15. In addition, Block claims the City and Cutshaw acted with gross 
negligence with respect to the above claims. The City's second motion for summary 
judgment, seeking summary judgment of the aforementioned claims, is currently before 
this Court. 
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SUMMARYJUDGMENTSTANDARD 
Summary judgment should be granted where there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. I.R.C.P. 
56( c). In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, the court must construe 
the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits in a light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party. Ruffing v. Ada County Paramedics, 145 Idaho 943, 945, 188 P.3d 885, 
887 (2008); Conway v. Sonntag, 141 Idaho 144, 146, 106 P.3d 470, 472 (2005), citing 
Infanger v. City of Salmon, 137 Idaho 45,44 P.3d 1100 (2002). 
'When a motion for summary judgment is "supported by a particularized affidavit, 
the opposing party may not rest upon bare allegations or denials in his pleadings," but 
must set forth "specific facts" showing a genuine issue. I.R.C.P. 56( e); Verbillis v. 
Dependable Appliance Co., 107 Idaho 335,337,689 P.2d 227,229 (Ct. App. 1984). A 
"mere scintilla" of evidence or only a "slight doubt" as to the facts is insufficient to 
withstand summary judgment. Finholt v. Cresto, 143 Idaho 894, 896, 155 P.3d 695, 697 
(2007); see also Jenkins v. Boise Cascade Corp., 141 Idaho 233,238, 108 P.3d 380, 385 
(2005). 
Finally, the initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of 
material fact is on the moving party, and once this burden is met, it is incumbent upon the 
non-moving party to establish an issue of fact regarding that element. Meikle v. Watson, 
138 Idaho 680, 683, 69 P.3d 100, 103 (2003); Yoakum v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 129 
Idaho 171, 923 P.2d 416 (1996). 
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ANALYSIS 
The City's arguments in support of summary judgment are divided into two 
categories: First, the City argues that it is not liable under general negligence theories. 
Second, the City contends it is immune from liability pursuant to provisions of the Idaho 
Tort Claims Act (hereinafter "ITCA"). 
A. Negligence arguments 
The claims against the City are based upon alleged acts or omissions by the City 
which resulted in a breach of duty owed to Block. The City's motion for summary 
judgment is granted based upon two of the four arguments presented to the Court. 
1. Summary judgment is granted based upon the economic loss rule. 
The City contends all of Block's damages constitute economic damages, 
including repair and lost value on the homes at 153, 155, 159 Marine View Drive, lost 
business damages, and lost value on six of the eight homes that were designated part of 
Canyon Greens No. 2. The Canyon Greens No. 2 homes suffered no physical damage 
related to slope movement. Supplemental Affidavit of Stephen Adams in Support of 
Motion for Summmy Judgment, Exhibit L, Affidavit of Terry Rudd, at 112-113. Because 
all of Block's damages are economic, recovery is prohibited pursuant to the economic 
loss rule. 
The economic loss rule is discussed in great detail in Blahd v. Richard B. Smith, Inc., 
141 Idaho 296, 108 P.3d 996 (2005). 
Unless an exception applies, the economic loss rule prohibits recovery 
of purely economic losses in a negligence action because there is no duty 
to prevent economic loss to another. Duffin v. Idaho Crop Improvement 
Ass'n., 126 Idaho 1002, 1007, 895 P.2d 1195, 1200 (1995); Tusch Enters. 
v. Coffin, 113 Idaho 3 7, 41, 7 40 P .2d 1022, 1026 (1987); Clark v. 
International Harvester Co., 99 Idaho 326, 336, 581 P.2d 784, 794 (1978). 
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The rule "applies to negligence cases in general; its application is not 
restricted to products liability cases." Ramerth v. Hart, 133 Idaho 194, 
197,983 P.2d 848, 851 (1999) (citations omitted). "Economic loss 
includes costs of repair and replacement of defective property which is the 
subject of the transaction, as well as commercial loss for inadequate value 
and consequent loss of profits or use." Salmon Rivers Sportsman Camps, 
Inc., v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 97 Idaho 348,351,544 P.2d 306,309 (1975). 
On the other hand, "[p ]roperty damage encompasses damage to property 
other than that which is the subject of the transaction." !d. 
!d. at 300, 108 P .3d at 1000. In order for the economic loss rule to apply in the case at 
hand, the damages claimed must relate to "the subject of the transaction." The Blahd 
Court referred to two cases which define "the subject of the transaction." 
In Tusch Enterprises, a seller hired a contractor to level a hill to 
prepare the area for construction. The seller participated in the site 
preparation, hired a builder to construct a duplex on the site and sold the 
duplex to a buyer. The buyer then discovered the duplex was damaged 
because the foundation was defective. The buyer sued the seller and the 
builder alleging negligence in preparing the foundation. This Court held 
the economic loss rule barred the negligence claims because the damage to 
the duplex caused by the defective foundation was purely economic. 
Tusch Enters., 113 Idaho at 41, 7 40 P .2d at 1 026. This Court later 
explained in another case that it "considered the duplex itself, rather than 
its construction, to be the subject ofthe transaction." Ramerth, 133 Idaho 
at 197, 983 P.2d at 851. 
In Ramerth, an airplane owner sued a repairman alleging the 
repairman's negligent servicing and inspection of the airplane caused 
damage to the engine and aircraft. The airplane owner argued the 
economic loss rule did not bar his negligence claim because the subject of 
the transaction was the repairman's services, not the engine or airplane 
that was serviced. This Court rejected that argument and held the damage 
to the engine and the aircraft were purely economic and therefore, subject 
to the economic loss rule. 133 Idaho at 197,983 P.2d at 851. These cases 
indicate the word "transaction," for purposes of the economic loss rule, 
does not mean a business deal-it means the subject of the lawsuit. 
!d. In Blahd, the plaintiffs' house was damaged because the foundation was settling. The 
Blahd plaintiffs attempted to distinguish their case from the facts surrounding the 
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property in Tusch Enterprises; however, the Blahd Court ultimately determined that both 
the lot and the house comprised the "subject of the transaction". 
Like the duplex in Tusch Enterprises, the Blahds' house is damaged 
because the foundation is settling. The damage to the Blahds' house is 
similar to the duplex damage in Tusch Enterprises, where this Court held 
the losses were economic. The Blahds seek to distinguish their case by 
noting the buyer in Tusch Enterprises did not sue the contractor who 
leveled the lot and did not allege the property had been leveled 
negligently. The fact that the buyer in Tusch Enterprises only sued the 
builder and the seller is immateriaL It is the subject of the transaction that 
determines whether a loss is property damage or economic loss, not the 
status of the party being sued. The Blahds purchased the house and lot as 
an integrated whole. Like the leveled lot and duplex in Tusch Enterprises, 
the subject of the transaction in this case is both the lot and the house. That 
being the case, the damages to the Blahds' house are purely economic and 
the Blahds' negligence claims against the Smith Entities and Jones are 
barred by the economic loss rule. 
Id. at 300-301, 108 P.3d at 1000-1001. In the case at hand, the subject of the transaction 
is the property developed by Block which is contained within the subdivisions, as well as 
the houses built upon this property. Thus, the damages sustained by Block are purely 
economic damages, similar to the facts of both Tusch Enterprises and Blahd. 
The Blahd Court also considered an exception to the economic loss rule, based 
upon whether there was a special relationship between the parties. 
The term "special relationship," ... refers to those situations where the 
relationship between the parties is such that it would be equitable to 
impose such a duty. In other words, there is an extremely limited group of 
cases where the law of negligence extends its protections to a party's 
economic interest. Duffin, 126 Idaho at 1008, 895 P.2d at 1201. There are 
only two situations in which this Court has found the special relationship 
exception applies. One situation is where a professional or quasi-
professional performs personal services. McAlvain v. General Ins. Co. of 
America, 97 Idaho 777, 780, 554 P.2d 955, 958 (1976). In "\1cAlvain, an 
insured expressly requested his insurance agent provide complete 
insurance coverage on the insured's business inventory. The insurance 
agent knew or should have known the amount of insurance that was 
needed to completely cover the value of the inventory. A fire destroyed 
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the inventory and the insurance coverage was insufficient to cover the 
loss. This Court held: 
When an insurance agent performs his services negligently, to the 
insured's injury, he should be held liable for that negligence just as 
would an attorney, architect, engineer, physician or any other 
professional who negligently performs personal services. 
Id at 780, 554 P.2d at 958. 
The other situation involving a special relationship is where an entity 
holds itself out to the public as having expertise regarding a specialized 
function, and by so doing, knowingly induces reliance on its performance 
of that function. Duffin, 126 Idaho at 1008, 895 P.2d at 1201. In Duffin, 
the Idaho Crop Improvement Association was the only entity in Idaho 
authorized to certify seed potatoes. The Association held itself out to the 
public as having expertise in seed certification and induced reliance on 
that expertise. The Federal-State Inspection Service also inspected seed for 
diseases. A farmer relied on the Association's expertise and bought the 
certified seed. Later, it was discovered the seed was defective and the 
farmer suffered economic losses. This Court held a special relationship 
existed between the farmer and the certifying Association because the 
Association had "engaged in a marketing campaign ... to induce reliance 
by purchasers on the fact that seed ha[ d] been certified." Id However, this 
Court explained the special relationship exception did not apply to the 
Federal-State Inspection Service because there was no evidence in the 
record to "conclude that it ha[ d] actively sought to induce reliance on the 
part of purchasers of certified seed." Id 
Blahd, 141 Idaho at 301, 108 P.3d at 1001. 
Block contends that the City owed him a duty as a result of a special relationship, 
and that further, the City assumed a duty of care to Block. Block's arguments are 
unpersuasive with respect to the economic loss rule. As explained in Blahd, there is an 
extremely limited group of cases where the law of negligence extends its protections to a 
party's economic interest. The first is MeA/vain v. General Ins. Co. of America, 97 Idaho 
777, 780, 554 P.2d 955, 958 (1976), where the court found a special relationship based 
upon an instance where a professional or quasi-professional performs personal services. 
MeA/vain is distinguishable from the case at hand because nothing in the record indicates 
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the City performed a personal service for Block. The purpose and intent of the Lewiston 
subdivision ordinance establishes that the role of the City with respect to subdivisions is 
not a personal service. The City's role is to provide for orderly gro\\-ih and development 
ofthe City. 
(a) The purpose of this chapter is to provide for the orderly growth and 
harmonious development of the City of Lewiston, to insure adequate 
traffic circulation through coordinated street systems with relation to 
major thoroughfares, adjoining subdivisions and public facilities; to 
achieve individual property lots of reasonable utility and livability, to 
secure adequate provisions for water supply, drainage, sanitary 
sewerage, and other health requirement; to insure consideration for 
adequate sites for school, recreation areas, and other public facilities; 
to promote the conveyance of land by accurate legal descriptions; and 
to provide logical procedures for the achievement of this purpose. 
(b) In its interpretation and application, the provisions of this chapter are 
intended to provide a common ground of understanding and a sound 
equitable working relationship between the public and private interests 
to the end that both independent and mutual objectives can be 
achieved in the subdivision of land. 
Affidavit of Kari Rave ncr oft in Support of Defendants 'Motion for Summary Judgment, 
Exhibit D, Lewiston City Ordinance 4177, section 32-2(a), (b). Further, the record 
indicates that Block hired engineers for the purpose of developing the property, thus, the 
City engineer was working for the City, not working personally for Block. 
In addition, this case is distinguishable from Duffin v. Idaho Crop Improvement 
Ass'n., 126 Idaho 1002, 1007, 895 P.2d 1195, 1200 (1995) where an entity held itself out 
to the public as having expertise regarding a specialized function, and by so doing, 
knowingly induced reliance on its performance of that function. There is no evidence in 
this case that the City of Lewiston held itself out to the public as having expertise 
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regarding a specialized function. Thus, no special relationship has been established 
between Block and the City. 
In summation, the case at hand is analogous to Tusch Enters. v. Coffin, 113 Idaho 
37, 41, 740 P.2d 1022, 1026 (1987) and Blahd v. Richard B. Smith, Inc., 141 Idaho 296, 
108 P.3d 996 (2005). The economic loss rule prohibits recovery of purely economic 
losses in a negligence action because there is no duty to prevent economic loss to another. 
The losses claimed by Block are purely economic. Further, there is no special 
relationship between Block and the City which creates an exception to the economic loss 
rule in this case. Therefore, the Defendants' motion for summary judgment, seeking 
dismissal of all of Block's claims against the City, is granted. 
2. The City did not owe Block a duty of care with respect to actions which 
occurred on the property prior to Block's purchase. 
The Complaint sets forth six allegations of negligence which occurred prior to 
Block's purchase of the property. Complaint,~ 55 (claims designated (iii), (iv), (v), (ix), 
(x), and (xi)). The City maintains that it had no duty to Block with respect to any alleged 
acts or omissions which may have occurred when the previous owner possessed the 
property. 
The existence of a duty is a question of law. Twpin v. Granieri, 133 Idaho 244, 
247,985 P.2d 669,672 (1999). The City asserts that until Block purchased the property, 
the City had no more duty to him than it did to any other member of the public regarding 
this property. The City relies on a Minnesota case, Radke v. County of Freeborn, 694 
N.W.2d 788 (Minn. 2005) in support of its argument, based upon the "public duty rule." 
Generally, a person has no common law duty to prevent a third person 
from injuring another unless there is some kind of special relationship. 
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Andrade, 391 N.W.2d at 841; Restatement (Second) of Torts§ 315 
(1965). Applying this principle to governmental torts in what is called the 
"public duty rule" requires that a governmental unit owe the plaintiff a 
duty different from that owed to the general public in order for the 
governmental unit to be found liable. Cracraft, 279 N.W.2d at 806. In 
other words, a purely "public duty" -as opposed to a "special duty" -cannot 
give rise to government tort liability. Id 
I d. at 793. The Idaho Supreme Court relied on the analysis set forth in Radke for 
purposes of determining whether the State has a duty to competently investigate a report 
of child abuse in Rees v. State, Dept. of Health and Welfare, 143 Idaho 10, 16, 137 P.3d 
397, 403 (2006)_2 \\''bile the case at hand is distinguishable factually from Radke and 
Rees because the issues before this Court do not address the responsibility for protecting 
abused and neglected children, the Minnesota application of the "public duty rule" is 
instructive in the case at hand. With respect to the six claims listed above, the issue is 
whether the City had a duty to prevent a land owner from causing injury to a future 
purchaser. The City contends that it owed no duty to Block with respect to Streibick's 
2 The Rees Court applied four factors for determining whether the government assumed 
responsibility for protecting reportedly abused and neglected children. 
There, the court noted under Minnesota law a statute alone could not create a special 
duty; rather there must be additional indicia the governmental unit "has undertaken the 
responsibility of protecting a particular class of persons[ ] from the risks associated with a 
particular harm." Jd at 793. It then considered four non-exhaustive factors to determine if 
the government assumed responsibility for protecting reportedly abused and neglected 
children: 
(1) Whether the governmental unit had actual knowledge of the dangerous 
condition; 
(2) Whether there was reasonable reliance by persons on the governmental unit's 
representations and conduct (such reliance must be based on specific actions or 
representations which cause the persons to forego other alternatives of protecting 
themselves); 
(3) Whether an ordinance or statute set forth mandatory acts clearly for the 
protection of a particular class of persons rather than the public as a whole; and 
(4) Whether the governmental unit used due care to avoid increasing the risk of 
harm. 
I d. at 794. Importantly, these four factors need not all be met for the Court to determine 
that a duty exists, id. at 788, and they do not create a bright-line test. ... 
Id. at 16, 137 P.3d at 403. 
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property any more so than it would to any other member of the public at large who might 
have considered purchasing the property. 
(2001). 
The City also relies on Udy v. Custer County, 136 Idaho 386, 34 P.3d 1069 
Udy's claims are in reality claims for negligent police protection for which 
there can be no recovery absent a special relationship with the victim. See 
Lundgren v. City of McCall, 120 Idaho 556, 557-58, 817 P.2d 1080, 1081-
82 (1991). Cf Isabella County v. Michigan, 181 Mich.App. 99,449 
N. W.2d 111 (1989) (state police officer who failed to report downed 
traffic sign was not liable to motorist who was injured in collision with 
that sign absent evidence of special relationship between officer and 
injured motorist giving rise to duty on officer's part); Alderman v. Lamar, 
493 So.2d 495 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1986) (no duty to decedent absent special 
relationship to report or place upright a leaning stop sign causing fatal 
automobile collision). Here, the record does not establish, nor does Udy 
argue that he or his passengers were in a special relationship with Sheriff 
Roskelley. Thus, the fact that Udy's accident may have been prevented 
through reasonable law enforcement actions is insufficient to establish a 
duty to the Appellants or otherwise form the basis for SheriffRoskelley's 
liability in tort. 
!d. at 391, 34 P.3d at 1074. 
Block has provided no evidence the City owed him a duty based upon a special 
relationship between Block and the City. Similarly, the City does not owe a duty to any 
person who may purchase land in Lewiston, from any current landowner, at a future date. 
Absent a duty, Block's burden to establish negligence cannot be met. Therefore, the 
City's motion for summary judgment with respect to claims of negligence when the 
property was owned by Streibick is granted. 3 
3 In addition to the two arguments above, the City also claims it had no duty to require Block obtain a slope 
stability or geotechnical analysis of the property and that Block cannot show that any action or inaction by 
the City caused Block's damages. Because summary judgment is granted based upon the foregoing 
analysis, it is not necessary for the Court to set forth a detailed analysis on these arguments. Summary 
judgment is also granted in the alternative, based upon the immunity provisions of the ITCA, set forth 
below. 
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B. Immunity Claims 
In addition, the City relies on the ITCA to assert immunity from liability on the 
Plaintiffs claims. This Court will address the City's immunity arguments for purposes of 
granting summary judgment on an alternative basis to the analysis set forth above. 
The ITCA "abrogates the doctrine of sovereign immunity and renders a 
governmental entity liable for damages arising out of its negligent acts or omissions." 
Lawton v. City of Pocatello, 126 Idaho 454, 458, 886 P.2d 330, 334 (1994). "The 
purpose of the ITCA is to provide 'much needed reliefto those suffering injury from the 
negligence of government employees.' The ITCA is to be construed liberally, consistent 
with its purpose, and with a view to 'attaining substantial justice."' Rees v. State, Dept. 
of Health and Welfare, 143 Idaho 10, 19, 137 P.3d 397,406 (2006) (internal citations 
omitted). 
At summary judgment, a three step analysis must be followed when a Defendant 
claims immunity pursuant to the ITCA. 
First, we must determine whether "tort recovery is allowed under the laws 
ofldaho." Harris, 123 Idaho at 298 n. 1, 847 P.2d at 1159 n. 1. This is 
essentially a determination of whether there is such a tort under Idaho 
Law. Czaplicki, 116 Idaho at 330, 775 P.2d at 644. Second, this Court 
determines if "an exception to liability under the ITCA shields the alleged 
misconduct from liability." Coonse, 132 Idaho at 803, 979 P.2d at 1163. 
Finally, "if no exception applies, [we examine] whether the merits of the 
claim as presented for consideration on the motion for summary judgment 
entitle the moving party to dismissal." Id 
Rees v. State, Dept. of Health and Welfare, 143 Idaho 10,15, 137 P.3d 397, 402 (2006). 
The Defendants concede that negligence is a recognized tort in the State of Idaho; 
however, the Defendants argue certain exceptions to liability under the ITCA are 
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applicable in the case at hand. Summary judgment is appropriate based upon immunity 
pursuant to the ITCA. Specific provisions are addressed individually. 
1. I.C. § 6-904B affords the City immunity from any claim which arises 
from the failure to inspect property or issue permits. 
The underlying basis for all of Block's claims against the City are based upon the 
City's failure to inspect the property, or failure to require certain geotechnical studies as 
a condition for the development of subdivisions, or issuance of building permits for the 
properties. The City contends it is immune from liability pursuant to certain provisions 
ofi.C. § 6-904B, which specifically provides immunity for actions arising out ofthe 
issuance of permits, or failure to make an inspection. This statute reads in pertinent part: 
A governmental entity and its employees while acting within the course 
and scope of their employment and without malice or criminal intent and 
without gross negligence or reckless, willful and wanton conduct as 
defined in section 6-904C, Idaho Code, shall not be liable for any claim 
which: 
3. Arises out of the issuance, denial, suspension or revocation of, or failure 
or refusal to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke a permit, license, certificate, 
approval, order or similar authorization. 
4. Arises out of the failure to make an inspection, or the making of an 
inadequate inspection of any property, real or personal, other than the 
property of the governmental entity performing the inspection. 
I.C. § 6-904B(3),(4). The ITCA defines gross negligence and reckless, willful and 
wanton conduct. 
For the purposes of this chapter, and this chapter only, the following 
words and phrases shall be defined as follows: 
1. "Gross negligence" is the doing or failing to do an act which a 
reasonable person in a similar situation and of similar responsibility 
would, with a minimum of contemplation, be inescapably drawn to 
recognize his or her duty to do or not do such act and that failing that duty 
shows deliberate indifference to the harmful consequences to others. 
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2. "Reckless, willful and wanton conduct" is present only when a person 
intentionally and knowingly does or fails to do an act creating 
unreasonable risk of harm to another, and which involves a high degree of 
probability that such harm will result. 
I. C. § 6-904C(l ),(2). The immunity language within this statute is broad enough to cover 
any claims of negligence which are based on issuance of building or other permits, 
approving subdivision plats, and inspecting or not inspecting the property at issue.4 The 
burden is particularly high for Block because "I.C. § 6-903(e) provides a rebuttable 
presumption that any act of an employee within the time and place of his employment is 
without malice or criminal intent." Boise Tower Associates, LLC v. Hogland, 147 Idaho 
774, 784,215 P.3d 494, 504 (2009). 
Nothing in the record before the Court establishes that the City acted with gross 
negligence. Block relies upon the affidavit of Bud Van Stone to support his argument 
that the City "acted unreasonably and failed to exercise reasonable care." Plaintiff's 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant City's Second Motion for Summary Judgment, 
at 42-43. Nothing within Mr. Van Stone's affidavit asserts the City acted in a manner that 
meets the definition of gross negligence set forth in the IT CA. Deposition of Bud R. Van 
Stone. 5 There is no evidence a City employee acted, or failed to act, in a mat111er that 
shows deliberate indifference to the harmful consequences to others. See I. C. § 6-
904C(J). Nor is there proof that the City intentionally and knowingly did or failed to do 
an act which created unreasonable risk of harm to Block, and which involved a high 
degree of probability that such harm would result, as contemplated by I. C. § 6-904C(2). 
4 Block contends the case at hand is akin to a negligent supervision claim. See Sherer v. Pocatello School 
Dist. No.25, 143 Idaho 486, 493, 148 P.3d 1232, 1239 (2006). The claim of negligent supervision in 
Sherer addressed whether the school district negligently supervised school children and is distinguishable 
from the case at hand. 
5 See Affidavit of Ronald J. Landeck in Support of PlaintifFs Objections to Defendant City's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, Exhibit M 
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Block cannot show, as a matter of law, that the City was grossly negligent, or engaged in 
reckless, willful and wanton conduct. 
Block's claims against the City are all based upon the City's actions with respect 
to approving subdivision plats, and issuing building permits for the homes which were 
damaged. These claims arise from a failure to inspect, a failure to provide information 
during the administrative process, or failure to require certain actions as a condition of 
issuing building permits. The claims against the City fall within the scope of immunity 
set forth in I.C. §6-904B. Therefore, the City's motion for summary judgment is granted 
on this alternative basis. 
2. In addition, discretionary function immunity shields the City from 
liability on all claims. 
The City claims it is immune from liability pursuant to discretionary function 
immunity exception of the ITCA. Discretionary function immunity is set forth at I.C. § 
6-904(1). 
A governmental entity and its employees while acting within the course 
and scope of their employment and without malice or criminal intent shall 
not be liable for any claim which: 
Arises out of any act or omission of an employee of the governmental 
entity exercising ordinary care, in relia.11ce upon or the execution or 
performance of a statutory or regulatory function, whether or not the 
statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or performance 
or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the 
part of a governmental entity or employee thereof, whether or not the 
discretion be abused. 
I.C. § 6-904(1). This exception to immunity applies to governmental decisions entailing 
planning or policy formation. See Dorea Enterprises, Inc., v. City of Blackfoot, 144 
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Idaho 422, 163 P.3d 211 (2007).6 The Court must follow a two-step process for 
determining whether this exception to liability is applicable. 
The first step is to examine the nature and quality of the challenged 
actions. !d. "Routine, everyday matters not requiring evaluation of broad 
policy factors will more likely than not be 'operational.'" Ransom, 113 
Idaho at 205, 743 P.2d at 73. Decisions involving a consideration of the 
financial, political, economic and social effects of a policy or plan will 
generally be planning and "discretionary." !d. "While greater rank or 
authority will most likely coincide with greater responsibility for planning 
or policy formation decisions; ... those with the least authority may, on 
occasion, make planning decisions which fall within the ambit of the 
discretionary function exception." !d. at 204, 743 P.2d at 72. The second 
step is to examine the underlying policies of the discretionary function, 
which are: to permit those who govern to do so without being unduly 
inhibited by the threat of liability for tortious conduct, and also, to limit 
judicial re-examination of basic policy decisions properly entrusted to 
other branches of government. !d. at 205, 743 P.2d at 73. 
!d. at 425, 163 P.3d at 214.7 
The claims against the City arise from the City's role of approving subdivisions 
and issuing building permits. Lewiston City Ordinance 4177, enacted in 1997, applies to 
subdivisions approval. This ordinance does not set forth a mandatory requirement for 
slope stability analysis. 8 The City engineer is given discretion to determine whether a 
slope stability analysis is required before a subdivision plat is approved. Aj]idavit of Kari 
Ravencroft in Support of Defendant's }vfotion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit D. 
6 The issue in Dorea was whether the City of Blackfoot's decision to flush sewage lines was discretionary 
or operational. 
7 The Dorea Court affirmed the district court determination that the City's decisions regarding the flushing 
of sewage lines was a discretionary function. The Dorea Court emphasized that the allocation of financial 
and human resources to perform the myriad tasks of running the City are basic policy decisions properly 
entrusted to other branches of government. !d. at 426, 163 P.3d at 215. 
8 A historical review of the Lewiston subdivision ordinance is pertinent to this analysis. Prior to 1997, the 
ordinance set forth mandatory requirements for when a slope stability analysis must be required. The 
revisions made to the ordinance in 1997 substantially removed this language, and left discretion to the city 
engineer to determine whether slope stability analysis would be required before a subdivision plat was 
approved. Affidavit of Kari Ravencroft in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit 
D. 
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The changes in the subdivision ordinance which eliminated the requirements for 
slope stability or geotechnical analysis fall within the category of "discretionary" 
decisions, which are afforded immunity pursuant to I. C. § 6-904(1 ). These revisions 
were the result of a determination that involved the consideration of the financial, 
political, and economic effects of the ordinance. The city engineer is given the discretion 
to determine whether a slope stability or geotechnical evaluation is necessary. Block 
contends that the engineer's decision to require an evaluation is an operational decision 
because it is a routine decision as part of the engineer's job, which does not involve a 
consideration of the financial, political, economic and social effects of a policy or plan. 
Block's argument is unpersuasive with respect to the city engineer's discretion on this 
issue. 
Decisions made under statutes and regulations which leave room for policy 
judgment in their execution are discretionary. The decision making process the city 
engineer follows is done pursuant to the ordinance, which leaves room for policy 
judgment in its execution. A similar issue was discussed in Crown v. State, Dept. of 
Agriculture, 127 Idaho 175, 898 P.2d 1086 (1995). 
The growers seem to maintain that, under Oppenheimer Indus., Inc. v. 
Johnson Cattle Co., 112 Idaho 423,732 P.2d 661 (1987), only the 
decision of whether to inspect is discretionary and that once that decision 
has been made, the conduct of the inspection is "operational." Essentially, 
it is the growers' position that publication of inspection results and 
revocation of a warehouse license are responsibilities subsumed within the 
inspection process. However, the growers' analysis overlooks the language 
in Oppenheimer indicating that "decisions made under statutes and 
regulations which leave room for policy judgment in their execution are 
discretionary." Oppenheimer, 112 Idaho at 425, 732 P.2d at 663. Applying 
that rationale to the present case, it is clear that the statutes governing 
publication and license revocation are discretionary. 
!d. at 181, 898 P.2d at 1092. 
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The City's role in approving subdivisions and issuing building permits is based 
upon city ordinances which leave room for policy judgment in their execution. This is 
illustrated by the testimony of current city engineer, Shawn Stubbers. Mr. Stubbers 
testified in his deposition regarding the factors which he has considered when deciding 
whether a slope stability or geotechnical analysis should be required.9 
Q. Okay. Vv'nat were the elements that caused you to determine that the 
subdivision required a geotechnical study? 
A. It was kind of a, a growing list of things. What started my interest, 
concern was the fact they wanted to go to septic systems, and in my 
professional experience, septic systems would add additional water to that 
potential fill area, which has the potential of causing slope failure. When I 
went back then and reviewed their PUD agreement, that specific area of 
the PUD agreement is caused out -- called out as having some site 
limitations. So that was additional information that I used. And then I did 
some research asking professionals in the area of what they thought about 
it. They pointed me in the direction of Terry Howard's study that was 
done. Once I reviewed that, saw that it called out septic systems as being a 
bad mix with those areas, that having fill and septic systems together was 
a bad mix, and that was the thing in my mind that said, you need to do a 
geotechnical evaluation. 
Second Affidavit of Ronald J Landeck in Support of Plaintiff's Objections to Defendant 
City's Motionfor Summary Judgment, Exhibit L, Deposition ofShawn Stubbers, at 37. 
In the case at hand, Le\viston City Ordinance 4177 gives discretion to the city 
engineer regarding whether a developer will be required to obtain a slope stability or 
geotechnical analysis. The authority is similar to that discussed in Crown v. State, Dept. 
of Agriculture, 127, Idaho 175, 181, 898 P.2d 1086, 1092 (1995). 
The Court must also consider the second step of analysis in regards to the 
discretionary function exception to immunity is applicable. See Dorea, 144 Idaho at 425, 
9 Vv'hen being questioned on this issue at the deposition, Mr. Stubbers testified regarding his decision to 
require that a developer obtain a geotechnical evaluation for a subdivision which is unrelated to this case. 
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163 P.3d at 214. In determining that the City's decisions with respect to Block's property 
are discretionary, it is noted that doing so permits those who govern to do so without 
being unduly inhibited by the threat of liability and also limits the judicial re-examination 
of basic policy decisions which are entrusted to the City. 
All of Block's claims against the City are based upon determinations made by city 
employees in the processes of approving subdivision plats or issuing building permits. 
These determinations are made in reliance upon or the execution of regulatory function. 
The actions of the City that Block complains of are those decisions which are 
contemplated within the ITCA as an exception to liability under the discretionary 
function exception. I.C. § 6-904(1). Thus, the City is shielded from liability on all of 
Block's claims and the Defendants' motion for summary judgment is therefore granted 
on this alternative basis 
3. Plan or design immunity shields the City from liability on Block's claim 
the City was negligent in approving the plats of Canyon Greens and 
Canyon Greens No. 2. 
In addition to the immunity provisions discussed above, plan or design immunity 
is applicable specifically to Plaintiff's claim (vi), which claims the City was negligent in 
approving the plats for the Canyon Greens subdivisions. I. C. § 6-904(7) provides 
immunity to a governmental entity and its employees for claims which arise out of a plan 
or design for construction to public property. 
A governmental entity and its employees while acting within the course 
and scope of their employment and without malice or criminal intent shall 
not be liable for any claim which: 
7. Arises out of a plan or design for construction or improvement to the 
highways, roads, streets, bridges, or other public property where such plan 
or design is prepared in substantial conformance with engineering or 
design standards in effect at the time of preparation of the plan or design 
or approved in advance of the construction by the legislative body of the 
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governmental entity or by some other body or administrative agency, 
exercising discretion by authority to give such approval. 
I.C. § 6-904(7). The City contends, in the alternative, it is immune from any claim 
arising out of the acceptance and design of subdivision plat maps relating to Sunset 
Palisades No. 4, Sunset Palisades No. 8, Canyon Greens, or Canyon Greens No. 2. The 
general area in question was subdivided four times. At each of these subdivisions, a 
stamped, engineered subdivision plat was submitted to the City, including roads, sewage 
lines, and easements, storm drain lines and easements, and other public property. 
Supplemental Affidavit of Stephen Adams in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, 
Exhibit A, Deposition of Lowell Cutshaw. 
There is no material question of fact that the subdivision plats were prepared in 
substantial conformance with engineering or design or design standards in effect at the 
time of preparation of the plan. Further, the subdivision plats were approved by the city, 
as a governmental entity with authority to give such approvaL 
Block contends design immunity is not applicable, on the distinction that this 
statute only allows immunity for public projects such as highways, roads, streets, or other 
public property. However, this argument is unpersuasive with respect to claim (vi). 
Claim (vi) asserts that the City was negligent in "approving the plats of Canyon Greens 
and Canyon Greens No. 2 without notifying and/or warning Block that earth movement 
had occurred on 153, 155, and 159 in 1999 and had not been eliminated or properly 
abated .... " Complaint, at 14 (claim (vi)). The approval or denial of a subdivision plat is 
a public project that is analogous to the development of highways, roads, streets, or other 
public property. Thus, in the alternative, the City is immune from liability for claim (vi) 
pursuant to I. C.§ 6-904(7) and summary judgment is granted on this issue. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Plaintiff developed subdivisions known as Canyon Greens and Canyon 
Greens No. 2, in Lewiston, Idaho. After the property was subdivided into lots, the 
Plaintiffbuilt homes upon certain lots. Three of the homes built by the Plaintiff were 
damaged as a result of earth settlement that occurred on the property. In 1999, there had 
been landslide movement in the area where the subdivisions are located. The Plaintiff 
was not informed of this slope movement by the City when the subdivision plats were 
approved, or when the building and occupancy permits were issued. 
The City has set forth several arguments in support of summary judgment. The 
City contends that the claims should be dismissed pursuant to the economic loss rule, 
which bars recovery for purely economic losses in negligence cases. The City also 
argues there is no duty of care owed by the City to Block for actions which happened on 
the property prior to Block's purchasing the land. In addition, the City claims immunity 
from liability based upon provisions of the Idaho Tort Claims Act. Based upon the 
foregoing analysis, the City's motion for summary judgment is granted. 
ORDER 
The Defendant City of Lewiston and Lowell J. Cutshaw's Second Motion for 
Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED. 
Dated this 
~ 
day of October 2011. 
{!_4!3J 0 
CARL B. KERRlCK- District Judge 
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COMES NOW, the above-entitled Plaintiff John G. Block ("Block"), by and through his 
attorneys of record, Landeck & Forseth, Attorneys at Law, and hereby submits this Motion for 
Reconsideration of this Court's Memorandum Opinion and Order on Second Motion for 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
OF MEMORANDUM OPINION AND 
ORDER ON SECOND MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT- I 
IZJ003/116 
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Summary Judgment pursuant to Rule 11 ( a)(2)(B) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. This 
Motion for Reconsideration is made on the grounds more fully stated in Plaintiffs Memorandum 
in Support of Motion for Reconsideration of Memorandum Opinion and Order on Second 
Motion for Summary Judgment, including the inapplicability of the economic loss rule to 
Block's claims, recognition of a duty of care the City of Lewiston and/or Lowell J. Cutshaw 
owed to Block, and the inapplicability of the exceptions to liability as set forth in Idaho Code§§ 
6-904B(3),(4), 6-904(1) and (7). 
This Motion is supported by the pleadings on file, and by the following documents 
submitted contemporaneously herewith: 
1. Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration of Memorandum 
Opinion and Order on Second Motion for Summary Judgment 
2. Fourth Affidavit of Ronald J. Landeck 
DATED this 28th day of October, 2011. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
JOHN G. BLOCK, a single man, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JACK J. STREIBICK, a single man, JACK J. 
STREIBICK, as Personal Representative of the 
) 
) Case No. CV 09-02219 
) 
) MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
) MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
) OF MEMORANDUM OPINION AND 
) ORDER ON SECOND MOTION FOR 
)SUMMARYJUDGMENT 
) 
Estate of Maureen F. Streibick, deceased, CITY OF ) 
LEWISTON, a municipal corporation of the State of ) 
Idaho, and its employee, LOWELL J. CUTSHAW, ) 
City of Lewiston Engineer, and DOES 1-20, ) 
Defendants. ) 
) 
Plaintiff John G. Block ("Block"), through counsel, hereby submits this Memorandum in 
Support of Motion for Reconsideration ofMemorandum Opinion and Order on Second Motion 
for Summary Judgment. Pursuant to I.R.C.P. Rule ll(a)(2)(B), Block respectfully requests that 
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this Court reconsider and withdraw its Memorandum Opinion and Order on Second Motion for 
Summary Judgment that granted Defendant City of Lewiston and Lowell J. Cutshaw's Second 
Motion for Summary Judgment ("Order"). 
In its Order tllis Court granted the Defendant City of Lewiston and Lowell J. Cutshaw's 
("City's") Second Motion for Summary Judgment based on its application of the economic loss 
rule and recognized exceptions from liability based upon provisions of the Idaho Tort Claims Act 
("ITCA"). Block asserts that this Court's application of the economic loss rule to bar his 
negligence claims was in error. In addition, Block asserts that this Court's recognition of and 
application of exceptions to liability based on provisions of the ITCA were also in error. Further, 
Block asserts that there remain genuine issues of material fact regarding the City's negligence 
and/or gross negligence with respect to its actions and/or omissions. Block's arguments are more 
fully explained below. 
The background facts in their most basic sense are that (i) a landslide occurred on 
property contained within City limits and contained within a subdivision, Sunset Palisades No.4 
("SP4"); (ii) the City knew and documented such landslide event in two separate file locations in 
City records with the intent of addressing such landslide when future development of the 
property occurred; (iii) the property at issue was proposed for development through various 
subdivision processes including Sunset Palisades No. 8 ("SP8") completed before Block 
purchased the property at issue, and Canyon Greens ("CG") and Canyon Greens No.2 ("CG2") 
completed during Block's ownership ofthe property at issue; (iv) the City's subdivision 
ordinance required staff to meet with each developer and identify any unusual problems and 
determine if special studies were needed; (v) City staff met with Block and failed to warn or 
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advise of the landslide occurrence either by not exercising ordinary care, or by failing to do what 
reasonable person(s) in a similar situation and of similar responsibility would recognize as his or 
her duty; (vi) Block developed the property exercising, at a minimum, ordinary care and in 
compliance with all of the City's requirements, (vii) in an 2009 almost identical landslide/earth 
movement event occurred that was the proximate cause of physical damage to Block's three 
homes and improvements constructed at 153, 155, and 159 Marine View Drive and within CG, 
and Block was forced to demolish some of these structures at great monetary loss. 
Some additional basic facts related to the situation described above are (i) at no time did 
Block enter into a contract with the City either for the sale of goods or services; (ii) at no time 
did Block enter into a contract to purchase anything more than the bare land on which he 
constructed the homes and various other structures and that contract was with the Streibicks and 
not the City; (iii) at the time of the City's n.egligent actions, Block owned only unimproved real 
property; (iv) Block is seeking damages because this "other property," the homes and 
improvements he constructed were damaged because of the 2009landslide; (v) Block is not 
claiming compensation for damages to the unimproved real property he purchased from a third 
party; (vi) the real property is still there. 
The Court's application of the economic loss rule to bar Block's recovery of damages is 
erroneous. 
Ibe facts of Block's case are distinguishable from the facts of the cases cited by this 
Court in its Order. The following cases were cited by the Court in its Order. 
In Salmon Rivers Sportsman Camps, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 97 Idaho 348, 544 P.2d 
3 06 (1975) the issues before the court were limited to (i) "whether a plaintiff may maintain an 
action against a manufacturer, with which it is not in privity of contract, to recover economic loss 
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on the ground ofbreach of implied warranty within the contract statute of limitations" and (ii) 
the effect of plaintiffs failure to give a defendant adequate notice ofbreach ofwarranty pursuant 
to the Uniform Sales Act. !d. at 352,356,544 P.2d at 310,314. The court did not thoroughly 
consider the "economic loss rule". 
The case of Ramerth v. Hart, 133 Idaho 194,983 P.2d 848 (1999) is also distinguishable 
from Block's case. In 1995 Morris sold an airplane to Ramerth. !d. at 195, 983 P.2d at 849. 
Ramerth later discovered that the airplane had certain defects caused by repairs improperly done 
in 1992 by Hart. !d. at 195-96, 983 P.2d at 849-50. Ramerth and Morris sued Hart based on 
negligence, negligence per se and breach of contract and sought damages for repairing the 
defective airplane as well as lost profits. Id. at 196, 983 P .2d at 850. The district court granted 
summary judgment dismissing the negligence claims based on a finding that the alleged damages 
were purely economic. Jd. The court cited Salmon Rivers stating "economic loss includes costs 
of repair and replacement of defective property which is the subject of the transaction, as well as 
commercial loss for inadequate value and consequent loss of profits or use." !d. The court held 
that the transaction was a sale and purchase and that the subject of that transaction was the 
defective airplane, thus damages to repair the subject of that transaction, the defective airplane, 
as well as commercial loss of profits from use ofthat defective airplane, was economic loss. !d. 
at 197, 983 P .2d at 851. Thus, boiled down to the basics, Ramerth purchased a defective 
airplane; the airplane was the subject of the transaction; the costs to repair or replace the 
defective airplane were economic loss. 
Also distinguishable from Block's case and cited by this Comi, is Blahd v. Smith, Inc., 
141 Idaho 296, 108 P .3d 996 (2005). The Blahds purchased a lot and house on a hillside. !d. at 
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298, 108 P.3d at 998. The ground underneath the house began to settle and caused damage to the 
house. Id. Peter and Kimberly Gysling had previously owned the lot and constructed the home. 
Id. at 299, 108 P.3d at 999. The Blahds purchased the home from the Gyslings. Id. The Blahds 
filed a complaint against several parties. I d. The district granted summary judgment on the 
ground that the Blahds, negligence claims were barred by the economic loss rule. I d. 
On review, the Idaho Supreme Court stated "it is the subject ofthe transaction that 
determines whether a loss is property damage or economic loss, not the status of the party being 
sued. The Blahds purchased the house and lot as an integrated whole .... [Therefore,] the 
subject of the transaction [was] both the lot and the house." Id. at 301, 108 P .3d at 1001. 
Therefore, the damage to the Blahds' house caused by the house foundation settling was purely 
economic and their negligence claims were barred against the Smith Entities (who improved the 
lot) and Jones (who told the Gyslings that the soil was adequate for residential construction) by 
the economic loss rule.Jd. at 301, 108 P.3d at 1001. 
Also distint,ruishable from Block's case and cited by this Court, is Tusch Ente1prises v. 
Coffin, 113 Idaho 37,740 P.2d 1022 (1987). In Tusch, Vander Boegh was the prior owner ofthe 
land and constructed three duplexes that were completed in early 1976.Jd. at 39, 740 P.2d at 
1024. In March 1979, Tusch Enterprises purchased the land and duplexes from Vander Boeghs. 
I d. at 40, 740 P.2d at 1025. Thereafter, Tusch Enterprises noticed damage to the foundation of 
the duplexes.Jd. Tusch Enterprises alleged negligence on the part of the Vander Boeghs and 
Coffin in the design and construction of the duplexes; however, because the only damages 
alleged were lost rental income from the duplexes and property damage to the duplexes and 
parking lot, the Court affirmed the district court's decision to dismiss the negligence claim 
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because such losses were purely economic losses. The court cited the Salmon Rivers court's 
statement that "economic loss includes costs of repair and replacement of defective property 
which is the subject ofthe transaction as well as commercial loss for inadequate value and 
consequent loss of profits or use." Id. at 41, 740 P.2d at 1026. Thus, because Tusch Enterprises 
suffered no personal injuries and no damage to property other than that which was the subject of 
the sale and purchase transaction, being the land and duplexes, Tusch Enterprises' lost rental 
income and duplex and parking lot damages were deemed economic losses and non-recoverable 
in their negligence action. Jd. at 40-41, 740 P.2d at 1025-26. 
Thus, all cases cited by the Court are inapposite to Block's case. Ramerth purchased a 
defective airplane, the airplane was the subject of the transaction, the costs to repair or replace 
the defective airplane was economic loss; the Blahds purchased a defective house and lot, the 
house and lot were the subject of the transaction, the costs to repair or replace the defective 
house and lot was economic loss; Tusch Enterprises purchased the lots, the duplexes and the 
parking lots, the lots, the duplexes and the parking lots were the subject of the transaction, the 
costs to repair or replace the defective lots, duplexes and parking lots were economic loss. The 
facts in these cases cited by this Court are distinguishable from the facts of Block's case. 
Block purchased four unimproved lots from Defendants Streibick; those four unimproved 
lots were the subject of the transaction, any costs to repair or replace those four unimproved lots 
is economic loss. However, Block has not alleged any such damage. The damage Block has 
alleged is distinct fi-om any damage to those four lots which were the subject of his transaction 
with Streibicks. At least one year after purchasing the lots, Block constructed homes, retaining 
walls, driveways, swimming pools, fences and decks on a portion of those four lots. These 
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homes, retaining walls, driveways, swimming pools, fences and decks are "other property" that 
has suffered damage. This "other property" was not part of the subject of the transaction. Block 
did not purchase the homes, retaining walls, driveways, swimming pools, fences and decks like 
Ramerth purchased an airplane, Blahds purchased a home and lot, and Tusch Enterprises 
purchased lots, duplexes and parking lots. These four cases provide an incomplete analysis of the 
issue before this Court in this case. The facts of Block's case are different, distinguish Block's 
case from the cases relied upon by this Court and compel a different result. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has recently revisited the "economic loss rule" in Aardema v. 
U.S. Dai1y Systems, Inc., 147ldaho 785,215 P.3d 505 (2009) and Brian and Christie, Inc. v. 
Leishman Electric, Inc., 150 Idaho 22, 244 P .3d 166 (20 1 0). 
In Aardema v. U.S. Dai1y Systems, Inc., 147 Idaho 785,215 P.3d 505 (2009) plaintiffs 
tort claim arose out of the contract for a milking system.Id. at 790, 215 P.3d at 510. The Idaho 
Supreme Court explained that "damage to person or property when the property is not the subject 
of the transaction is recoverable under a negligence theory." Id. The Court observed that "it has 
not defined the 'subject ofthe transaction,' instead relying on factual comparisons from previous 
decisions." Id. at 791,215 P.3d at 511, citing Blahd, supra at 301. Its "clear pattern" in these 
decisions has been to "implicitly" define the "subject of the transaction" by the subject matter of 
the contract." Jd. The court continued by recanting its prior statement in Blahd, to the effect that 
the word "transaction" refers to the "subject of the lawsuit," by clarifying that "if the subject of 
the transaction is defined as the subject of the lawsuit essentially every claim would be barred by 
the econom1c loss rule. Instead we read this overbroad language from Blahd to mean that the 
underlying contract that is the subject of the lawsuit is the subject of the transaction." I d. at FN2. 
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Thus, this Court's recitation on page 6 of its Order that for purposes of the economic loss rule the 
word transaction means the subject of the lawsuit is in eiTor. Further, the court in Aardema 
explained that the defendants' argument that the cows were the subject of the transaction was 
strained and that only the milking machines were the subject of the transaction because the dairy 
did not contract with any of the defendants for cattle. Therefore physical damage to the cows was 
not economic loss. 
Brian and Christie, Inc. v. Leishman Electric, Inc., 150 Idaho 22, 244 P .3d 166 (20 1 0), 
the Idaho Supreme Court's most recent decision analyzing the "economic loss rule," clmified 
Idaho law and fully supports Block's right to pursue negligence claims against the City. In that 
case, plaintiff owned a restaurant and a subcontractor, hired to perform electrical work, 
connected signs that had been installed by a sign company to the restaurant building's electrical 
power without inspecting the sign's wiring. The signs' wiring caused a fire that resulted in 
substantial damage to the building and its contents. Plaintiff sued the subcontractor for negligent 
performance of electrical work. The district court held that the restaurant's cause of action was 
barred by the economic loss rule. Id. at 171-72. 
In Brian and Christie, the Supreme Comi drew the "distinction between the recovery of 
damages in tort for physical injmies to person or property and the recovery of truly economic 
loss for breach of warranty or contract" as one which centers upon the "economic expectations" 
of the parties. It quoted from Clark v. International Harvester Co., 99 Idaho 326, 581 P.2d 784 
(1978) in noting that "[t]he economic expectations of parties have not traditionally been 
protected by the law concerning unintentional torts." Id. at 335, 581 P.2d at 793. This is the 
underpinning of the economic loss rule, which is that parties enter into a transaction, through 
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contract or wan·anty, concerning which a party's economic expectations are not met. That is not 
at all the situation in Block's case. There was no contract or warranty with the City. There was 
no economic expectation involved in the transaction involving Block and the City. The facts of 
the Block case do not fall within the ambit of the economic loss rule. 
As further support for this position, the Court in Brian and Christie states that the 
definition of economic loss stated in earlier Idaho cases "does not apply in cases involving the 
negligent rendition of services because such cases do not involve the purchase of defective 
property." Block did not purchase the houses he built. Block did not purchase any property 
from the City. Block had no economic expectations in connection with any transactions he had 
with the City. The Court goes on to say that "[ d]amages from harm to person or propetiy are not 
purely economic losses." Even though Block may have had aspirations for the his development 
when entered into his real estate purchase with the Streibicks, his property damage occurred, as 
alleged in his Complaint, as a result of the City's failure to warn of the landslide. This Court has 
not concluded that Block has not properly alleged a common negligence claim against the City 
for its failure to warn of this condition. Block alleges that the City's failure to warn caused him 
damages. Under these circumstances, at the very least, Block's alleged economic loss "is 
recoverable in tort as a loss parasitic to an injury to person or property." Id. citing Dz{{{zn, supra 
at 1007, P.2d at 1200. The Brian and Christie Court emphasized that their concern 1s "with the 
duties imposed by the law upon the defendant with respect to the plaintiffs business not with the 
duties imposed by the constructions contract." Citing Just's, Inc. v. Arrington Construction Co., 
99 Idaho 462, 468, 583 P .2d 997, 1003 (1978). 
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This then is the major erTor this Court has made by broadly applying the economic loss 
rule where, in reality, the rule is severely limited by circumstances of each case and those 
circumstances, in this case, do not give rise to the application of the rule. There is a duty 
imposed on the City of Lewiston under law to warn Block of the known dangerous condition on 
his property. The City of Lewiston did not use ordinary care and in fact was grossly negligent of 
its duty to avoid injury or damages to Mr. Block in his development of this property. The City is 
liable for those damages and the economic loss rule does not bar recovery for those damages 
and, even if it did, because those damages are also recoverable in tort as a loss parasitic to injury 
to property, all economic losses are recoverable in the negligence action. Brian and Christie, 
supra at 172. 
There is no further Idaho Supreme Couli case law citing to either of these two very recent 
cases; however, the U.S. District Court ofldaho recently discussed the Aardema case in 0 Bar 
Cattle Co., v. Owyhee Feeders, Inc., 2010 WL 2652289 (June 30, 2010). The 0 Bar court 
addressed the issue of the economic loss rule in relation to jury instructions. The court explained 
that the economic loss rules operates to segregate damage claims between the tort law and the 
contract law and that "the Idaho Supreme Court has chosen to draw the line between these two 
potentially overlapping systems of law on the basis of (1) whether the loss claimed relates to the 
subject matter of the transaction and (2) whether the loss claimed includes property damage." ld. 
at *1. 
In regard to the subject of the transaction, the court noted that the Idaho Supreme Court 
has interpreted the subject of the transaction by the subject matter of the contract. Id. at *2. In 
applying that definition the court found that the underlying contract was a bailment agreement 
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whereby defendants would keep, care for, feed, water and medicate plaintiffs cattle. As such, 
the subject of the transaction was the bailment agreement and the deceased cattle were property 
other than that which was the subject of the transaction. Jd. Thus, plaintiffs negligence claim 
was appropriate. Id. 
In regard to the property damage, the court explained that even if the Joss claimed related 
to the subject matter of the transaction, a plaintiff may still recover damages under a negligence 
theory if they have suffered property damage. I d. at *2. The court relied on the Oppenheimer 
case in which the Idaho Supreme Court drew a distinction between prope1iy that had been 
destroyed and property that had been reduced in value. The court noted "[i]t is clear that the 
Idaho courts have drawn a clear distinction between property damage and economic loss based 
around the destruction of property [and that as] long as a plaintiff claims actual damage and not 
just loss of use or value, they may seek damages under a negligence theory." !d. at *3. 
In Oppenheimer Industries, Inc. v. Johnson Cattle Co., Inc., 112 Idaho 423,732 P.2d 661 
(1987), Oppenheimer contracted with Bolen Cattle Co. to care for several head of cattle. Id. at 
424, 732 P.2d at 662. Bolen a1legedly rebranded the cattle and sold them. Id. A state deputy 
brand inspector inspected the converted cattle prior to sale. Id. The trial court ruled that 
Oppenheimer's claims against the State Brand Board failed to state a cause of action in tort 
because they were based upon economic damages. Id. at 425, 732 P.2d at 663. The Idaho 
Supreme Court noted that Oppenheimer was not alleging mere economic damage. ld. at 426, 732 
P .2d at 664. The court found that Oppenheimer suffered the loss of its property due to the 
negligence of the deputy brand inspector. !d. Thus, Oppenheimer had a cause of action against 
the deputy brand inspector. 
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There does not appear to be any Idaho case law relating specifically to the facts of 
Block's case, where "other property" was added to real property that was the subject of a 
transaction and it is this "other property" that suffered physical damage. However, the United 
States Supreme Court has stated that for purposes of applying the economic loss doctrine the 
"product" is limited to that which the manufacturer originally placed in the stream of commerce 
through the product's sale to the initial user, but that equipment added to the product after the 
product was sold to the initial user was not part of the product itself but was "other property" and 
that physical damage the product causes to "other property" is recoverable. Saratoga Fishing Co. 
v. JM Martinac & Co., 117 S.Ct. 1783 (1997). If the land Block purchased is designated as the 
"product" and the "other property" not necessarily equipment, but homes, walls, garages, 
driveways, fences, etc. are added to that product, or land, and then that product or land causes 
physical damage to the other property such damage should be recoverable. 
Block clearly suffered physical damage to "other property" and therefore property loss. 
The City building official observed the following damage to 153 and 159: severe foundation 
damage, structural cracks inside sheetrock, warped floors, walls that had moved out of 
alignment, windows that had broken because of movement of the walls and a gas line separation. 
John Smith Depo. 39:19-25, 40:1-2. Furthermore, Block had to demolish an entire house (153) 
and demolish the basement of another (159), which is complete property loss, property which is 
no longer in Block's possession. John Block Depo. 286:5-7,287:5-7,22-25, 288:1-25. 
Thus, Block asserts that this Court was in error in applying the economic loss rule to 
Block's tort claim against the City for failure to warn, a duty imposed by law not one imposed by 
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any "transaction," and that at the very least there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether 
Block suffered property damage other than that which was the subject of any "transaction." 
This Court failed to apply the appropriate summary judgment standard in granting Defendant 
City's Second Motion for Summary Judgment 
Summary judgment should be granted when there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw. I.R.C.P. 56( c). "Upon a 
motion for summary judgment, all controverted facts are liberally construed in favor of the non-
moving party." G&M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514, 808 P2d 851 (1991). All 
reasonable inferences which can be made from the record shall be made in favor of the party 
resisting the motion. Tusch Enters. v. Coffin, 113 Idaho 37, 740 P2d 1022 (1987) (emphasis 
added). An inference adverse to the nonmoving party may be drawn if it is the only reasonable 
inference. Christensen v. Idaho Land Developers, Inc., 104 Idaho 458, 660 P2d 70 
IQJU.Ltl/.L.LI:l 
(Ct.App.1983) (emphasis added). If the record contains conflicting inferences or reasonable 
minds might reach different conclusions, a summary judgment motion must be denied. G&lvf 
Farms, 119 Idaho at 517, 808 P2d at 854. "All doubts are to be resolved against the moving 
party[.]" Id. 
This Court failed to construe the exceptions set forth in the ITCA appropriately. 
Under the ITCA, liability is to be the rule with certain specific exceptions to be closely 
construed. Sterlingv. Bloom, 111 Idaho 211,214-15,723 P.2d 755,758-59 (1986); Reesv. State, 
Dept. ofHealth and Welfare, 137 P.3d 397, 143 Idaho 10 (2006). In addition, the purpose of the 
Idaho Tort Claims Act (ITCA) is to provide much needed relief to those suffering injury from the 
negligence of government employees. Rees v. State, Dept. of Health and Welfare, 137 P.3d 397, 
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143 Idaho 10 (2006). This Court in its construction and application of the specific exceptions to 
liability under the ITCA not only failed to construe the exceptions closely, rather it construed 
them broadly, placing the burden on Block to counter the City's assertions of immunity. 
Block's main argument is that the City should have told him, as someone with the status 
of a developer/builder on property within the City limits and over which the City had regulatory 
authority, that he was building on the site of a former landslide of which the City had knowledge 
and a duty to disclose. 
Given the City's concession that negligence is a recognized tort in the State ofldaho, the 
Court erred by failing to properly apply the 3-step analysis at the summary judgment stage and 
concluding that the provisions of the ITCA asserted by the City, including LC. §§ 6-904B(3) and 
(4), 6-904(1) or 6-904(7), provide immunity to the City for their negligent acts. Order at 13. 
The City's duty to Block. 
In Rees v.ldaho Dept. of Health and Welfare, 143 Idaho 10, 137 P.3d 397 (2006) the 
Idaho Supreme Comi considered whether the Idaho Department ofHea1th and Welfare and its 
employees could be liable for negligently investigating a reported case of child abuse. I d. at 13. 
The district court granted summary judgment for the State. The Supreme Court explained that 
when reviewing a motion for summary it engaged in a three step analysis. First, whether tort 
recovery is allowed under the laws of Idaho. Second, does an exception to liability under the 
ITCA shield the alleged misconduct from liability. Third, whether the merits of the claim entitle 
the moving party to dismissal. 
Under the first step, the court noted that the parties agreed that the Department owed no 
general duty to Tegan thus the issue was whether Idaho law recognized a special duty of care in 
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this instance. "Determining when a special relationship exists sufficient to impose an affirmative 
duty requires an evaluation of the 'the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the 
law to say that particular plaintiffis entitled to protection."' Jd. at 15, 137 P.3d at 402 citing 
Coghlan, 133 Idaho 3 99, 987 P .2d at 311. The court cited to the "public duty m1e" a rule of non-
liability and stated that an exception to this exists when a duty is owed to individuals rather than 
the public only and this approach accorded with Idaho law referring to Coghlan. I d. at 16, 13 7 
P.3d at 403. The Coghlan case involved the Idaho Supreme Court determining that a disttict 
court's grant of a motion to dismiss regarding duty was in error and remanded for further 
proceedings because the court found sufficient inferences that the University of Idaho defendant 
and the sorority defendant had assumed a duty of care to the plaintiff. "A duty can be created if 
one voluntarily undertakes to perform an act, having no prior duty to do so, the duty arises to 
perform the act in a non-negligent manner." Id. at 400, 987 P.2d at 312. The court referenced 
allegations that supported an inference in favor of plaintiff that the university defendants 
assumed a duty to exercise reasonable care to safeguard the plaintiff from bad acts of which it 
had knowledge. Id. And further the sorority defendants took actions which constituted 
unde1iakings sufficient to create a duty to act in a non-negligent manner. I d. at 402, 987 P .2d at 
314. 
In examining this, the court applied a fact-intensive test as set out in a Minnesota case. Id. 
There, the court noted that a statute alone could not create a special duty and there had to be 
additional indicia that the government has undertaken the responsibility of protecting a particular 
class of person from the risk associated with a particular harm. I d. It then considered four 
non-exhaustive factors: 
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1. Whether the government had actual knowledge of the dangerous condition 
2. Whether there was reasonable reliance by persons on the government's 
representations and conduct (such reliance must be based on specific actions or 
representations which cause the person to forego other alternatives of protecting 
themselves) 
3. Whether an ordinance or statute set for mandatory acts clearly for the protection of a 
particular class of persons rather than the public as a whole; and 
4. Vv'hether the government used due care to avoid increasing the risk ofhann. 
The court explained that these four factors need not all be met for the Court to determine 
that a duty exists and they do not create a bright-line test. 
Applying those factors in Block's case, the subdivision ordinance sets fotih mandatory 
acts clearly for the protection of a particular class of persons rather than the public as a whole. In 
regard to whether the City had actual knowledge of the dangerous condition (i.e. the 1999 
historic landslide), there is no question it had actual knowledge because two memos were placed 
in City records by the City Engineer. Regarding reliance, Block reasonable relied on City staffs 
statements and conduct in his preapplication meeting. Regarding the fourth factor, whether the 
City used due care to avoid hann to Block, clearly there is a genuine issue of material fact as to 
whether the City exercised due care in their actions as set forth in the affidavits of John Block, 
Eric Hasenoehrl, Bud Van Stone and John ("Hank") Swift previously submitted. The Court has 
ened by concluding that the City did not owe to Block a duty to competently perform its services 
as set forth in the subdivision code and to warn Block of the previous landslide on his real 
property because of the special relationship created once Block met with City staff as part of the 
subdivision process. 
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Idaho Code § 6-904B does not afford the City immunity for Block's claims which a1ise from the 
City's issuance of permits and/or failure to inspect because, at a minimum, there is a genuine 
issue of material fact whether the City acted with gross negligence. 
Idaho Code § 6-904B provides immunity to a governmental entity and its employees 
while acting within the course and scope of their employment and without malice or criminal 
intent and without gross negligence or reckless, willful and wanton conduct for any claim which: 
3. Arises out of the issuance, denial, suspension or revocation of, or failure or 
refusal to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke a permit, license, certificate, approval, 
order or similar authorization. 
4. Arises out of the failure to make an inspection, or the making of an inadequate 
inspection of any property, real or personal, other than the property of the 
govemmental entity performing the inspection. 
Gross negligence is defined as "the doing or failing to do an act which a reasonable 
person in a similar situation and of similar responsibility would, with a minimum of 
contemplation, be inescapably drawn to recognize his or her duty to do or not do such act and 
that failing that duty shows deliberate indifference to the harmful consequences of others." I. C. § 
6-904C. Block adamantly disputes this Court's assertion that "[n)othing in the record before the 
Court establishes that the City acted with gross negligence." An examination of the foliowing 
facts demonstrates that genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether the City acted with 
gross negligence. 
1. Eric Hasenoehrl, a licensed professional civil engineer, testified that the City did not act 
reasonably in approving the subdivision plan for Canyon Greens knowing that a landslide 
had occurred previously in that same area. Eric Hasenoehrl Depo. 566:9-24. 
2. Mr. Hasenoelu·l also testified that the City acted with deliberate indifference to the 
harmful consequences of its action by approving the subdivisions. Eric Hasenoehrl Depo. 
567:6-24. 
3. Mr. Hasenoehrl also testified that the City acted with gross negligence by failing to warn 
Block and approving the subdivisions. Eric Hasenoehrl Depo. 568:1-25. 
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4. Mr. Hasenoehrl testified in his deposition that a licensed engineer working for the City of 
Lewiston has an obligation to bring forward those things that have potential hann and to 
take action so that the information is used and addressed in the future. Eric Hasenoehrl 
Depo. 462:8-22,472:1-5. 
5. Mr. Hasenoerhl also testified that the City should disclose every piece ofinfonnation that 
is necessary for the orderly and safe development of property. Eric Hasenoehrl Depo. 
480:20-25, 481:1. 
6. Chris Davies, a licensed professional engineer, and the current City Engineer, testified 
that if the City knows information it "should tell people about it. That's our job." Chris 
Davies Depo. 21:15-24. Mr. Davies also explained that ifhe had known about the Tim 
Richard Memorandum he would have passed it on to a potential developer. Chris Davies 
Depo. 20:3-11. 
7. John Smith the current City building official has testified that issuance of a residential 
building pennit on a lot unsuitable for development would be outside his authority and 
that he would "be negligent in [his] duty to issue a permit". John Smith Depo. 18:24-25, 
19:1-9. Mr. Smith further testified that he does not have authority to issue a residential 
building pennit for a lot that the City knows in within an area of landslide activity. John 
Smith Depo. 19:18-23. 
8. Shawn Stubbers, a licensed professional engineer, testified that the City in reviewing a 
subdivision has a duty to bring information forward to a developer. Shawn Stubbers 
Depo. 47:11-17. 
9. Fonner City Public Works Director Bud Van Stone testified that the placement of Tim 
Richard's memorandum into the SP No.4 files was done in the nonnal course of business 
so that the City would use such for future reference. Bud Van Stone Depo. 46:12-25, 
47:1-8. 
10. By failing to warn John Block at time of subdivision of Canyon Greens and Canyon 
Greens No. 2 and upon issuance of building pem1its for 153, 155 and 159 and the Canyon 
Greens No. 2 lots, the City acted unreasonably and failed to exercise reasonable care. It is 
part of City staff's job to review every single document that was relevant to a subdivision 
or re-subdivision. Bud Van Stone Depo. 52:4-9. 
11. If City staff failed to research every development, subdivision or re-subdivision 
submitted for approval then they "wouldn't have been doing their job[.]" Bud Van Stone 
Depo. 53:21-25, 54:1-3. 
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If this Court construes the facts most liberally in favor of Block, a trier of fact could 
conclude that the City had a duty to warn Block of the landslide and that by failing to wam 
Block that he was about to develop and construct residential housing on the site of a former 
landslide the City showed deliberate indifference to the risk of serious hann that could result 
from such actions. It is not within the province of this Court on a motion for summary judgment 
to take this factual determination out of the jury's hands. The Idaho Supreme Court addressed 
this issue inS. Griffin Const., Inc. v. City a_( Lewiston, 135 Idaho 181,16 P.3d 278 (2000) where 
it concluded that the district comi had ened by granting summary judgment on an issue of gross 
negligence because genuine issues of material fact existed. 
This Court's language stating that the "immunity language within this statute is broad 
enough to cover any claims of negligence which are based on issuance of building or other 
permits, approving subdivision plats, and inspecting or not inspecting the property at issue" is in 
enor given the Idaho Supreme Court's direction that such exceptions must be construed closely 
or narrowly rather than broadly. Rees, supra. In addition, this Court's language stating that the 
"burden is particularly high for Block," in regard to Block proving malice or criminal intent is 
disconcerting. Block has never alleged malice or c1iminal intent and further, any "burden" 
imposed by the ITCA should not be "particularly high" for a plaintiff injured by wrongful act of 
the govemment and/or its employees. Rather, any "burden" must be construed in favor of Block 
as set forth in the appropriate summary judgment standard of review. 
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Idaho Code§ 6-904(1) does not afford the City immunity for aU of Block's claims. 
Idaho Code§ 6-904(1) provides immunity from liability for a govemmenta1 entity and its 
employees while acting within the course and scope of their employment and without malice or 
criminal intent for any claim which: 
Arises out of any act or omission of an employee of the govemmental entity 
exercising ordinary care, in reliance upon or the execution or performance of a 
statutory or regulatory function, whether or not the statute or regulation be valid, 
or based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perfonn a 
discretionary function or duty on the part of a govemmental entity or employee 
thereof, whether or not the discretion be abused. 
The regulatory function and discretionary function clauses ofi.C. § 6-904(1) represent 
two different types of actions that might be ilmnune under the ITCA, but the same test applies to 
each. Rees, 143 Idaho at 20, 137 P.3d at 407. However, if a govemmenta1 employee fails to 
exercise ordinary care while carrying out either function then this exception would not afford 
immunity. Id. "Under Idaho law whether a government employee exercised ordinary care is 
normally a factual question best left to the jury." !d. 
The City failed to exercise ordinary care in carrying out its regulatory function or at a Il1inirnum 
there is a genuine issue of material fact whether the City failed to exercise ordinary care. 
The Subdivision Ordinance states, in part, in Section 32-9 that "in carrying out the 
purposes of the preapplication process, the subdivider and the city shall be responsible for the 
following actions: 
(1) Actions by the subdivider. The subdivider and/or his agents shall meet with 
the city at the preapplication conference ... 
(2) Actions by the city .... Inspect the site or otherwise determine its relationship 
to streets, utility systems, and adjacent land uses, and identify any unusual 
problems with regard to topography, utilities, flooding or other condition .... 
Review and discuss with the developer the potential need for special studies, 
which may include but are not limited to traffic, soil, slope stability, wetlands, 
foundations or other studies that may be required as a result of site conditions, 
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and the implications of the findings of those studies, if required. The 
requirement of said special studies shall be detennined by the city engineer. 
Lowell Cutshaw Depo., Exhibit 32. 
Tim Richards, a licensed professional engineer and fonner City Engineer has testified 
that when the City memorialized the 1999 landslide in two separate files the intent was that such 
information would be available at the time of future development. Tim Richards Depo. 44:8-12. 
In addition, Mr. Richards has testified that "[t]he files or the system was used by the city to pass 
along institutional knowledge." Tim Richards Depo. 34:11-16. Warren Watts, a licensed 
professional engineer has testified that the City has a duty to review records and files as pari of 
its subdivision process. WaiTen Watts Depo. 92:2-16. The City conducted a preapplication 
meeting with Block regarding CO. CITE. The City failed to search its records and locate the 
memorandums related to the landslide prior to attending this meeting and thereafter. CITE. In 
addition, Mr. Watts has testified that the City has a duty to warn or notify a developer of 
conditions or instability on property that the developer is planning to develop. Warren Watts 
Depo. 89:4-22. Eric Hasenoehrl, a licensed professional engineer has testified that at no time did 
the City notify or warn him of the information the City possessed in its files regarding the 
landslide in the area ofCG and C02. Affidavit ofEric Hasenoehrl p., ~.John Block, the 
Plaintiff, who developed CO and CG2 has testified that at no time did the City notify or warn 
him of the information the City possessed in its files regarding the landslide in the area of CO 
and C02. Affidavit of John Block p. , ~. Based on this evidence in the record there is certainly a 
genuine issue of material fact whether the City exercised ordinary care in conducting its 
regulatory functions. 
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The City failed to exercise ordinary care in carrying out its discretionary function or at a 
minimum there is a genuine issue of material fact whether the City failed to exercise ordinary 
care. 
A failure to warn is a decision made solely by an individual and "does not require an 
evaluation of financial, political, economic and social effects. \Vhile it is hopefully not a routine, 
everyday decision, it nevertheless involves the exercise of practical judgment and not planning or 
policy fonnation. Thus, the activity appears to be 'operational'." Brooks v. Logan, 127 Idaho 
484,488, 903 P.2d 73,77 (1995). See also, Hunter v. State, Dept. of Corrections, Div. of 
Probation & Parole, 138 Idaho 44, 57 P.3d 755 (2002) (The method in which the department 
warned the probationer's employer regarding his conviction did not involve consideration of 
financial, political, economic or social effects.) The City's failure to warn Block of the landslide 
was operational, just as in Brooks, the decision was made solely by individuals and did not 
require an evaluation of financial, political, economic and social effects. It involved practical 
judgment and not planning or policy formation. 
With respect to the issue of a geotechnical evaluation, although the primary decision to 
modify the Subdivision Code to allow the imposition of such a requirement is to be decided on a 
case-by-case basis, in this case, this issue could still result in the imposition of liability for the 
City's failure to exercise due care in the "operation stage" ofthis decision. See, e.g., October 4, 
1995, Idaho Attorney General Guidance to the Executive Director of PERSI. (In regard to PERSI 
investment decisions the attorney general stated "The investment decision is still afforded the 
'discretionary function' immunity, but the negligence in failing to exercise due care in the 
'operation stage,' i.e., not conducting a title search or obtaining title insurance, may result in 
liability.") This is analogous to the City's decision regarding a geotechnical evaluation in this 
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case. The City's negligence in failing to exercise due care in the 'operation state,' i.e., failing to 
review the specific infom1ation related to this particular site which would have indicated that the 
proposed development was on the site of a recorded landslide and then failing to require 
additional studies, including a geotechnical evaluation, should result in liability. There is 
certainly a question of fact whether doing these things was a failure to exercise due care in the 
"operation state''. Warren Watts, a licensed professional engineer has testified that the City 
should have required a geotechnical evaluation when the property was subdivided in 2005. 
Warren Watts. Depo. I 13:18-24. In addition, John "Hank" Swift a licensed professional 
geotechnical engineer has testified that the City had a duty to prevent development in the area of 
a landslide. Hank Swift Depo. (September 14, 2011) 228:15-17. 
This Court's analysis and application of I. C. § 6-904(1) makes the exceptions to liability set forth 
in I.C. §§ 6-904B (3) and (4) moot and is incorrect and overly broad. 
This Court states that: 
All of Block's claims against the City are based upon detem1inations made by city 
employees in the processes of approving subdivision plats or issuing building 
permits. These determinations are made in reliance upon or the execution of 
regulatory function. The actions of the City that Block complains of are those 
decisions which are contemplated within the ITCA as an exception to liability 
under the discretionary function exception. I. C. § 6-904(1 ). Thus, the City is 
shielded from liability on all ofBlock's claims and the Defendants' motion for 
summary judgment is therefore granted on this alternative basis. 
This Court should have construed the statutes to give effect to the intent of the legislature 
and give effect based on the whole act and every word therein, "lending substance and meaning 
to the provisions." Carrier v. Lake Pend Oreille School Dist., 142 Idaho 804, 134 P.3d 655 
(2006). 
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This Court's application of the exception to liability provided in Idaho Code & 6-904(7) was 
erroneous because that exception cannot apply to Block's failure to warn claim. 
Idaho Code § 6-904(7) provides i1mnunity from liability for a govemmental entity and its 
employees while acting within the course and scope of their employment and without malice or 
criminal intent for any claim which: 
Arises out of a plan or design for construction or improvement to the highways, 
roads, streets, bridges, or other public property where such plan or design is 
prepared in substantial conformance with engineering or design standards in 
effect at the time of preparation of the plan or design or approved in advance of 
the construction by the legislative body of the governmental entity or by some 
other body or administrative agency, exercising discretion by authority to give 
such approval. 
This Court states that the exceptions to liability provided in Idaho Code § 6-904(7) apply 
to Block's claim (vi). Order at 20. Claim (vi) states that the City and/or Cutshaw breached a duty 
of care by approving the plats of Canyon Greens and Canyon Greens No.2 without notifying 
and/or warning Block that earth movement had occurred on 153, 155 and 159 in 1999 and had 
not been eliminated or properly abated. Again, the Court interprets Block's claim too narrowly 
and interprets the exception to liability broadly in contrast to Idaho Supreme Court precedent. 
Block's claim (vi) is essentially a failure to warn claim. Block's claim is that the neither 
the City nor Cutshaw notified or warned him at any step along the way during the subdivision 
process related to Canyon Greens and Canyon Greens No. 2 and prior to their approval, that on 
such propetiy a landslide had previously occurred of which the City knew and had record of. 
In addition, the Court's statement that the "approval or denial of a subdivision plat is a 
public project that is analogous to the development ofhighways, roads, streets, or other public 
property" is incredible. Order at 21. By its plain language, the application of I. C. § 6-904(7) is 
restricted to "a plan or design for construction or improvement to the highways, roads, streets, 
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bridges, or other public property." Clearly, the Administrative Plat for Canyon Greens was not a 
plan or design for construction of highways, roads, streets, bridges or other public property. 
Keltic Engineering prepared the Administrative Plat for Canyon Greens which was accepted by 
the City of Lewiston and recorded on February 15, 2006. Hasenoehrl Affidavit July 13, 2010, 
p.~ 6. In accordance with the Subdivision Code Section 32-7, Administrative Plats have "no 
public improvements required, all property fronts upon an improved, publicly dedicated 
street[.]" Karl Ravencroft Affidavit. Canyon Greens was an Administrative Plat. Stubbers Depo. 
14:4-10. An engineered set of plans is not required for a subdivision, engineered sets of plans are 
required for utilities and roadways and major grading performed by the developer. Watts Depo. 
I 09:23-25, 110:1-3. 
Further, Black's Law Dictionary defines "public property" as "[s]tate-or community-
owned property not restricted to any one individual's use or possession." Black's Law 
Dictionary, 2nd Pocket Ed. at 564. Public property is exempt from taxation. Idaho Canst. Art. 
VII, § 4. There is no right to use public property for private purposes. Tyrolean Associates v. City 
o..f Ketchum, 100 Idaho 703, 604 P .2d 717 (1979). Former City Engineer, Tim Richards, testified 
that the property at issue was private property. Tim Richards Depo. 50:1-4. 
The plain language ofthis statute only provides immunity with regard to plans or designs 
for public projects (i.e., highways, roads, streets, bridges, or other public property). See, State v. 
1-!ammersley, 134 Idaho 816, 10 P3d 1285 (2000) (overruled on another point of law) ("Courts 
commonly construe statutory language by applying the legal maxim of noscitur a sociis, noting 
that a word is known by the company it keeps.") Idaho courts have considered this immunity in 
cases concerning public property. See Brown v. City of Pocatello, 148 Idaho 802, 229 P3d 1164 
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(201 0) (homeowner suffered damage from City road construction project and alleged negligent 
planning and design of a city road); Lawton v, City of Pocatello, 126 Idaho 454, 886 P2d 330 
(1994) (negligent design of a city street intersection); Morgan v. State, Dept. of Public Works, 
124 Idaho 658, 862 P2d 1080 (1993) (negligent design of state office building where a bHnd man 
sustained injuries when he stepped backwards offloading dock located in office building); 
Bingham v. Franklin County, 118 Idaho 318 (1990) (condition of public road). 
Therefore, Block respectfully requests that this Court reconsider and withdraw its finding 
that the exceptions to liability set forth in I. C. 6-904(7) apply to this case and in particular 
Block's claim (vi). 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court withdraw its 
Memorandum Opinion and Order on Second Motion for Summary Judgment and for the reasons 
set forth above, thereby issue a subsequent Order denying in full or in part the City's Second 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
DATED this 28th day of October, 2011. 
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